Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KUALALUMPUR2041
2006-11-01 08:38:00
SECRET
Embassy Kuala Lumpur
Cable title:  

SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY

Tags:  MARR MASS MCAP MOPS OVIP PREL PTER MY 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHKL #2041/01 3050838
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 010838Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7890
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA IMMEDIATE 2216
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA IMMEDIATE 1570
S E C R E T KUALA LUMPUR 002041 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP MOPS OVIP PREL PTER MY
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HILLEN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER J. LAFLEUR, REASONS 1.4 b, d.

Summary
-------

S E C R E T KUALA LUMPUR 002041

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MTS, PM/RSAT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS MCAP MOPS OVIP PREL PTER MY
SUBJECT: SCENE SETTER FOR THE VISIT OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY
HILLEN

Classified By: AMBASSADOR CHRISTOPHER J. LAFLEUR, REASONS 1.4 b, d.

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Malaysian-American relations rest on an impressive
range of economic exchanges and have improved significantly
in other areas as well over the three years of Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi's tenure. This moderate Muslim-majority
state is our tenth-largest trading partner worldwide.
Although Malaysia is not a treaty ally, we have increasingly
strong military-military and counter-terrorism cooperation.
In international affairs, Malaysia strongly opposed us on the
Iraq invasion and more recently on our stance on Israel's use
of force in Lebanon. However, Malaysia has stepped forward
to offer troops for the UN force in Lebanon and continues to
contribute to peacekeeping operations in places such as East
Timor. While Malaysia often takes positions opposing our own
in the UN, Prime Minister Abdullah has met regularly with
President Bush and has developed a useful dialog on Muslim
world relations with the West. Abdullah promotes a moderate
vision of Islam and Malaysia has worked to defuse ethnic
conflicts involving Muslims in the Philippines and elsewhere
in Southeast Asia. We hope your visit will further
strengthen the mil-mil ties between Malaysia and the U.S.,
recognize Malaysia's continued contribution to international
peacekeeping, encourage Malaysia's participation in
multilateral counterterrorism efforts, and promote Malaysia's
support for non-proliferation regimes and eventual
participation in PSI.

Political/Economic Landscape
--------------


2. (C) Malaysia has been a difficult political partner in
the past. Malaysians nurse strong anti-colonial sentiments,
are fiercely portective of their sovereignty and (among the
Malay majority) hold some resentment over perceived ill

treatment of Islam by the West. Malaysian intellectuals tend
to hold a "Euroskeptic" view of U.S. foreign policy in
general and like to cast themselves as defenders of "third
world" interests. Former Prime Minister Mahathir played on
these sentiments to generate political support for himself
and his ambitious economic agenda. When he relinquished his
post in 2003, he left behind a modernized economy but also
strained relations with much of the West. Today, however,
Malaysia presents us with important transformational
opportunities. In terms of its economic development,
educational achievement, public welfare, and political
stability, Malaysia stands out among muslim-majority nations.
The Malaysians project a moderate version of Islam, and,
over the longer term, could lend additional support to
democratic forces in the Middle East and Iraq. We also share
strong common East Asian regional interests in stability and
prosperity. Malaysian counter-terrorism cooperation is
indispensable in defeating Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in the
region. Malaysia's economy is one of the most open, diverse
and well-developed economies in the Islamic world and in
ASEAN. Malaysia is our tenth largest trading partner, we are
Malaysia's number one foreign investor, and economic ties
could strengthen further if ongoing negotiations on a free
trade agreement are successful.

Bilateral Ties--Improving the Substance
--------------


3. (S) In our bilateral relations, the GOM has begun
matching improvements in tone with improvements in substance.
PM Abdullah has openly espoused improved relations with the
U.S., and values the good rapport he established in his
meetings with the President. In July, Secretary Rice met
with PM Abdullah and FM Hamid at the ASEAN Regional Forum and
President Bush met with PM Abdullah on the sidelines of the
UNGA in September. Last year the GOM acceded to our
long-standing urging and signed the IAEA Additional Protocol;
the Malaysians have also started sending observers to recent
PSI exercises; and the GOM is preparing to implement an
export control regime. The third round of our FTA talks is
underway in Kuala Lumpur at this moment.


4. (C) Although they keep the details closely held, the GOM
has been a key partner on counterterrorism. Early round-ups
in 2001-2002 of scores of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) suspects
helped ensure there have been no terrorist attacks here.
However, Malaysian extremists, as illustrated by a series of
recent arrests in Malaysia's Borneo states, still have the
capability to support JI operations elsewhere. Two Malaysian
citizens were among the 14 high value U.S. detainees
transferred to Guantanamo earlier this year. In 2003,

Malaysia established the Southeast Asia Regional Center for
Counterterrorism (SEARCCT),which runs a full schedule of
multilateral training courses, many conducted with U.S.
support. We and our colleagues in Manila, Jakarta and other
Southeast Asian posts have embarked on a regional effort to
strengthen these countries' border controls. We are
currently seeking the GOM's concurrence to carry out a Border
Control Assessment Initiative (BCAI) in Sabah.

Security Cooperation
--------------


5. (C) Mil-mil cooperation between the United States and
Malaysia has grown in recent years particularly with regard
to the greater frequency of high-visibility ship visits.
Security-related training sponsored by the United States for
military and law enforcement participants has also been on
the rise. Although the possibility of a terrorist threat to
the Malacca Strait has received the bulk of international
attention, the fact is that although pirate attacks
illustrate vulnerabilities, we have never identified any
terrorist activities in the Straits. Conversely, terrorists
operate regularly in the Sulu/Sulawesi Sea corridor and we
have redirected our focus to this theater. Malaysia's recent
success initiating regional aerial monitoring of the Straits
of Malacca (the "Eyes in the Sky" program),has helped reduce
piracy in the Straits though it moves cautiously forward in
its multilateral efforts in this area. Malaysia has recently
concluded a new 505 agreement that will allow us to utilize
1206 funds to put CT equipment into the vulnerable Sulu and
Sulawesi Seas border areas of Sabah where terrorists are
known to transit. We are awaiting approval of the 1206
proposals made in conjunction with regional embassies.
Malaysia has not signed either a PSI or Article 98 agreement.
In general, Malaysia remains open to bilateral cooperation
that strengthens its own defense capacity, but the GOM will
quickly raise the principles of sovereignty and territorial
integrity when discussing international security regimes and
coordination, such as for the Straits of Malacca. Malaysia's
only multilateral defense arrangment is the Five Power
Defense Pact with the UK, Singapore, Australia and New
Zealand.


6. (S) We have been pleased by the overwhelmingly positive
media coverage our ship visits have received, in contrast to
the quiet arrivals of past years. The flip side to this is
that our visits are getting increased attention from
ideological foes on the Islamic right, and lately from former
Prime Minister Mahathir. Deputy Prime Minister Najib has
stoutly defended our cooperation before Parliament, and we do
not see that our engagement is under threat. However, we do
need to be cognizant of our increased military visibility and
sensitive to GOM concerns, particularly with high tensions in
the Middle East. The GOM cited concerns about the growing
visibility of training in eastern Sabah when it recently
decided to review on a case by case basis proposed training
events involving foreign military forces in that region.


7. (C) Malaysia has one of the best records in UN
Peacekeeping Operations continues to be very active and
supportive. They have committed forces to operations in
Timor in the past and are presently engaged there in
operations. The GOM has volunteered forces for UNIFIL duty
as well. Malaysia has developed a Peacekeeping Training
Center and updated the facility in recent years to provide
specialized training for the troops it sends into the field.
USG has obligated almost 1.1 million dollars for GPOI funds
for training and equipment that can be but into action with
the signing of a new 505 agreement.

Malaysian Foreign Policy and US--A Mixed Bag
--------------


8. (S) Abdullah champions his moderate vision of Islam --
albeit with limited impact to date -- within the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (OIC),which Malaysia will continue
to chair through early 2008. Malaysia supports Abbas, the
Palestinian Authority, the MEPP roadmap, and Iraqi
reconstruction. However, the Malaysian public remains highly
critical of our Middle East policies, and the GOM is
consistently critical of Israel, with which it has no
diplomatic relations. Malaysia volunteered 1,000 troops to
participate in UNIFIL. After more than a month of lobbying,
and in the face of objections from Israel, UN SYG Annan
agreed to allow Malaysia to send a force of 376 soldiers to
support UNIFIL with deployment expected at the end of
November.


9. (S) In early September, Malaysia surrendered the

chairmanship of the Non-Aligned Movement, but as past chair
remains a member of the leadership troika. During Malaysia's
tenure it championed policies which supported the NAM stance
on the Iranian nuclear program, and engaged, often on overly
friendly terms, with such problematic international players
as Zimbabwe, Cuba and Venezuela. Abdullah hosted Hugo Chavez
for a visit to Malaysia in August, and assured Venezuela of
his support for election to the Latin American chair on the
UN Security Council (although they have indicated privately
since they could support an alternative candidate once the UN
voting stalemated.)


10. (C) The GOM issued a public condemnation of North
Korea's nuclear test and publicly supports UNSCR 1718,
although it has no enthusiasm for sanctions. They have
repeatedly called for a return to the six-party DPRK nuclear
talks and have criticized North Korea's truculence. Malaysia
has lent rhetorical support to Iran's right to develop
"peaceful" nuclear technology and is pursuing closer trade
ties. The Malaysian government is publicly supportive of
China's "peaceful rise", welcoming in particular China's
growing imports of Malaysian products, despite lingering
suspicions among some officials of China's long-term
intentions.


11. (C) In Southeast Asia, Malaysia has played an important
and constructive role. In August Malaysia completed its
earlier peacekeeping mission to East Timor following the
armed uprising that led to deployment of Australian,
Malaysian and Portuguese forces, while a new deployment of
Malaysian police personnel to East Timor is underway. The
GOM has also taken a leading role in the southern Philippines
peace process, hosting negotiations and contributing
observers to the International Monitoring Team in the
southern Philippines. The Malaysians have urged the Thai
government to resolve peacefully the unrest in Southern
Thailand and are hopeful that the new junta will take a more
conciliatory role in calming their northern border. Malaysia
is especially chagrined by Burma's intransigence because it
championed Burma's entry into ASEAN. Having publicly
criticized the Burmese regime though, FM Hamid appears to be
at a loss as to what to do next and Malaysia has of late
suggested it is up to the UN now to deal with the problem.

PM Abdullah's Challenges
--------------


12. (C) Prime Minister Abdullah's main priorities are
sustaining economic growth and spreading it to less-developed
rural areas of the country and encouraging more efficient and
collegial government. No one doubts his sincerity but his
mild-mannered and cautious approach has led critics to
question his leadership. Now three years into his five-year
term, Abdullah has appealed to the public for patience in
delivering reform.


13. (C) PM Abdullah currently faces a new problem: in
April, former PM Mahathir began openly attacking his
successor for failing to follow through with many of the
former PM's initiatives, not promoting economic growth and
for corrupt practices of Abdullah's family members. These
attacks have escalated, with Mahathir now calling for
Abdullah to step down. Mahathir can no longer dictate policy
(unlike Singapore's Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew),but having
the "father" of the nation's economic success -- and a once
much feared political boss -- attacking his former
subordinates has made them all nervous. Abdullah has often
maintained an "elegant silence" and tasked others in the
Cabinet to explain his decisions and defend against
Mahathir's attacks. At this point, Abdullah's power of
incumbency and control over the United Malays National
Organization (UMNO) party apparatus should help ensure
Mahathir's campaign fails. However, Mahathir's public
insinuations that the PM and his supporters are "not Malay
enough" may constrain the PM's public statements on foreign
policy issues. Abdullah will seek to use the annual UNMO
convention, to take place the week following your visit, to
reaffirm and strengthen his party leadership position.


Malaysia's Moderate Islam
--------------


14. (C) Malaysia, with its entrenched majority coalition, is
hardly an ideal democracy, but it can still serve as a useful
model for evolving Islamic societies elsewhere. The Malay
people, long known for their tolerance, have become more
conservative in recent years, but Prime Minister Abdullah has
enshrined the Malay political elite's continued preference

for moderation in his "Islam Hadhari" or "Civilizational
Islam" policy. Abdullah's key message is that Islam can
become a leading world civilization again only if it embraces
economic development, education, innovation and tolerance.
While observers are wary of a longer-term trend toward
greater divisions between the Muslim Malay majority and other
ethnic groups, Malaysia has kept inter-ethnic tensions well
under control by regional and world standards for over 35
years.
LAFLEUR