KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION MAINTAINS A MODERATE, INDEPENDENT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000055

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/7/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM PINS PINR PREL IZ IR SY TU
SUBJECT: KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION MAINTAINS A MODERATE, INDEPENDENT
STANCE

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CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. The Kurdistan Islamic Party (KIU) hopes to be
a viable option for Kurdish voters that are not satisfied with
what they perceive to be the corrupt, self-serving policies of
the KDP and PUK. KIU officials reputedly reject violence in the
name of Islam and argued that the Iraqi Government needed to
work better with Islamic parties to control Islamic fanaticism.
The KIU expected more KDP and PUK attacks in the future but
hoped to remain a "peaceful opposition party". Recently, the
Kurdish Alliance formally requested that the KIU rejoin its
bloc, but the KIU was unwilling to compromise their political
independence without receiving concessions from the PUK and KDP.
The KIU receives a small budget from the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) but is unwilling to accept funds directly from
the PUK or KDP. The KIU has no special relations with the
Kurdistan Islamic Group and rejected the recent fatwa to kill
author Meriwan Halabja as extremism. The KIU representatives
indirectly responded to a question regarding their views on
Sharia law by stating the KIU voted for the Constitution. End
Summary.


(SBU) KURDISTAN ISLAMIC UNION - A VOICE of moderation
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2. (C) On 1 March 2006, IAPO's met with members of the
Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU),including Kirkuk chief and
Central Committee member Muhammad Karim, deputy chief of Kirkuk
Abd al-Qadir Zagold, and Kirkuk Provincial Council member
Ibrahim Khalil Rashid. The KIU representatives said their party
rejected all violence in the name of Islam and would never
accept one Iraqi sect to impose its will on the others. They
pointed out that their party was the first Iraqi Islamic group
to publicly denounce Ansar al-Sunna's Islamic ideology as too
extreme - a move that greatly enhanced the KIU as a terrorist
target. The KIU representatives argued that the Iraqi
Government needed to work with Islamic parties to control
Islamic fanaticism. They believe their party must continue to
be a viable option for Kurdish voters that are not satisfied
with the often corrupt, self-serving policies of the KDP and PUK.


3. (C) Karim claimed the KIU was able to earn five seats on
the national Council of Representatives because it did not
represent a sect and had a creative governance plan for Iraq's
future. According to Karim, Allawi's group responded favorably
to their governance plan and wanted to meet to discuss its
contents, but nothing yet had materialized. The KIU's plan in
the short-term could be summarized as: first, prioritize
security as a means to implement civil projects; second, treat
all groups and parties equally; third, work to remove the term
"occupier" from the Iraqi vernacular and coordinate with the
Coalition to improve its treatment of Iraqis; and fourth,
improve minority rights and mitigate the persecution of
minorities by dominant Iraqi groups. Karim argued that Iraq
could not fight its enemies with force, only ideology.


4. (C) The KIU representatives stated their support of civil
rights and emphasized that its key platform was anti-corruption
in northern Iraq. The KIU prefers technocrats with "clean
hands" to hold government positions. In reference to the role
Sharia law should play in governance, the KIU representatives
indirectly answered that they had voted in favor of the current
Constitution draft. Karim added that his party supported the
Constitution because it was moderate on civil and human rights.
Karim said the KIU denied the fatwa issued by Kurdistan Islamic
Group (KIG) official Abd al-Qadir Said to kill Meriwan Halabja,
because he authored the controversial book, "Sex, Islamic Law,
and Women." The KIU position was clear in that it supported the
KRG Ministry of Culture to deal with this "problem" according to
the law. The KIU representatives said their party had no
special relations with the KIG other than the two parties were
political counterparts in northern Iraq. Karim then asked
whether the Embassy would release a statement condemning
Halabja's book out of respect to Iraqi Muslims. He seemed
puzzled as to why the USG would not release a definitive opinion
on the controversy.


(SBU) THE PRICE OF POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE
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5. (C) Recently, the Kurdish Alliance formally requested that
the KIU rejoin its bloc, but the KIU responded that it would

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only unite if the Kurdish Alliance agreed to KIU demands that
include funding for special projects and increased political
representation in the Kurdish Regional Government. The Kurdish
Alliance response has been to threaten KIU resources in the
Kurdistan region. Additionally, the KIU delegation has not been
invited to many of the discussions regarding national government
formation in Baghdad. They complained that the U.S. Ambassador
had not invited the KIU, while Mithal al-Alusi's party (with
only one seat) had been involved in the negotiations.


6. (C) The KIU had expected some repercussions from the KDP
and PUK when it decided to split from the Kurdish Alliance but
never anticipated attacks on their buildings or the targeting of
their officials. Karim said the KIU expected more attacks in
the future but hoped to remain a peaceful opposition party in
the Kurdish Regional Government. He was confident that the
Kurdish Alliance was likely to dismiss the KIU from positions
and opportunities in the KRG but claimed the KIU was willing to
lose all it possessed to exercise its democratic rights.


7. (C) The KIU receives a small budget from the KRG and relies
on donations from its members. The KIU reportedly refuses to
accept money directly from the KDP or PUK, because it would
compromise their independence. KIU party members that earned
salary from their political positions returned a large
percentage of those earnings to the party. For example, each of
the five KIU members on the national Council of Representatives
kept only $400 of his $10,000 monthly salary. Rashid requested
that the U.S. support the KIU because it was vulnerable to the
KDP and PUK's dominance in northern Iraq. When questioned about
possible international funding sources the KIU members became
visibly uncomfortable.

Biographic Notes
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8. (C) The KIU in 2003 presented a post-war plan to the head
of the Coalition Provisional Authority, who liked the plan and,
as a result, gave KIU leader Salah al-Din Baha al-Din a seat on
the 25 member Governing Council. The three representatives at
the current meeting had the appearance of western businessmen
and seemed genuine in their statements to promote civil projects
and curb corruption in the north. KIU Kirkuk chief and Central
Committee member Muhammad Karim clearly was the top KIU official
in the meeting; he sat between his two colleagues and did most
of the talking. The KIU representatives appeared sincere in
their call for greater civil and human rights, and it is
plausible that the KIU will gain more traction in northern Iraq
if it holds fast to its image of anti-corruption and demands for
greater accountability from the two dominant Kurdish parties.
ORESTE