Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT2394
2006-06-19 14:31:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN

pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3493
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #2394/01 1701431
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191431Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5279
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002394 

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN
KUWAITI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: A. KUWAIT 2271 - THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY
FRIEND: SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO
REFORM UNITES POLITICAL OPPOSITES

B. KUWAIT 2150 - FREEDOM AGENDA: GRASSROOTS REFORM
MOVEMENT BLOSSOMS IN KUWAIT'S ORANGE
MOVEMENT

C. KUWAIT 2148 - FREEDOM AGENDA AND JUNE 29
ELECTIONS: PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY
PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVISM

D. KUWAIT 1638 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART II

E. KUWAIT 1637 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART I

F. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE
VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN
AT "AMERICAN DIWANIYA"

G. 05 KUWAIT 4993 - FREEDOM AGENDA: NOW SHOWING AT
EMBASSY KUWAIT: USING FILM TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 002394

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KISL KU FREEDOM AGENDA ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: FREEDOM AGENDA: IMPLICATIONS OF ISLAMIST GAINS IN
KUWAITI PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

REF: A. KUWAIT 2271 - THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY
FRIEND: SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO
REFORM UNITES POLITICAL OPPOSITES

B. KUWAIT 2150 - FREEDOM AGENDA: GRASSROOTS REFORM
MOVEMENT BLOSSOMS IN KUWAIT'S ORANGE
MOVEMENT

C. KUWAIT 2148 - FREEDOM AGENDA AND JUNE 29
ELECTIONS: PROGRESS ON REFORM DEFINED BY
PARTICIPATION AND ACTIVISM

D. KUWAIT 1638 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART II

E. KUWAIT 1637 - UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD'S POLITICAL WING: THE
ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT PART I

F. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE
VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN
AT "AMERICAN DIWANIYA"

G. 05 KUWAIT 4993 - FREEDOM AGENDA: NOW SHOWING AT
EMBASSY KUWAIT: USING FILM TO PROMOTE
DEMOCRATIC AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Matthew H. Tueller
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (S/NF) Summary: There is a strong possibility that the
Kuwaiti Parliament elected on June 29 will include more
Islamist members than the previous one. Islamists are
well-organized and poised to capitalize on the women's vote.
While there are legitimate concerns about the impact this
would have on U.S. interests, a more Islamist Parliament
should not be viewed as a major setback for our Freedom
Agenda. First, Islamists are unlikely to gain a majority in
Parliament (33 seats),without which they will be unable to
advance their conservative social agenda. With its 16
Ministers and strong bloc of pro-Government MPs, the
Government will still be able to control what legislation is
approved by Parliament. Second, although they generally
cooperate in Parliament and during elections, Kuwaiti
Islamists are not a monolithic bloc. Even if more Islamist
MPs are elected, there are important differences between
Islamist groups in Kuwait; some are far less hostile to U.S.

interests than others. Third, the election of more Islamist
MPs could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait.
Islamists in the now dissolved Parliament strongly supported
electoral reform and are likely to continue pushing for a
reduction to five constituencies in the next Parliament.
Without Islamist support, this and other important political
reforms have little chance of being implemented. End summary.

Increase in Islamist MPs Likely
--------------


2. (S/NF) There are several reasons to believe that there
will be more Islamist members in the next Parliament. First,
Islamists are poised to benefit most from the participation
of women in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Islamists
are well-organized and enjoy the support of a strong,
conservative base whose female members are likely to vote for
male Islamist candidates. Second, Islamist MPs in the
previous Parliament were quick to join liberal MPs in
supporting electoral reform. Islamist candidates are likely
to capitalize on their support for reform to attract more
moderate voters (ref A). Third, regional events have
contributed to a growing conservatism in Kuwaiti society,
leading some Kuwaitis to support Islamist candidates whom
they believe will protect Kuwait's conservative culture.
Finally, the short campaign period benefits Islamists who are
better organized and better funded than other political
groups.


3. (S/NF) According to Post's rough estimate, out of the 96
candidates who have a good chance of being elected to the 50
open seats, 41 are Islamists or supported by Islamists,
including two Shi'a Islamist candidates; 40 are
Government-leaning; 8 are liberal; and 7 are independents.
(Note: There were 15 Sunni Islamist MPs in the
recently-dissolved Parliament. End note.) Although there
are differences between Islamist candidates, Islamist groups
are pooling their resources in an effort to increase overall
Islamist representation in Parliament. The 56 candidates
believed to genuinely support political reform include all 41
of the Islamists from our short-list of strongest candidates.


The Spectrum of Islamists in Kuwait
--------------


4. (S/NF) Though they often cooperate in Parliament and

KUWAIT 00002394 002 OF 003


during elections, Kuwaiti Islamists are not a monolithic
bloc. There is a great degree of variety between Kuwait's
different Islamist groups, whose political ideologies range
from pragmatic and open, to extremist and vehemently
anti-American. (Note: For a brief overview of Kuwait's
Islamist, Shi'a, and liberal political blocs, see our
classified website: http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/.
End note.) The Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM),the
political arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, is one of
the most vocal advocates of political reform in Kuwait and
strongly supported recent proposals to reduce the number of
electoral constituencies, seen as crucial to limiting
electoral corruption (refs D and E). The two ICM MPs in the
recently-dissolved Parliament also set a precedent in January
by disclosing their financial records, an example no other MP
followed. Other Islamist groups, like the Salafi Movement
and the Ummah (Nation's) Party, similarly support political
reform, which they believe will increase their political
influence. In the previous Parliament, Islamist MPs
cooperated through the 14-member Islamic Bloc, which showed
some signs of division earlier in the year.


5. (S/NF) The main difference between Kuwaiti Islamist
groups is in how pragmatic they are in pursuing their
objectives and the degree of animosity they have against the
West. Salafis are generally uncompromising in their policies
and strongly anti-American or anti-Western in their rhetoric,
though in private meetings some can be friendly and engaging
while differing with U.S. policies. The ICM, on the other
hand, is extremely pragmatic and, while critical of U.S.
policies, supportive of a dialogue with the U.S. on regional
issues. Despite their criticisms, few Kuwaiti Islamists
actively advocate the departure of U.S. troops from Kuwait or
Iraq. Indeed, Kuwaiti Islamists often have to justify their
toleration, and even support, for the extensive U.S. presence
in the country to their regional counterparts. In addition,
many tribal candidates with conservative leanings are
supported by Islamist groups, but are ultimately beholden to
their tribes rather than a pan-Islamist ideology. When
analyzing the results of the elections, therefore, a
distinction should be made between the Islamist MPs elected:
the election of more Salafis could be seen as a setback for
our freedom agenda, whereas the election of more pragmatic
Islamists, like ICM members, would be less worrisome to U.S.
security and strategic interests.

Issues of Concern
--------------


6. (S/NF) The one issue almost all Kuwaiti Islamists agree
on is the need to fully "Islamize" Kuwaiti legislation by
amending Article 2 of the constitution to make Islamic
Shari'a "the source of legislation," rather than "a main
source." In order to amend the constitution, however,
Islamists would need the support of 44 out of the 65 members
of Parliament. With the Government controlling 16 of these
seats, obtaining the necessary two-thirds majority would be
practically impossible. (Note: The Prime Minister is
required to appoint one elected MP as a Minister, meaning
there are always 49 elected MPs and 16 Government Ministers,
who serve as ex officio MPs, in Parliament. End note.) In
addition, the Amir retains the right to exercise his
constitutional right to dissolve Parliament and call new
elections if the Islamists push this issue, which is unlikely.


7. (S/NF) The greater concern is that Islamist MPs would
push a conservative social agenda and/or block important
legislation, like the $500 million pledged by the Kuwaiti
government to aid victims of hurricane Katrina. Islamist MPs
could also obstruct passage of a U.S.-Kuwait free trade
agreement that included a provision requiring Kuwait to end
its economic boycott of Israel. In addition, Islamists might
advocate increasing Kuwaiti assistance to the
Hamas-controlled Palestinian Authority, revising Kuwait's
educational curricula to bring it more in line with their
conservative values, or introduce other legislation inimical
to U.S. interests. One must keep in mind, however, that
Islamists are unlikely to win a majority in Parliament (33
seats) and that the Government is still likely to have a
clear majority capable of blocking conservative social
legislation and passing legislation it supports. It is also
important to note that Kuwaiti parliamentarians have an
extremely limited ability to shape foreign policy, which is
considered the sole purview of the Government. If anything,
the Islamists are likely to be just a vocal opposition, but
not a real threat to the Government.

No Political Reform Without Islamists
--------------

KUWAIT 00002394 003 OF 003




8. (S/NF) Ironically, the election of more Islamist MPs
could increase the chance for political reform in Kuwait.
All 14 members of the Islamic Bloc in the previous Parliament
were also part of the 29 MP "orange" bloc whose insistence on
grilling the Prime Minister unless the Government adopted
five constituencies led the Amir to dissolve Parliament.
Since the number of liberal and truly independent MPs is
likely to remain unchanged or even decline, the greatest
chance for the number of pro-reform MPs to increase is for
more Islamist candidates to be elected. This explains some
liberals' support for Islamists despite their ideological
differences (ref A). On the other hand, some liberal
contacts question Islamists' sincerity (ref C),arguing that
Islamists' support for political reform is based purely on
the calculation that it will increase their political power.
Unfortunately, this may be true; but without Islamist
support, these reforms are not likely to be implemented in
the first place.

Next Steps
--------------


9. (S/NF) Post will continue to attend the election
diwaniyas of candidates from all political backgrounds,
paying close attention to the rhetoric and support of
Islamist candidates and noting any significant differences
between them. We will also continue to seek constructive
ways to engage Islamists through events like American
diwaniyas (ref F) and movie nights (ref G),as well as
occasionally nominating moderate Islamists for IVP or
MEPI-funded programs focusing on political reform, as
suggested in post's report on the ICM (refs D and E). In
reporting on the influence of Islamists in Kuwait, we will
focus on analyzing both the similarities and differences
between Kuwaiti Islamist groups, the alliances that emerge
between them, and any potential threats to U.S. interests
that emerge from their increased representation in
Parliament.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
TUELLER