PROPOSED JANUARY 24 VOTE ON AMIR-DESIGNATE'S

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KUWAIT 000208

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARPI, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU,
PARIS FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/22/2015
TAGS: PGOV PREL KU SUCCESSION
SUBJECT: PROPOSED JANUARY 24 VOTE ON AMIR-DESIGNATE'S
HEALTH; DISSOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT RUMORED POSSIBLE

REF: A. KUWAIT 200


B. KUWAIT 184 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: DCM Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: The leadership situation in Kuwait is in
continual flux with one National Assembly session scheduled
for January 24 at 10am to vote on declaring Amir-designate
Shaykh Saad Al-Salem medically unfit for office, and another
session scheduled for 6:30pm the same day to allow Shaykh
Saad to take the constitutionally-mandated Amiri oath. If
the two-thirds of Parliament (44 votes) needed to declare the
Amir medically unfit is obtained, as is rumored likely, the
second session will automatically be negated. Though
unlikely, some suggest Shaykh Saad could dissolve Parliament
prior to the morning session. The ruling family rift is
primarily between leading members of the Al-Jaber and
Al-Salem branches (ref A). The majority of Al-Sabah family
members support Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah (Jaber) becoming
Amir, but a vocal minority led by National Guard Chief Shaykh
Salem Al-Ali (Salem),Shaykh Mohammed Al-Khaled (Hamad),and
Shaykh Saud Al-Nasser (non-Mubarak descendant) are resisting
Shaykh Saad's replacement. Shaykh Salem Al-Ali, long an
ardent critic of Jaber domination of political power, is
likely holding out for key ministerial portfolios before
agreeing to a compromise deal. While Kuwaitis are
disappointed (and embarrassed) by the current situation, no
one expects the controversy to escalate beyond bitter
Al-Sabah infighting. The bright spot in the current
controversy is the prevalence of open public debate about the
country's leadership and the commitment to following
constitutional procedures. End summary.

The Players
--------------


2. (C) The current leadership controversy is primarily
between the Al-Sabah's leading Shaykhs, though some have
suggested several younger Shaykhs are exacerbating the
situation (ref A). Prime Minister Shaykh Sabah, the de facto
ruler of Kuwait for the past five years, is supported by the
majority of the ruling family and is widely expected to
prevail in the current dispute. On January 20, 60 leading
Al-Sabah family members attended a meeting at the Prime
Minister's private residence to express their support for his
leadership (ref B). In addition to leading Al-Jabers like
the Ministers of Interior, Defense, and Energy, a number of
prominent Al-Salems were also present, including Foreign
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed and two of Shaykh Salem Al-Ali's
sons. Shaykh Sabah supports a close U.S.-Kuwait strategic
relationship, and is generally considered as pro- economic
and political reform, albeit at a relatively slow pace.


3. (C) Leading the opposition to Shaykh Sabah is National
Guard Chief Shaykh Salem Al-Ali, who provoked a national
controversy and indirectly criticized the Prime Minister in
October 2005 when he called for the creation of a
three-member committee to "assist the leadership" of the
country. The most senior member of the Al-Salem branch,
Shaykh Salem Al-Ali has long agitated against Jaber
domination of political power. He is extremely rich, but is
known to be somewhat of a miser. Also opposing Shaykh Sabah
are Shaykh Mohammed Al-Khaled from the Hamad branch, who was
replaced as Interior Minister when Shaykh Sabah became Prime
Minister in 2003, and Shaykh Saud Al-Nasser Al-Sabah (not a
descendant of Mubarak Al-Kabir),formerly Minister of Oil,
Minister of Information, and Kuwaiti Ambassador to the U.S.
(Note: One of Shaykh Saud's sons is an Assistant
Undersecretary in the Prime Minister's office. End note.)

As Family Negotiations Fail...
--------------


4. (C) Negotiations between senior family members on
succession appear to have stalled. Last minute mediation
efforts on January 22 by a delegation of Al-Sabah family
members, which included family heavyweights such as Interior
Minister Shaykh Nawaf Al-Ahmed (Jaber),Foreign Minister
Shaykh Dr. Mohammed (Salem),Shaykh Mubarak Al-Abdullah
(Jaber),and Chairman of the National Committee on Missing
and POW Affairs Shaykh Salem Al-Sabah (Salem),to reach an
agreement with Shaykh Salem Al-Ali - believed to be the power
behind Shaykh Saad - failed when Shaykh Salem Al-Ali left in
the middle of the meeting. Some sources say Shaykh Salem
Al-Ali is demanding any resolution include agreement on
ministerial portfolios, as well as the positions of Amir,
Crown Prince, and Prime Minister.


5. (C) Sources report that senior Jaber members Prime

KUWAIT 00000208 002 OF 002


Minister Shaykh Sabah and Shaykh Mubarak Al-Ahmed met with
Shaykh Salem Al-Ali the evening of January 22 to negotiate a
compromise. Shaykh Salem Al-Ali proposed two deals. In one,
Shaykh Saad would be allowed to take the Amiri oath, then
depart the country for medical treatment, appointing Shaykh
Sabah Crown Prince and deputizing him as Amir before he left;
Shaykh Sabah would also be allowed to retain the Prime
Minister position. In exchange, Shaykh Salem Al-Ali demanded
the Ministries of Defense, Interior, and Energy for his
picks. In the alternative deal, Shaykh Saad would step down,
allowing Shaykh Sabah to become Amir in return for Foreign
Minister Shaykh Dr. Mohammed becoming both Crown Prince and
Prime Minister. Shaykh Sabah reportedly rejected both of
these proposals. (Note: During the January 20 meeting at
Shaykh Sabah's residence, family members reportedly agreed on
an arrangement whereby Shaykh Sabah would become Amir, Shaykh
Dr. Mohammed would become Crown Prince, and Interior Minister
Shaykh Nawaf would become Prime Minister. End note.)

...Kuwait Turns to Parliament
--------------


6. (C) In a meeting with Shaykh Saad on January 22, National
Assembly Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi agreed to hold a special
parliamentary session allowing Shaykh Saad to take the
constitutionally mandated Amiri oath at 6:30pm on Tuesday,
January 24. The Cabinet, proceeding on a separate track, has
scheduled (with parliamentary support) a National Assembly
session at 10am the same day to vote on activating Article 3
of the Succession Law to declare Shaykh Saad medically unfit
to be Amir. If two-thirds of Parliament (44 votes) vote for
the activation, as is rumored likely, the Amiri oath-taking
session would automatically be canceled. Some contacts
speculate, however, that as a last resort Shaykh Saad (or
those acting on his behalf) could move to dissolve Parliament
before the 10am session. (Comment: Such a move is highly
unlikely. The image-conscious Kuwaitis do not want to be
viewed in the region or globally as not being able to resolve
the succession issue when other countries in the region have
successfully managed the transition of power following the
death of their leaders. End comment.)


7. (C) Given the breakdown in negotiations, sources say the
Cabinet has no choice but to proceed with activation of
Article 3. If Shaykh Saad is removed, the Cabinet can
nominate a new Amir, who must be approved by a majority vote
(33 votes) in Parliament. It is unclear, however, what would
happen if the two-thirds majority (44 votes) needed to remove
Shaykh Saad was not obtained. Local media reported that
National Assembly Speaker Jassem Al-Khorafi met 33 MPs on
January 22 to discuss the parliamentary reaction to the
contradictory requests it has received. Sources report
Al-Khorafi and a majority of MPs prefer voting to activate
Article 3 prior to the special oath-taking session.

Political Precedence
--------------


8. (C) While Kuwaitis are nervous (and embarrassed) by the
leadership crisis, no one expects the situation to escalate
beyond the bitter infighting within the ruling family.
Regardless of the outcome, U.S. interests and the
U.S.-Kuwaiti bilateral relationship are unlikely to be
significantly affected. Ironically, the leadership crisis
may inadvertently set a precedence for parliamentary
involvement in choosing the Amir, which could have a
long-term impact on political reform in Kuwait.

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