GOVERNMENT FORMATION: KDP GRIPING ABOUT TALABANI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000053

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 3/5/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ IR
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION: KDP GRIPING ABOUT TALABANI

REF: (A) 05 KIRKUK 268, (B) BAGHDAD 620

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CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY. RC met separately on
February 28 with Falah Bakir, a close aide to the KRG-E PM (and
future unified KRG) PM Barzani, and with Fadil Mirani, Secretary
of the Kurdistan Democratic Party's Politburo. On Baghdad
government formation, Bakir downplayed Talabani's role in favor
of Barzani's representing the Kurds. The new national
government should include the 4 major parties from the
elections: the UIA, the Kurdish Alliance, National Accord
Front, and Al-Iraqiyya. The Kurdish Alliance could accept
Ja'afari as PM. The Kurds did not want to be held back by being
seen as a war zone like the rest of Iraq. Mirani charged
foreign fighters were responsible for the Samarra bombing: Iran
had a hand. He charged Talabani was close to Tehran and was
"hasty." Chalabi was taking bribes from Iran and was part of
the problem. Mirani thought it would be good to rotate jobs
among ethnic groups as they did in Lebanon. Mithal al Alusi
would be a better defense minister than current Interior
Minister Bayan Jabr or current Defense Minister Sa'adun
al-Dulaymi. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.


2. (C) On government formation, Bakir said:

-- KRG President Barzani, not President Talabani, represented
the Kurdish Alliance in Baghdad government formation
negotiations. Barzani would be KRG President for the next 4
years. Talabani was just a Baghdad candidate on the Kurdish
Alliance list and its candidate for whatever national job the
alliance would get. (COMMENT: That national job is the
Presidency. Bakir is very close to the Barzanis, and his
attitudes probably reflect President Barzani's. This highlights
the animosity still present between the two main parties, and
shows the limits of a merger of the two KRGs. END COMMENT.)

-- The new national government should include the 4 major
parties from the elections: the UIA, the Kurdish Alliance,
National Accord Front, and Al-Iraqiyya.

-- The Kurdish Alliance had no red lines: it could accept
Ja'afari as PM. Rather, the Kurdish Alliance would judge
candidates for PM on the basis of policies -- such as
federalism, human rights, democracy and the status of Kirkuk --
and their policy priorities. (NOTE: The Kurdish Alliance has
since asked the Shia Coalition to revoke Ja'afari's nomination
to be PM, citing their inability to work cooperatively with him
toward a national unity government. END NOTE.)

-- Real discussions began only after the election results were
officially confirmed, and the Samarra bombing had then set them
back. Everyone was refusing to admit their community had
committed violence because then, if they could stop later
violence, it would show they could have stopped the earlier
violence.

-- Unlike the Sunnis or Shia, the Kurds were only interested in
certain issues: they did not want to rule the whole country.
The Kurds did not want to be held back by being seen as a war
zone like the rest of Iraq. A new Iraqi transport ministry
announcement about RPG's as a threat on landing -- which was not
true in the Kurdish Region -- had caused Austrian Airlines to
push back the start date for its flights to the KRG. (NOTE:
Bakir repeated his complaints about western travel advisories,
reported ref A. END NOTE.)

-- Governments existed to provide security, assistance or
services. If they could not provide these, it raised the
question as to why have them. The KRG paid for oil, but
suffered when the Iraqi government then failed to pay Turkey for
it and oil imports to the KRG stopped.


3. (C) Mirani (AMCIT) said:

-- Foreign fighters were responsible for the Samarra bombing.
Iran had a hand. Syria and Iran wanted to solve in Iraq their
problem with America. Iran wanted to show it was influential in
Iraq. We should press Syria, Lebanon and Iran.

-- Talabani was saying there was no Iranian influence in Iraq,
but he was in fact close to Tehran. Chalabi was taking bribes
from Iran and was part of the problem.

-- People had been "negative" after the bombing, but had now
pulled back.


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-- Sa'dr's role was a question mark: he was asking foreign
powers to mediate in Iraq.

-- The Kurds depended on the GOI for peace and economic
development: "If the whole house collapses, your room cannot be
safe." The fact Kurdish leaders were in Baghdad showed Kurds
cared about Iraq.

-- President Talabani was in "too much of a rush," but his
temperament was unchangeable. The Sunnis thought Talabani
pro-Shia.

-- It would be good to rotate jobs among ethnic groups as they
did in Lebanon.

-- The Kurds needed to be treated as the second largest group
(read; vs. Arabs),rather than the third (versus Sunnis and
Shia).

-- Ministers needed to be nonpartisan. Mithal al Alusi would
be a better defense minister than Bayan Jabr or Sa'adun
al-Dulaymi.


4. Comment. Bakir is unhappy that security problems in the
south tar KRG efforts to attract foreign investment. He has
often argued that, with our help, Kurdistan could become a
possible model for the rest of Iraq. However, his comments
carried much less of a secessionist flavor than those two days
earlier by Kamran Karadaghi of the national Presidency Council
(ref B). Indeed, Mirani -- unasked -- went out of his way to
stress the Kurds' commitment to the government formation
process. We report Mirani's other comments for what they are
worth: he offered no explanation or examples of how Talbani was
"hasty" or close to Iran.
ORESTE