KUWAIT'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 003071

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR S/CT, EB/ESC/IEC, INR/EC, DS/ITA, NEA/ARP FOR
JACKSON
LONDON FOR TSOU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/30/2016
TAGS: PREL KCIP KU PTER EPET
SUBJECT: KUWAIT'S CRITICAL ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY
STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 110159


B. KUWAIT 4400

Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: On July 10, 19, and 23, EconOff met with
lead security officials from Kuwait National Petroleum
Company (KNPC),Kuwait Oil Company (KOC),and Oil Sector
Services Company (OSSC). EconOff conveyed the USG desire to
help Kuwait to secure its critical energy infrastructure and
requested an overview of security conditions and activities
at key sites in accordance with Ref A. All three officials
expressed their appreciation for the USG offer to assist, but
said that further security assessments were not their most
pressing need. The GOK and Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC)
have received numerous assessments and recommendations from
private-sector security contractors. Kuwaiti security
officials emphasized that security at critical sites had
become a clear priority receiving close attention from the
highest levels of KPC, the Ministry of Energy, and the
Ministry of Interior. They cited significant enhancements
that had been implemented in recent months, especially at the
critical Mina Al-Ahmadi facilities. These included improved
access control systems, installation of additional
surveillance equipment, and extension and reinforcement of
perimeter fencing. All three officials said the problems of
greatest concern are now vulnerability to attack from the sea
and poor dissemination of relevant, actionable intelligence
from the ministerial level down to the working level. The
officials from KOC and OSSC specifically asked if the USG
could use its influence with the GOK to facilitate
improvements in these areas. End Summary.


2. (S/NF) Comment: The rejection by these KPC officials of
USG offers of assessments and recommendations did not seem to
indicate intransigence or a fear of scrutiny. All three
officials seemed open in their responses and eager to
cooperate in moving forward. They showed an excellent
command of the key issues of concern and although EconOff met
with each official separately, their comments were remarkably
consistent. Maritime security and information sharing
clearly represent their areas of greatest concern and
frustration. End Comment.

GOK Acting on Recommendations from Previous Assessments
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3. (S/NF) EconOff met separately with KNPC Security Manager
Fahad Al-Dihani, KOC Security Manager Mohammed Al-Fodari, and
OSSC Deputy Chairman Ali Ahmed Al-Obaid on July 10, 19, and
23 respectively to discuss the points provided in ref A.
(Note: All three of these companies are subsidiaries of
Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC). KNPC is responsible for
refining and marketing in Kuwait and manages the Mina
Al-Ahmadi facilities; KOC is responsible for exploration and
production; OSSC has overall responsibility for security
across Kuwait's oil sector. End note.) All three security
chiefs expressed thanks for the offer of assistance and said
that in recent months significant progress has been made in
enhancing physical security of key infrastructure, especially
the Mina Al-Ahmadi location identified in Refs A and B as a
critical energy facility. Recent enhancements directly
respond to gaps identified in independent security
assessments conducted by British, American, and Australian
private-sector security contractors, including Global Village
Strategies and AustroConsult. Enhancements include
construction of triple-layered perimeter fencing, extension
of perimeter fencing 100 meters into the sea, expanded buffer
zones between installations and adjacent private and/or
public property, installation of CCTV cameras and motion
detectors, a much-improved badging and access system,
establishment of detailed emergency response plans, creation
of a centralized security control center, increased
patrolling, and an improved training and qualifications
system for oil sector security personnel. EconOff toured the
Al-Ahmadi perimeter and saw firsthand that a number of
previous deficiencies identified in ref B had been corrected.

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Overall, security officials said that coordination among all
the relevant parties was still insufficient but improving
significantly.

Stronger Progress and Coordination Driven from the Top
-------------- --------------


4. (S/NF) All three KPC security officials expressed
appreciation for the USG offer to assist with security
assessments but said that recent assessments conducted by
private-sector security contractors already provided a clear
and comprehensive picture of security deficiencies as well as
prioritized recommendations to address these deficiencies.
All were confident that KPC was making progress in
implementing the necessary solutions but said the gradual
reassignment of overarching oil sector security
responsibilities to OSSC was proceeding slowly. (Note: OSSC
was only established in August 2005 to assume overall
security responsibility for all of the KPC subsidiaries. End
note.) During the transition to full OSSC control, security
improvements are principally being driven by the Vital Oil
Installations Group (VOIG),headed by the Director General of
Kuwait State Security and comprised of representatives from
various GOK ministries and KPC. The VOIG reports to the
Council of Ministers on the security of oil infrastructure.
The KPC security officials said the VOIG had been highly
effective in forcing cooperation among government entities
and overcoming political obstacles to the implementation of
security enhancements. However, they emphasized that the
Kuwait Coast Guard was the one key stakeholder that had not
been adequately brought into the process.


5. (S/NF) Security officials recognized that there is still
much room for improvement in physical security, but said that
they now had much greater confidence than they did a year ago
that efforts to enhance security had been rationalized and
that the momentum for improvement was being driven from the
top down. They cited high-level involvement of the
Ministries of Interior and Energy in addition to the senior
leadership of KPC. KPC's training institute is now
graduating 100-150 security personnel every three months with
specific training in oil sector security. KPC security
recognized that large portions of the Kuwaiti oil sector
remain relatively vulnerable including pipelines, gathering
centers, tank farms, terminals, and offshore facilities.
However, they noted that critical, non-redundant facilities,
for which terrorist attacks could cause the greatest supply
disruption, were properly being addressed first.

Greatest Weaknesses: Maritime Interdiction, Intel Sharing
-------------- --------------


6. (S/NF) According to these security officials, the most
significant gaps in security are now vulnerability to attack
from the sea and inadequate dissemination of relevant
intelligence and threat information. They suggested that the
USG could be most helpful by sharing intelligence and threat
information with KPC directly or by using its influence with
the GOK to improve the flow of relevant intelligence from the
Ministerial level to the working level. All three also said
the problem with maritime security was not surveillance and
detection, but enforcement and interdiction. They said the
installation of radar and sonar systems and the establishment
of a maritime exclusion zone allow security personnel to
recognize potential seaborne threats but the Coast Guard
fails to provide a ready and robust capability to intercept
and/or neutralize these threats once they are identified.
Deputy Director Al-Obaid of OSSC suggested this could be
remedied by having the MOI establish a corps of Oil Sector
Marine Security personnel who would be seconded to KPC for
training, management, and operational control. (Note: The
Deputy Director has not yet forwarded this proposal through
official channels. End note.) Maritime security
responsibilities currently rest with the Kuwait Coast Guard
which, according to KPC, lacks the resources, the capability,
and the will to play an effective role.


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For more Embassy Kuwait reporting, see:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Or Visit Embassy Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
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TUELLER