Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUWAIT1638
2006-05-09 10:54:00
SECRET//NOFORN
Embassy Kuwait
Cable title:  

UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S

Tags:  PGOV PINR KDEM KISL KU ISLAMISTS 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8192
PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHMOS RUEHPW
DE RUEHKU #1638/01 1291054
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 091054Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4359
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 KUWAIT 001638

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS
FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2026
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S
POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, PART II

REF: A. KUWAIT 1057 - MFA UNDERSECRETARY DESCRIBES VISIT
OF HAMAS LEADER

B. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE
VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN

C. KUWAIT 661 - KUWAIT SHI'A AND SUNNI CONDEMN IRAQ
SHRINE BOMBING SOME BLAME U.S.

D. KUWAIT 467 - AMIR APPROVES NEW CABINET: SHI'A
AND ICM GAIN

E. 05 KUWAIT 4313 - FREEDOM AGENDA: MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD SPOKESMAN SAYS ORGANIZATION
COMMITTED TO WORKING WITHIN POLITICAL
SYSTEM

F. 05 KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC
RECITATION: THE ISLAMIST INFLUENCE IN
KUWAIT'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PART II

G. 05 KUWAIT 656 - ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF
A GROWING INFLUENTIAL FORCE

H. 04 KUWAIT 1274 - NEW ICM LEADERS STRIVE FOR
MAINSTREAM

I. 04 KUWAIT 495 - KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE OPENS UP TO
OFAC

J. 03 KUWAIT 3536 - POLITICAL ISLAM WORKING GROUP:
KUWAIT SNAPSHOT

K. 03 KUWAIT 3217 - DEFEATED ISLAMIST OFFERS VIEWS
ON KUWAITI POLITICS

L. 91 KUWAIT 2068 - KUWAIT'S PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS:
SKETCH OF THE ICM

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) This is Part II of a two-part message (see Kuwait 1637
for Part I). Part II covers the Islamic Constitutional
Movement's (ICM) policy positions, funding, and publications.
It also outlines Kuwaiti liberals' views on the ICM and
concludes by recommending limited engagement with the
organization on shared political objectives. Part I
addressed the ICM's origins, influence, structure, and
connection to the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood (KMB).

Policy Positions: Politically Liberal...
--------------


19. (C) The ICM is one of the most vocal advocates of
political reform in Kuwait. In particular, the organization
has actively lobbied for a reduction in the number of

electoral constituencies, official Government recognition of
political parties, stronger anti-corruption measures, a
reduction in the voting age from 21 to 18, police and
military suffrage, and a rotation of power by allowing
Parliament to choose the Prime Minister. ICM leaders insist
they are "firmly committed" to working within Kuwait's
democratic system to achieve their political objectives, even
if it means being voted out of office. "We have to accept
what the majority wants, even if it differs from our views,"
MP Nasser Al-Sane told Poloff, pointing to the KMB's "long
history of political cooperation in Kuwait." In an effort to
increase transparency and limit corruption at the national
level, ICM MPs Al-Sane and Mohammed Al-Basiri took the
unprecedented step of providing their complete personal and
family financial records to Parliament in January; no other
MPs followed suit.


20. (C) ICM leaders strongly condemn terrorist violence,
specifically in Iraq and Kuwait, though they are notably
silent on Palestinian violence against Israel. Secretary
General Dr. Bader Al-Nashi told Poloff the ICM was working
with leading Sunni clerics on a statement condemning
terrorism. (Note: In 2003, the UN listed Lajnat Al-Daawa
Al-Islamiyya (LDI) - a Kuwait-based NGO affiliated with the
Social Reform Society (SRS),the social wing of the KMB - as
a terrorist-supporting organization and some 1.4 million KD
(approximately $4.5 million) of the NGO's assets were frozen.
The ICM has vehemently denied any involvement, even remotely
through any of its affiliate organizations, in terrorist
financing activities. End note.)


21. (C) The ICM supported the U.S.-led liberation of Iraq,
but now has some concerns about Sunni exclusion from, and
Iranian influence on, the nascent Iraqi government, according
to Al-Nashi. Despite their criticisms of specific U.S.
policies, ICM leaders like Al-Dallal are quick to point out,
"While we may disagree with the U.S. on certain issues that
will not stop us from cooperating or entering into treaties
with the USG."


22. (C) On Iran, Al-Nashi told Poloff the ICM supported a
nuclear-free Middle East and opposed both Iran's and Israel's
nuclear program. Dr. Hamad Al-Matar, a Chemical Science

KUWAIT 00001638 002 OF 005


professor and an ICM member of the younger, more moderate
persuasion, recently asked Poloff for information
highlighting Iran's poor technological safeguards and
inability to adequately protect its nuclear facilities to use
during a televised interview on the potential environmental
impact of Iran's nuclear program on Kuwait.


23. (C) The ICM is also very pragmatic in its relations with
Kuwait's Shi'a community. (Note: Approximately one third of
Kuwaiti citizens are Shi'a. End note.) The ICM has
coordinated positions on parliamentary issues with Shi'a
political associations, and strongly condemned sectarian
violence in Iraq, such as the bombing of the Shi'a shrine in
Samarra (ref C). According to Al-Dallal, the ICM is even
developing a plan to incorporate non-KMB members into the
ICM, starting with other Sunnis and gradually moving to also
include Shi'a.


24. (C) The ICM's position on economic issues is less
specific. Its leaders say they support "reforming the
economic system of the State," though they offer few
particulars. MPs Al-Basiri and Al-Sane voted for legislation
permitting foreigners to own and trade Kuwaiti stocks, a
draft law to protect intellectual property rights, and a
direct foreign investment law. Al-Sane also voted for an
anti-money laundering law; Al-Basiri was absent. In December
2005, Al-Nashi said the ICM would oppose Project Kuwait, an
estimated $8.5 billion plan to develop Kuwait's northern oil
fields, in its current form, without explaining what changes
the ICM proposed.

...But Socially Conservative
--------------


25. (C) While forward-looking on most political and economic
issues, the ICM is decidedly more conservative on social
issues. As an organization, the ICM did not support granting
women full political rights; both ICM MPs voted against the
legislation, which Parliament approved in May 2005. Most ICM
leaders claim, however, they personally supported the
legislation, but were overruled by the ICM's conservative
base in a close internal vote on the issue.


26. (C) Despite its initial opposition, the ICM has now
fully embraced women's suffrage and is now actively courting
the women's vote. The organization is still divided,
however, on women holding political office and is unlikely to
support any female candidates in the 2007 parliamentary
elections. In a recent interview, Al-Nashi claimed women's
electoral participation would "assist the movement (ICM) in
achieving positive results." He concluded that "the ICM is
very optimistic about women's participation in the next
elections."

Staunchly Pro-Palestinian
--------------


27. (C) The ICM is staunchly pro-Palestinian and often
criticizes U.S. support for Israel (see paras 33 to 35).
According to one local press report, the organization
supports an "anti-normalization law with Israel." Hamas
leader Khaled Al-Mishal was hosted by former ICM MP Mubarak
Al-Duwaileh at his diwaniya during Al-Mishal's recent visit
to Kuwait (ref A).

Shari'a: A Contentious Issue
--------------


28. (C) One of the ICM's most important, and contentious,
political objectives is the implementation of Islamic
Shari'a, a goal its leaders claim is not contradictory to the
organization's commitment to democracy and political
pluralism. Specifically, the ICM supports the amendment of
Article 2 of the Kuwaiti Constitution, which states that "the
religion of the State is Islam, and the Islamic Shari'a shall
be a main source of legislation," to read "the source of
legislation." Al-Dallal explained this was necessary to
institutionalize the GOK's commitment to implementing Islamic
Shari'a by ensuring all legislation passed by Parliament,
regardless of which group controlled it, would have to be
approved by a Shari'a committee before implementation.
Elaborating, Al-Dallal said certain issues like the
prohibition of alcohol and homosexuality, and inheritance law
favoring male heirs were non-negotiable under Shari'a, but
others like strict punishments for stealing, adultery, and
conversion were subject to interpretation and revision.


29. (C) Al-Nashi told Poloff that Shari'a was "a grouping of

KUWAIT 00001638 003 OF 005


laws whose interpretation can change over time." He
stressed, however, that the adoption and implementation of
these laws should only be achieved through Parliament.
According to Al-Dallal, the ICM is "in the process of
reassessing (its) ideology and policies," including its
support for amending Article 2. Al-Nashi argued similarly in
a recent interview that political participation would lead
Islamist groups like the ICM to be more realistic and
pragmatic.

Funding: No Double Dipping
--------------


30. (S) ICM leaders claim the organization's routine
political activities and publications are funded through
monthly "ICM" dues. Campaigns are funded by candidates, ICM
donations, and sponsors who provide money for specific events
like campaign dinners. Al-Nashi explained that the
organization does not have an official budget or produce an
annual expense report since political parties are prohibited
in Kuwait. The ICM recently created an investment fund
specifically earmarked to pay for its future political
activities, Al-Dallal reported. Al-Dallal reported
unspecified charity organizations used to partially fund ICM
activities, but that due to increased scrutiny and stricter
auditing procedures, funds were no longer being raised this
way. Both Al-Nashi and Al-Dallal insisted the ICM did not
receive or provide money from/to Muslim Brotherhood branches
outside of Kuwait. (Note: According to one local press
report, the Egyptian government complained to the GOK that
the KMB provided "at least $10 million" to the Egyptian MB
during the recent elections. We were unable to shed any
light on this accusation. End note.)

What They Say to Everyone Else
--------------


31. (U) In addition to its website (www.icmkw.org),the ICM
publishes a weekly newspaper entitled Al-Haraka. Recent
issues featured articles by local and regional authors,
including women and at least one Shi'a, on a wide range of
subjects, such as regional efforts to combat youth drug use,
private sector job opportunities, educational reform,
instilling Islamic values in young people, junior traders'
influence on the Kuwait Stock Exchange, electoral reform,
women's political participation, and Palestinian internal
politics.


32. (U) In an article published in the April 10 edition of
Al-Haraka, MP Al-Sane argued that rampant corruption in Arab
countries was caused by the absence of democracy. In another
article in the same issue, a female board member of the
Kuwait Teachers, Society, which is allegedly dominated by
the KMB (ref F),praised the rising number of women writing
in local dailies, but argued that this was "not sufficient as
we are still in dire need for committed women's voices in
this domain." An article in the March 27 edition addressed
the obstacles to women being elected in the 2007
parliamentary elections; outlined measures that could be
implemented to improve their chances, such as a quota system;
and concluded, "We say to all: help the women!" An article
in the March 20 edition reported neutrally on a Kuwaiti
conference on women and human rights organized by liberal
MPs, the main objectives of which were to "spread the culture
of human rights," share human rights experience with
"neighboring countries," and "confirm the role of women in
social development."


33. (U) Articles on regional issues are generally critical
of U.S. policy in the region, specifically U.S. support for
Israel. One April 10 article reported on a statement issued
by participants in a recent conference in Cairo entitled "For
Resistance in Palestine and Iraq against American and Zionist
Occupation," which called for "adopting resistance as the
sole option for the peoples of the world to counter the
American and Zionist aggression and to combat the corruption
and despotism of the rulers of states that have chosen
subservience and submission to American policies." (Note:
Written by an Egyptian author, the article did not
specifically endorse or condemn the statement. End note.)


34. (SBU) Three columnists in Al-Haraka are particularly
vehement in their criticisms of the U.S.: Adel Al-Qasser, an
Islamist; Dr. Sami Khalifa, a conservative Shi'a; and Issa
Majed Al-Shaheen, a former ICM Spokesman. In a March 27
article entitled "American-Iranian Cooperation," Al-Shaheen
argued that possible U.S.-Iranian dialogue on Iraq was the
result of regional developments, such as "the exposure of the

KUWAIT 00001638 004 OF 005


American role in funding and training the sectarian death
squads" of the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. He further
criticized the "confusion and carelessness" of U.S. policy in
the region, especially "giving Iran a critical role in Iraq";
U.S. willingness to "divide Iraq into mini-states to weaken
(it) as a future threat to the Zionist entity"; and, U.S.
involvement in "igniting sectarian conflicts to menace the
social fabric of the region." Dr. Khalifa's and Al-Qasser's
articles are similarly critical of U.S. policy, particularly
towards Israel. All three columnists also regularly write
similar articles for local Arabic dailies.


35. (SBU) The SRS also publishes a weekly entitled
Al-Mujtima, which features articles written by both Kuwaiti
and non-Kuwaiti authors and tends to be much more critical of
the U.S. The "In Brief" section of the March 25-30 edition
reported that "supporting Hamas and backing it economically
and politically would represent backing the Palestinian cause
versus the expansionist Zionist scheme that menaces the
future of the region." The author of an "Opinion" article in
the same edition noted that the "fourth anniversary of
(Iraq's) foreign occupation...coincided with the mounting by
American troops of a barbaric campaign against the Samarra
region and its people under the pretext of resisting terror."
The article continued: "Iraq has become over the past three
years a vulnerable entity under foreign occupation, open to
Zionist penetration, espionage, sabotage, and attempts at
Christianization." Another article by an Egyptian author,
Dr. Jamal Nasser, commemorated the death of Hamas spiritual
leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin, praising him for "awakening the
nation" and "instilling in it the spirit of jihad." He
concluded, "Undoubtedly, the martyrdom of Shaykh Ahmed will
push the Arabs towards solidarity to protect their homelands
against this (unspecified) brutal monster."

Liberals Advise Cautious Approach to ICM
--------------


36. (C) Many liberal Kuwaitis acknowledge that political
reforms will primarily benefit the Islamists, at least in the
short-run, but advise a cautious approach to Islamist
organizations like the ICM. Ahmed Deyain, a columnist and an
astute political analyst, downplayed the ICM's popular
support. Comparing the ICM to a "deflated balloon," Deyain
claimed the organization was "no longer the most important
political power in Kuwait." Other groups, like the more
conservative Salafis, were rising in its place, he said.
Deyain noted that while increasingly pragmatic the ICM was
also "opportunistic," and cautioned that "they are still
Islamists" and support conservative social policies.


37. (C) Haila Al-Mekaimi a political science professor at
KU, echoed this view, cautioning that the ICM's substantial
political influence did not necessarily reflect widespread
popular support. She pointed out that the group failed to
win KU's Faculty Elections, despite the general impression
that the university is dominated by the KMB. Al-Mekaimi also
noted that many non-conservative students participated in
KMB-dominated student groups without sharing the KMB's
ideology. Dr. Ahmed Al-Baghdadi, a columnist and retired KU
political science professor, told Poloff that the KMB, which
he characterized as "the evil face of Islam," wanted to
"control Kuwait both socially and politically." Decrying the
Government's "co-optation" of the KMB, Al-Baghdadi blamed
what he saw as growing conservatism in education and the
media on the KMB's influence.


38. (C) Dr. Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb, a liberal sociology
professor at KU, claimed Islamists like the KMB were
exploiting Arab disillusionment with Western liberal
democracy and U.S. policy for political gain. Although he
warned that the KMB was "not at all democratic," Al-Naqeeb
believed (somewhat contradictorily) that the KMB was
nonetheless very pragmatic and politically opportunistic,
willing to discard its ideologically-influenced policy
positions, like support for amending Article 2 of the
Constitution, when politically expedient. He noted that the
KMB never openly challenged the ruling Al-Sabah family and
always worked within the political system to achieve its
objectives. Al-Naqeeb believed the organization's more
moderate, pragmatic elements were stronger than its
conservative tribal base and that, ultimately, the KMB was
"not a threat" to democracy in Kuwait. Both Al-Naqeeb and
Al-Baghdadi predicted the ICM would make significant gains in
the 2007 parliamentary elections.


39. (C) Kuwaiti liberals reacted strongly to the recent
statement by the SRS calling on the Government to amend

KUWAIT 00001638 005 OF 005


Article 2 of the Constitution. Many accused the SRS of
wanting to "turn Kuwait into a Taliban state." Former
Minister of Oil Ali Al-Baghli, a Shi'a, argued that adopting
Shari'a would restrict the freedoms currently enjoyed by
Kuwaitis. Dr. Ayad Al-Mana, an advisor to the Kuwait
Journalists, Association, accused the SRS of merely trying
to gain popular support.

Engaging the ICM by Challenging Its Moderate Credentials
-------------- --------------


40. (S/NF) While there are legitimate concerns about the
ICM's positions on certain issues, these should not obstruct
constructive USG engagement with the organization to promote
political reform. Specifically, in tandem with our efforts
to support Kuwaiti liberal activists, occasionally nominating
moderate ICM's members for appropriately themed International
Visitor and MEPI-funded programs, such as "Grassroots
Democracy," "U.S. Legislative Elections," "U.S. Foreign
Policy and Human Rights," or American University's Summer
Institute on Democracy and Elections, would help ICM members
better understand U.S. policy positions and give U.S.
officials an opportunity to more thoroughly assess the ICM's
commitment to democratic governance. Such participation
would also be a direct challenge to the ICM to moderate some
of its conservative social positions and could potentially
contribute to the further marginalization of the ICM's more
conservative elements. Additionally, the Embassy can
continue its efforts to dialogue with Islamist organizations
through "American diwaniyas" (ref B),movie nights, and other
representational events.


41. (S/NF) Of Kuwait's four established Islamist political
associations, the ICM is the most moderate and poised to
benefit most from continued democratic reforms. The other
three - the Traditional Salafis, the Scientific Salafis, and
the Ummah (Nation's) Party (also Salafi) - are much more
vitriolic in their criticisms of the U.S. and Israel and
hard-line in their positions on social issues like women's
rights and religious freedom. Absent measured engagement
with moderate ICM members, the U.S. risks promoting political
reform without engaging the political associations likely to
benefit most if the reforms are implemented. Other political
associations are not as organized and influential as the
Islamists, and less likely to be able to take full advantage
of the reforms. Kuwait's Shi'a community is fragmented
politically, and lacks well-organized political groupings, a
cohesive political agenda, and appeal among the non-Shi'a
population. Kuwait's liberal political associations, largely
relics of the Arab nationalist movements popular here in the
1960s and 1970s, are similarly divided and lack strong public
support.

********************************************* *
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s

Visit Kuwait's Classified Website:
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/
********************************************* *
LEBARON