Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT2953
2006-07-23 15:34:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

KIMMITT/ZELIKOW VISIT TO KUWAIT: GOK LEADERSHIP

Tags:  PREL PGOV EAID KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8675
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #2953/01 2041534
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 231534Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5900
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL IMMEDIATE
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 002953 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/I, AND C; LONDON FOR TSOU; PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS
SUBJECT: KIMMITT/ZELIKOW VISIT TO KUWAIT: GOK LEADERSHIP
SUPPORTS IRAQ COMPACT; BLAMES HIZBALLAH FOR LEBANON CRISIS

REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 211527Z JUL 06

B. KUWAIT 2898

Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 002953

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/I, AND C; LONDON FOR TSOU; PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV EAID KU KUWAIT IRAQ RELATIONS
SUBJECT: KIMMITT/ZELIKOW VISIT TO KUWAIT: GOK LEADERSHIP
SUPPORTS IRAQ COMPACT; BLAMES HIZBALLAH FOR LEBANON CRISIS

REF: A. WHITE HOUSE 211527Z JUL 06

B. KUWAIT 2898

Classified By: CDA Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: Treasury Deputy Secretary Kimmitt and
State Department Counselor Zelikow, during a July 22 visit,
briefed Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh Sabah, Deputy PM and FM Shaykh
Dr. Mohammed, Finance Minister Bader Al-Humaidhi, Fawzi
Al-Hunaif of the Kuwait Fund, and Director General of the
Arab Fund Abdul Latif Al-Hamad (septel) on the Iraq Compact
and sought GOK support for Iraq's economic reform. Kuwaiti
officials welcomed the Compact commenting that clear
guidelines and expectations would facilitate international
support to Iraq and speed its economic recovery. As the
meeting closed, the Amir quietly added, "the money will not
be a problem. We are concerned about stability." The Amir
also spoke at length on the need for Iraqis to assume more
responsibility for security and acknowledge their need for
American help. On Lebanon, GOK officials blamed Hizballah,
with support from Iran and to a lesser extent Syria, for the
current crisis and expressed hoped that the Secretary's visit
to the region would lead to an immediate solution. The Amir
informed the delegation of Kuwaiti humanitarian assistance to
the Lebanese people and called for opening more corridors for
the speedy delivery of relief supplies. FM Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed, in a separate meeting, was less optimistic about
immediate prospects for resolving the crisis. End Summary.



2. (C/NF) Deputy Secretary Kimmitt opened his hour-long
July 22 meeting with Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber
Al-Sabah by offering the President's greetings and informing
the Amir how much the President looked forward to his
September visit. DepSec Kimmitt told the Amir he last
visited Kuwait in 1991 following the Iraqi invasion and
occupation and was pleased to see that since that time, peace
and prosperity have reigned in Kuwait. He regretted that

other parts of the region were in crisis and welcomed
Kuwait's interest in and commitment to reversing the
situation. He restated U.S. engagement in the region and
advised the Amir that the Secretary, accompanied by Counselor
Zelikow, would travel to the region on July 23 to address the
Israeli-Lebanese conflict.

Iraq Compact Key to Economic Reform and Stability
-------------- --------------


3. (S/NF) Turning to a more immediate concern for Kuwait,
DepSec Kimmitt stressed the importance of international
support to help Iraq complete its transition to a stable,
peaceful country. Commenting on his recent visit to Baghdad,
he explained that Iraqi Prime Minister Maliki was focusing on
three initiatives to help turn Iraq around: security,
national reconciliation, and the Iraq Compact for economic
reform. Iraq will identify benchmarks for its economic
performance and seek international support, under UN
leadership, to help it meet its targets. He said that Maliki
would travel to the UK, the U.S., and the UN in the coming
week to launch the Compact, and technical work had begun on
the Compact with a goal to sign the final Compact in the
fall. DepSec Kimmitt expressed appreciation for GOK support
for Iraq's reform, said the U.S. looked forward to working
with Kuwait on this and other initiatives, and delivered a
copy of a POTUS letter to that effect (ref A).

GOK Welcomes Compact, Notes Previous Frustration on Aid
-------------- --------------


4. (C/NF) Shaykh Sabah responded that despite what the
former Iraqi Government did to Kuwait, the GOK has always
considered the Iraqi people victims and felt an obligation to
"liberate" them. He reviewed Kuwaiti assistance to Iraq,
citing a $60 million grant for school and hospital
assistance, and $500 million in reconstruction loans at an
interest rate of 1.5 percent. Complaining that the GOI has
not yet spent any of the money, he asserted Iraq needed
stability and security not more aid. He further claimed
militias were selling oil and said Iraq had adequate natural
resources -- oil, gas, water, arable land -- but needed to
better manage them.


5. (S/NF) Following the meeting with the Amir, DepSec
Kimmitt accompanied by Counselor Zelikow and CDA, had a
thirty-minute side meeting with Foreign Minister Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed Al-Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah. Kimmitt briefed the FM

KUWAIT 00002953 002 OF 004


on the timeline for the Iraq Compact and on the work already
done by the GOI and others to establish the commitments the
Iraqis would make in order to receive international support.
Kimmitt stressed the importance of having a strong
demonstration of support from the Gulf Arab countries. The
FM said that this was exactly the way he had advised GOI DPM
Barham Saleh to proceed and he was encouraged to hear that
the Compact would constitute a binding agreement to force the
GOI to make the tough decisions that needed to be made. The
GOK had grown frustrated at competing and conflicting
requests for assistance from a parade of Iraqi ministers and
individuals with unclear motives and agendas. Committing the
GOI to a reform program would be an important step forward.



6. (S/NF) DepSec Kimmitt thanked the Minister for Kuwait's
willingness to send a representative to the cancelled Iraq
Compact steering group meeting (the GOK had been prepared to
send Ambassador-designate Gen (ret) Ali Mu'min and Dr. Nabil
Jafer Abdul Rahim of the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic
Development). He asked if the FM had any insights into Saudi
reluctance to accept the Iraqi invitation. Shaykh Dr.
Mohammed said that Iraqi insistence on holding the meeting in
Baghdad had not gone down well with the SAG. He confessed he
himself had doubts about the wisdom of the Baghdad venue and
asked if it would not be better to hold the steering group
meeting on the sidelines of UNGA, or in some other more
accessible location. DepSec Kimmitt said the Baghdad
location was an Iraqi decision and that it sent a powerful
signal of international confidence in the new government.
Counselor Zelikow noted that the USG had been prepared to
provide full transportation and security support to
delegations in order to support the GOI desire to hold the
meeting in Baghdad. Shaykh Dr. Mohammed said that you would
get a certain level of representation in Baghdad, but not
necessarily senior-level.


7. (C/NF) In an earlier meeting with Finance Minister Bader
Al-Humaidhi and Kuwait Fund Director of Operations Fawzi
Al-Hunaif, DepSec Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow reviewed in
greater detail the concept for the Iraq Compact, laid out a
timeline for critical steps, and encouraged the active
participation of the GOK as a member of the core group.
DepSec Kimmitt expressed confidence in the Iraqi team led by
DPM Saleh and said the Iraqis were "off to a strong start" on
their macroeconomic fundamentals, establishing stand-by
agreements with the IMF, building sufficient foreign
reserves, establishing control of government finances,
stabilizing the dinar, and beginning to address the problems
of corruption and inflation.


8. (C/NF) FinMin Al-Humaidhi's initial concerns were related
to security. He said that although the GOK had all the
requisite technical expertise and financial resources to
support development efforts, he did not see how it was
possible to implement projects in Iraq given the present lack
of security. DepSec Kimmitt responded that within the
International Zone, the security environment was difficult
but acceptable and that the UN had successfully implemented a
number of projects outside the IZ. Like the FM, Al-Humaidhi
complained that with each successive change of Government in
Iraq, GOI priorities for reconstruction changed to reflect
the particular sectarian or tribal interests of those in key
posts and that the GOK had yet to receive any official
correspondence from the GOI on specific aid projects. DepSec
Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow explained that the very purpose
of creating the Compact was to establish a strategic list of
priorities and detailed plans that the GOI would be compelled
to adhere to by the international community. DepSec Kimmitt
also explained that the first order of business would be to
create an effective and equitable structure for the oil
sector to be embodied in an oil/gas law.

No Movement on Debt but Supportive of Reconstruction
-------------- --------------


9. (C/NF) When asked by DepSec Kimmitt if the GOK needed any
assistance on the issue of Iraqi debt, the Finance Minister
tersely responded that he had no need for further technical
information or analysis. He said all matters regarding Iraqi
debt to Kuwait were well documented and available in the
public domain. When asked if he had any deeper political
concerns, the Minister responded, "Unfortunately, things are
moving very slowly in Iraq." He said that Kuwait had a
strong interest in a secure, stable, and economically viable
Iraq, but reiterated his concerns over the dominance of

KUWAIT 00002953 003 OF 004


sectarian interests. The Minister emphasized that the GOK
does not discriminate among sects in its approach to aid,
citing Kuwaiti support to Shi'a communities following violent
incidents in Kerbala and Najaf. The FinMin concluded that
Regional Institutions should also play a lead role in
reconstruction, referring to the Arab Fund and the Inter-Arab
Investment Guarantee Corporation, both resident in Kuwait.

Amir on U.S. Military: Pull Back, But Don't Pull Out
-------------- --------------


10. (S/NF) The Amir also used his meeting with DepSec
Kimmitt to propose giving the Iraqi Government more
responsibility as one way of promoting stability. In his
view, the U.S. has made some mistakes over the past three
years -- the Saddam Hussein trial in which his defense team
has "polished and prepared him for a new role," and the
dissolution of the army, for example -- and is now mistakenly
viewed as an occupation force and part of the problem. By
backing off and allowing greater autonomy in the Baghdad
area, as has been done in the north and the south, Iraqis
would have to assume greater authority which would help to
ferret out insurgent forces and quell Iraqi-on-Iraqi
violence. He stressed the importance of developing the Iraqi
army and police forces and urged the U.S. to continue to play
a consultative role.


11. (S/NF) DepSec Kimmitt agreed that it was essential for
Iraqis to assume a greater leadership role and advised the
Amir that the military had responded well to training and was
steadily playing an enhanced role on security issues. Rear
Admiral Moeller noted that training of Iraqi police forces
also continued, but had been hampered by corruption, poor
leadership, and a lack of accountability. Under new
leadership in the Ministry of Interior, progress was
expected. DepSec Kimmitt asserted that economic reform would
help to improve the security situation and the Compact was
part of this effort. It was important for the Iraqi
Government to establish reform priorities, to pay for what it
could, and to make clear to the international community where
it needed help. Strict adherence to such a plan would help
Iraq to progress using its abundant resources and the talent
and energy of the Iraqi people. Success would also attract
private sector investment. Responding to the Amir's
suggestion that Iraqis should have to ask the U.S. to remain,
so they would stop referring to U.S. troops as occupiers,
DepSec Kimmitt and Counselor Zelikow said PM Maliki had made
clear his desire for U.S. support. In fact, PM Maliki and
other Iraqi officials tended to be more worried that the U.S.
would withdraw its forces too soon.

Blame Hizballah and Iran, Not the Lebanese Government
-------------- --------------


12. (S/NF) Turning to Lebanon, the Amir said he had told
Energy Secretary Bodman and Commerce Secretary Gutierrez that
Lebanon's only problem was Hassan Nasrallah (ref B),who bore
responsibility for the recent destruction of Lebanon. He
accused Hizballah of only being concerned about Hizballah
and, unlike Israel, would not seriously consider talks about
releasing the kidnapped soldiers, amending the
Lebanese-Israeli borders, or a European troop presence. He
asserted the GOL should not be blamed for what Hizballah has
done with the support of Iran and Syria. He expressed
concern about Iran's role in Lebanon and said the future for
Lebanon would be clearer after August 22 when Iran is
expected to respond to the P5 1 incentive package. DepSec
Kimmitt agreed with the Amir's views on Iranian involvement
saying Iran does not want stability and security and it was
incumbent on the international community to counter the GOI.
He told the Amir the overriding goals for Lebanon were to
resolve the current crisis, rebuild Lebanon, and put it on a
path toward stability. The Amir seconded the need for an
urgent solution to the crisis and hoped the Secretary's visit
would be productive. Restating Kuwaiti concern for the
Lebanese people, he informed the delegation that Kuwait was
prepared to assist the GOL with infrastructure reconstruction
and had also donated $20 million in humanitarian assistance,
although he was concerned about the existing humanitarian
corridors. He said Cyprus was too far away, causing delays
in the provision of needed supplies, and recommended a
corridor through Syria with the GOL checking supplies.
Counselor Zelikow welcomed Kuwait's humanitarian support to
Lebanon and advised the Amir that for security reasons, using
Syria was problematic.


KUWAIT 00002953 004 OF 004



13. (S/NF) In response to the FM,s question, during the
side meeting Counselor Zelikow ran through expectations and
agenda for the Rome meeting on Lebanon. He summarized the
outcome that most parties wanted to see as "saving Lebanon
while defeating Hizballah." Shaykh Dr. Mohammed said that
the current crisis in Lebanon was expediting the inevitable
-- a showdown between the legitimate government of Lebanon
and Hizballah. He said he was not optimistic about the
outcome. Lebanon was going to go through real turmoil.
Hizballah was deeply entrenched with a constituency not
limited to Shi,a in the south. The Foreign Minister
concluded with the observation that it was a daunting task
for Lebanon to organize itself in the face of Hizballah and
allow legitimate authority to emerge on top.

Support Abu Mazen
--------------


14. (C/NF) The Amir further noted his disappointment with
developments in Palestinian areas. He stated that Abu Mazen
is ready to negotiate with Israel, but was prevented from
doing so. He urged the U.S. to support Abu Mazen, suggesting
that a high-level visit could be a "confidence-booster."

Meeting Participants
--------------


15. (U) U.S. Delegation:

-- Robert Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of Treasury
-- Philip Zelikow, Counselor of the State Department
-- Rear Admiral Robert Moeller, CENTCOM
-- Evangelia Bouzis, NSC Director for Iraq
-- J. Alexander Monsarrat, State Department
-- Vickie Alvo, Department of Treasury
-- CDA Matthew H. Tueller, Embassy Kuwait
-- Natalie E. Brown, Embassy Kuwait (notetaker)
-- Steve Conlon, Embassy Kuwait (notetaker)


16. (U) While in Kuwait, the delegation, in three separate
meetings, met:

-- Kuwaiti Amir Shaykh Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Jaber Al-Sabah
-- Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Shakyh Dr.
Mohammed Al-Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah
-- Finance Minister Bader Al-Humaidhi
-- Shaykh Nasser Sabah Al-Ahmed Al-Sabah, Minister of Amiri
Diwan Affairs
-- Fawzi Al-Hunaif, Director of Operations, Kuwait Fund for
Arab Economic Development


17. (U) This cable was cleared by DepSec Kimmitt and
Counselor Zelikow.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
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