UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 001637

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NOFORN
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STATE FOR NEA/ARP, NSC FOR RAMCHAND, LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS
FOR ZEYA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/08/2026
TAGS: PGOV PINR KDEM KISL KU ISLAMISTS
SUBJECT: UNDERSTANDING THE KUWAITI MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD'S
POLITICAL WING: THE ISLAMIC CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, PART I

REF: A. KUWAIT 1057 - MFA UNDERSECRETARY DESCRIBES VISIT
OF HAMAS LEADER

B. KUWAIT 995 - FREEDOM AGENDA: ISLAMISTS SHARE
VIEWS ON ELECTORAL REFORM IRAQ AND IRAN

C. KUWAIT 661 - KUWAIT SHI'A AND SUNNI CONDEMN IRAQ
SHRINE BOMBING SOME BLAME U.S.

D. KUWAIT 467 - AMIR APPROVES NEW CABINET: SHI'A
AND ICM GAIN

E. 05 KUWAIT 4313 - FREEDOM AGENDA: MUSLIM
BROTHERHOOD SPOKESMAN SAYS ORGANIZATION
COMMITTED TO WORKING WITHIN POLITICAL
SYSTEM

F. 05 KUWAIT 3266 - READING WRITING AND QUR'ANIC
RECITATION: THE ISLAMIST INFLUENCE IN
KUWAIT'S EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM PART II

G. 05 KUWAIT 656 - ISLAMISTS IN KUWAIT: CONTOURS OF
A GROWING INFLUENTIAL FORCE

H. 04 KUWAIT 1274 - NEW ICM LEADERS STRIVE FOR
MAINSTREAM

I. 04 KUWAIT 495 - KUWAIT FINANCE HOUSE OPENS UP TO
OFAC

J. 03 KUWAIT 3536 - POLITICAL ISLAM WORKING GROUP:
KUWAIT SNAPSHOT

K. 03 KUWAIT 3217 - DEFEATED ISLAMIST OFFERS VIEWS
ON KUWAITI POLITICS

L. 91 KUWAIT 2068 - KUWAIT'S PRO-DEMOCRACY GROUPS:
SKETCH OF THE ICM

Classified By: Ambassador Richard LeBaron for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

(C) This is Part I of a two-part cable. Part I deals with
the origins of the Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM),its
political influence and popular support, its structure and
leadership, and the relationship between the ICM and the
Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood (KMB). Part II addresses the
ICM's policies and publications, and the potential for
limited USG engagement with the organization to promote
political reform in Kuwait.


1. (C) Introduction and Summary: The Islamic Constitutional
Movement (Al-Haraka Al-Dusturi Al-Islamiyya),the political
arm of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, is one of, if not the,
largest and most influential political associations in
Kuwait. (Note: The Government does not officially recognize
political parties. End note.) As the country begins to
slowly implement political reforms, the ICM will play an
increasingly important role in Kuwait's political life. This
cable, based on numerous conversations with ICM leaders and
members, and Kuwaiti political analysts, examines the ICM's
origin, organizational structure, affiliation with the Muslim
Brotherhood, policies, and, ultimately, potential as a
pro-reform partner.


2. (C) After a crushing electoral defeat in 2003, the ICM
reorganized, emerging with a new, younger leadership and a
reformist agenda (ref H). Since then, ICM leaders claim the
organization's popularity and political influence has
increased. Highlighting this growing influence, one of the
ICM's top leaders, Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti, was appointed
Minister of Communications in the recently-formed Cabinet
(ref D). Today, the ICM is one of the most vocal advocates
of political reform in Kuwait. However, with respect to USG
interests, our concerns center on the organization's support
for very conservative social policies, such as the
implementation of Islamic Shari'a; its criticisms of U.S.
policy towards Israel; and its connection to the Muslim
Brotherhood.


3. (S/NF) While these concerns should not be overlooked,
neither should they be overblown. It is important to
recognize that the ICM's commitment to democracy appears
genuine: the ICM, and previously the KMB, has participated in
Kuwaiti politics peacefully for decades. Many of the ICM's
social policies are more representative of the organization's
conservative tribal base than they are of MB ideology. The
notable exception is Islamic Shari'a which remains a
contentious issue, but not one that should obstruct
constructive U.S. engagement with the ICM. In tandem with
our support for Kuwaiti liberals, occasionally nominating
moderate ICM members for IVP and MEPI-funded programs
focusing on political reform would expose them to the USG's
vision for democratic reform in Kuwait and the region, help
us better understand the organization and social objectives
of the ICM and KMB, and hopefully further marginalize the
ICM's more conservative "old guard." The alternative is to
promote political reform here without engaging the political
associations that may benefit most if these reforms are
implemented. Liberal and Shi'a political associations are

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not as organized and popular as the Islamists, and the
increasingly influential (Islamist) Salafi associations are
more reactionary and less compromising than the ICM. End
summary and introduction.

Origins of the ICM
--------------


4. (C) The ICM was established as an independent, uniquely
Kuwaiti political movement on March 30, 1991 by members of
the KMB disillusioned by the international Muslim
Brotherhood's (IMB) tacit support for Iraq's invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990 (refs H and L). (Note: The Muslim
Brotherhood (Jamiyyat Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimeen),founded in
Egypt in 1928 by Hassan Al-Banna, has branches in roughly 70
countries. End note.) The ICM grew out of the Social Reform
Society (SRS),a KMB-affiliated Islamic charity that still
exists. The SRS was created in 1961 as a reconstituted
version of the Islamic Guidance Society (IGS),the original
MB organization in Kuwait. The IGS was established in the
early 1950s by Abdul Aziz Al-Ali Al-Mutawa, the brother of
the current SRS chairman and KMB spiritual mentor, Abdullah
Al-Ali Al-Mutawa, but lost influence in the staunchly Arab
nationalist Kuwait after the IMB supported an attack on
Egyptian President Gamel Abdul Nasser in 1956. It was
finally closed in 1959.


5. (C) Initially, the SRS focused primarily on promoting its
conservative social agenda. The organization lobbied
successfully for the segregation of male and female students
at Kuwait University and the prohibition of alcohol in
Kuwait. Recruiting heavily among students, the SRS came to
dominate the influential National Union of Kuwait Students
(NUKS) and Kuwait University's Student Union, organizations
the KMB continues to dominate. Gradually, the SRS's
political influence also grew, particularly in the mid-1970s
when the Government increased support for Islamist groups to
balance the influence of Arab nationalists. Members of the
SRS were included in the new Cabinet created after the Amir
dissolved Parliament in 1976, and concessions were made to
allow the organization more influence in zakat (religious
tax) collection and Islamic banking, specifically in Kuwait's
first Islamic bank, the Kuwait Finance House (KFH),
established in 1977. This rising influence led to the
election of two SRS members in the 1981 parliamentary
elections. In successive Parliaments, the organization
expanded its political influence, though it increasingly had
to compete with Salafi groups for support among Islamists and
Kuwait's conservative tribes.


6. (C) The KMB reputedly split with the IMB after the Iraqi
invasion, resulting in part in the establishment of the ICM.
The ICM became the "political wing" of the KMB, and the SRS
its "social wing." Through much of the 1990s, the ICM
enjoyed strong political support and was represented in every
Parliament. In the 2003 elections, however, the group
suffered a crushing defeat, losing three of its five
parliamentary seats. Prompted by its poor performance, the
ICM dramatically altered its organizational structure,
elected new, younger leaders, and adopted a "reform" agenda
(ref H).

Influential, But How Popular?
--------------


7. (S) The ICM wields considerable political influence, as
evidenced by the appointment of Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti, the
head of the ICM's Ideological and Civilization Dialogue (i.e.
Foreign Relations) Office, as Minister of Communications in
the new Cabinet formed in February (ref D). It is more
difficult, however, to determine the organization's popular
support. Since the Government does not recognize political
parties, there is no official party registration and ICM
leaders refuse to "guess" the number of ICM members. Some
observers claim the ICM "dominates" the country, having
substantial support in government ministries, academia, and
the financial sector. These estimates are likely overblown.


8. (C) Of the 13 ICM-supported candidates who ran in the
2003 parliamentary elections, including five incumbents, only
Dr. Nasser Al-Sane and Mohammed Al-Basiri were re-elected,
receiving 920 and 2,108 votes, respectively. This poor
performance suggests the group's popular support is not as
substantial as some claim. ICM officials argue, however,
that elections are not indicative of the organization's true
support due to Government manipulation of electoral outcomes.
One credible liberal Kuwaiti political analyst estimated the
number of ICM members to be "several hundred, but less than

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500," plus a much larger, and unspecified, number of
"supporters." One influential younger Al-Sabah recently told
the Ambassador he believed the ICM had 27,000 members, though
it was not clear if he made any distinction between the ICM
and the KMB. The organization has 100 members who hold
official positions, a likely indication that its base is
substantially larger. The ICM is not known to be represented
on the 16-member (six appointed and ten elected) Municipal
Council.

The ICM's Organizational Structure and Leadership
-------------- --------------


9. (C) After its electoral defeat in 2003, the ICM
drastically restructured, creating a 70-member General
Assembly in addition to its 21-member General Secretariat and
nine-member Executive Secretariat (also called the Political
Office). General Assembly members, including fifteen women,
elect members of the General Secretariat, which in turn
choose members of the Executive Secretariat. The General
Secretariat, which includes three women, meets monthly and

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the Executive Secretariat weekly. According to ICM
officials, this re-organization was intended in part to
prepare the organization to become an official political
party, once permitted by the Government.


10. (C) The ICM also overhauled its leadership, replacing
its older, more conservative leaders with younger, more
"moderate" members. Today, the ICM leadership includes
Secretary General Dr. Bader Al-Nashi (46),Official Spokesman

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Mohammed Al-Elaim (46),and Assistant Secretary General MP
Dr. Nasser Al-Sane (51),who also serves as President of the
Arab Organization of Parliamentarians against Corruption and
Vice President of International Parliamentarians against
Corruption, a Canada-based NGO.


11. (C) In addition, the ICM has seven offices that assist
the Executive Secretariat: the Political Relations Office
headed by Mohammed Al-Dallal (41); the Ideological and
Civilizational Dialogue Office headed by Dr. Ismail Al-Shatti
(56) (Note: Al-Shatti told Poloff this is the "Foreign
Relations Office," but the ICM cannot adopt that name without
provoking the Government. End note.); the Parliamentary
Affairs Office headed by MP Mohammed Al-Basiri (51); the
Women's Affairs Office headed by a woman, Suad Al-Jarallah;
the Developmental Programs Office headed by MP Dr. Nasser
Al-Sane; the Electoral Constituencies Office headed by Nasser
Al-Khaldi; and the Public Relations and Media Office headed
by Musaed Al-Thafiri.


12. (C) Key policy positions, like the decision to oppose
women's suffrage, are determined by a General Assembly vote
and then referred to the General and Executive Secretariats
for approval. More routine decisions are made by the
Secretariats. ICM leaders claim all decisions are made

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internally by the ICM, not the IMB. On more controversial
issues, the ICM engages both Kuwaiti and regional experts to
prepare studies and provide advice to better inform members
before a general vote.


13. (C) In Parliament, the ICM operates primarily through
the 13-member Islamic Bloc, a loose alliance of Islamist MPs
that cooperates on certain legislation. MP Al-Sane said the
ICM also coordinated with other parliamentary blocs when they
supported ICM policies. In a recent interview, Al-Nashi said
the ICM would support only nine candidates in the 2007
parliamentary elections to consolidate its electoral support.



14. (S) ICM leaders and liberal political analysts alike
note that there is a conflict within the ICM between the more
conservative "old guard" who led the organization up to 2003
and the new leadership, which while still socially
conservative is far more pragmatic and "moderate" (on the
Islamist scale). Asked who was winning the internal debate,
one young, "moderate" ICM member said, "We are," but
acknowledged there was still opposition within the ICM's
conservative base to certain reforms. ICM members who
regularly criticize the U.S. and advocate the most
conservative social policies come largely from this weakened,
but still influential "old guard."

Relationship between ICM and KMB
--------------


15. (S/NF) According to ICM Political Relations Director
Mohammed Al-Dallal (strictly protect),the ICM and the KMB
are "the same thing": ICM members are all Muslim Brothers,

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but not necessarily vice-versa. Al-Dallal explained that
neighborhood KMB committees voted for members of the ICM's
General Assembly. When pressed, Al-Dallal admitted the KMB
kept a precise database of its members by neighborhood, but
refused to give a number or say how many were also members of
the ICM; he casually mentioned 200 and 500 as examples of the
number of KMB members per neighborhood, but did not say
whether these were actual figures nor did he give the total
number of neighborhood committees. Although they have
separate leadership structures, the KMB exerts some
(undetermined) degree of authority over the ICM.


16. (S/NF) Al-Dallal told Poloff that the KMB is a "secret
organization" and, except for its leading personalities, its
members are kept secret. Candidates for membership must be
"referred" by someone who is already a member: generally, a
relative, friend, or teacher. Al-Dallal explained that the
referral process includes writing a report on the candidate's
loyalty, character, and trustworthiness, which is reviewed by
KMB leaders before acceptance and initiation. Al-Dallal
joined the KMB when he was 17-years-old after being recruited
in a student group and spending "more than a year visiting
their mosques and diwaniyas." He later became involved in
the ICM through Kuwait University's Student Union (KUSU);
Al-Dallal was twice elected KUSU President.


17. (S/NF) Support for the ICM comes mainly from students
and "conservatives," here incorporating both socially
conservative tribal elements and religiously conservative
Muslims (i.e. Islamists). ICM members are drawn from the
KMB, which recruits young people through student unions and
SRS-sponsored spring and summer camps, featuring "boy scout
like-activities" and Islamic-themed lectures. The KMB is
also rumored to have close connections to Kuwait's Islamic
financial community, specifically the Kuwait Finance House
(KFH),whose advisory board, according to one report (ref I),
includes several former SRS officials.


18. (S/NF) The exact organizational relationship between the
KMB and the IMB is unclear. According to ICM leaders, the
KMB's relationship with the IMB has been "frozen" since 1990.
They explain that the KMB is "a separate entity," which
shares a common ideology, "cooperates informally" with other
branches of the IMB on charitable activities, and
participates in some IMB-organized conferences and seminars,
but is not subordinate to the IMB's leadership. As proof of
their independence, ICM leaders note that the ICM voted to
oppose women's suffrage legislation despite being strongly
encouraged by other IMB branches, notably in Jordan and
Egypt, to support the legislation. Nonetheless, Al-Dallal
claimed the IMB was "the most active organization in the
Gulf," especially the Kuwaiti branch due to the degree of
freedom permitted in Kuwait.

End of Part I.

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