Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIRKUK37
2006-02-16 19:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Kirkuk
Cable title:  

(U) CORRUPTION IN THE KURDISH NORTH

Tags:  KCOR ECON PGOV PREL IZ 
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VZCZCXRO0075
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0037/01 0471939
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 161939Z FEB 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0484
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0521
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0548
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000037 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, ECON, USAID, IRMO, NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2016
TAGS: KCOR ECON PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (U) CORRUPTION IN THE KURDISH NORTH

KIRKUK 00000037 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIRKUK 000037

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, ECON, USAID, IRMO, NCT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/16/2016
TAGS: KCOR ECON PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (U) CORRUPTION IN THE KURDISH NORTH

KIRKUK 00000037 001.2 OF 003


CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: Corruption is Kurdistan's
biggest economic problem. The two ruling parties' dominant
control lets corruption flourish. Corruption relies on
family-clan and/or peshmerga ties. Kurdish corruption starts at
the top with a few political "godfathers" who quietly distribute
contracts among themselves. Some members of a younger, third
generation of party leaders in alliance with reform-minded
politburo members in both parties are pushing for reform.
However, their efforts are unlikely to bear fruit until after
the Kirkuk issue is resolved and Kurdistan's borders are
decided. (NOTE: The information in this cable was obtained
from a variety of sources -- Arab, Christian, Kurdish, Turcoman
and expatriate businessmen and NGO workers -- over the last six
months. END NOTE.) END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.


(SBU) KURDISTAN'S CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY DEFICIT LINKED
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) The biggest complaint most ordinary Kurds have about
both the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) is their extreme corruption. Most
Kurds believe corruption permeates every level of the parties
and the two Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRGs) they control:
KRG-Erbil (KRG-E) and KRG-Sulaymaniyah (KRG-S). Most believe
the two parties see the ubiquitous political controls they put
on public life as necessary to protect their respective sources
of illicit funds. Thus, common wisdom in Kurdistan links
corruption and the democracy deficit.


(C) ORIGINS: A FISH ROTS FROM THE HEAD
--------------


3. (C) The ruthless competition between the two parties has
made them desperate to hold on to their supporters and win new
ones. Neither party can afford to be pickier than the other in
how it does this or who its allies are. Neither party thinks it

can afford to hold its members accountable. The parties'
Soviet-style political system in which the formal government,
including the judicial and legislative branches, is subordinate
to the party robbed both KRGs of independent oversight. Loyalty
became the paramount value; competence and honesty were
dismissed. Once in power, party leaders took their rewards;
their followers emulate them. Ignorance and ever-present
worries about Baghdad also help to keep people's eyes shut to
the problem. Thus, in Kurdistan corruption spread from the top
down.


(SBU) CORRUPTION BASED ON CLAN AND PESHMERGA TIES
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Corruption in Kurdistan follows a patron-client model.
The difference between the two regions is more one of degree.
KRG-E corruption centers more on the Barzani clan; KRG-S
corruption runs on old Peshmerga ties. The core of the
corruption in both, i.e., "the godfathers" as one interlocutor
termed them, lies with those who control the security forces.
They keep the game running because controlling the guns means
they can enforce their illegal contracts. Security forces, and
thus corruption networks, depend on their patrons and thus
seldom cross party lines, i.e., companies that do business in
Erbil do not do business in Sulaymaniyah and vice versa. This
extends even to the cell phone industry, e.g., Asiacell in
Sulaymaniyah and Korek in Erbil. According to one Kurd in
Kirkuk, Asiacell's profits are divided 50:50 between three PUK
politburo members and the company.


(C) MUNICIPALITY MINISTRIES AS CORRUPTION CENTERS
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Some ministers and ministries are worse than others. In
both KRGs, the Minister and Ministry of Municipalities are
perhaps the most corrupt. One of many scams these ministers run
is extorting kickbacks from recipients of land awarded to them
in recognition for their service to the parties. The minister
and all of the officials who sign off on these land grants take
a fee from the recipients. In addition, the minister will award
some of the land to himself and some to his friends for a fee.


(C) 10%-30% IS THE TYPICAL SHARE

KIRKUK 00000037 002.2 OF 003


--------------


6. (C) Government contracting is predictably rife with
corruption. For example, in Sulaymaniyah, without a godfather
one will not even receive the tender advertising the project.
Fights between connected companies are not necessary because
there is so much money floating around that everyone can get a
piece. (Comment: This may not last. As the circle of
corruption widens and deepens, eventually demand will outrun
supply. End Comment.) The entrepreneur pays 10%-30% of the
contract's value to his "partner" and another 10% to the
director of the government office issuing the contract. If it
is a construction contract, one can use substandard materials
and shoddy work to preserve the profit margin. The building
inspector will pass it because he will have been told to do so
even before he shows and he will get a payoff too. The office
director will cut a similar deal to ensure any samples pass
government lab tests.


(C) FUELING CORRUPTION
--------------


7. (C) Corruption is rife in the fuel business, as the
existence of hordes of street fuel sellers attests. Fuel
shortages are manipulated and perhaps created by the parties so
as to drive up black market fuel prices. Also, fuel for Iraq is
sold into Turkey and Syria. For example, in January 2006, a
Kurdish resident of Kirkuk told IPAO the story of a newly-hired
customs inspector who (in January 2006) noticed four fuel trucks
coming from Turkey that were suspiciously heavy. He checked
inside and found the tanks full of water, whereupon he arrested
the drivers and impounded the trucks. That night, a high KRG
official called the office and said those were his tanker
trucks. The trucks and drivers were released with an apology
from the officer.


(U) "I am your friend," AND "This is best for you."
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Every large company is affiliated with one of the
"godfathers." If it were not, it would soon shrink for lack of
business. Anyone investing in the north will be approached by
someone not directly affiliated with the KRG leadership of that
area who will take a 10%-30% stake in the company or project.
The real godfathers never reveal themselves. In Sulaymaniyah,
we hear there are three or four of them and they are all PUK
politburo members. If anyone tries to cause one of their
companies a problem or take away a contract, the godfathers just
say, "That belongs to a cousin of mine" and the matter is
dropped.


(C) CORRUPTION WARPING THE ECONOMY
--------------


9. (C) Corruption has warped the growth of the entire Kurdistan
economy. For example, the leading private companies in
Kurdistan are all vertically integrated cross-sectoral
conglomerates, e.g., Diyar Group, Eagle Group, Falcon Group, KAR
Group, Nasri Group, Sandi Group, Silver Star Group and Ster
Group. These conglomerates tend to have construction,
import-export, logistics, real estate and security subsidiaries.
All of these companies are alleged to be allied to one or more
non-competing "godfathers" in the local ruling party. The
vertical integration is necessary because corruption means that
one cannot allow well-connected rivals to control the goods and
services one needs to operate. So, these politically connected
entrepreneurs import inputs, organize the shipments, protect the
shipments and work sites, buy the real estate and build the
projects themselves. Capabilities across sectors allow a
conglomerate to compete against other client firms of its patron
for any contract its patron may land.


10. (C) The economies and governments of the Kurdish north are
tightly wrapped in the tentacles of the KDP and PUK. Those
tentacles are extending into the Kurdish-inhabited border zones
of Ninawa, Salah ad Din and Diyala provinces and Kirkuk as the
biggest prize of all. In Kirkuk, we are told the KDP focuses on
land speculation and the PUK on contract fraud. With Kirkuk
still up for grabs, albeit more tightly bound to the PUK than
KDP at this point, business remains depressed. Companies await
a victor in the turf war so they can shop with confidence for a
lasting patron.


(C) KDP/PUK GENERATIONAL CHANGE COULD OVERTURN THE SYSTEM
-------------- --------------


KIRKUK 00000037 003.2 OF 003



11. (C) A western expatriate businessman in northern Kurdistan
acknowledged the widespread corruption, but notes that many
party leaders do not see what they do as wrong. They think of
it as just compensation for all their sacrifices in the
struggle. The second tier of leaders in the KDP and PUK
politburos below Barzani and Talabani also participate in the
corruption. However, the third generation of leaders divides
between those who want their turn at the trough and those who
want to end corruption. The last group is allying itself with
second-generation leaders, such as the KDP's Nechirvan Barzani
or the PUK's Nechirwan Mustafa, who also support change. Our
source notes that Barzani, Talabani and second-tier leaders
already have their bank accounts, homes and family members
abroad, as well as substantial assets inside the country. He
believes that, so long as they can enjoy the fruits of their
labors, they will not stop the change. Also, they know that
everything they have built for Kurdistan will be lost if reform
does not come.


(U) COMMENT
--------------


12. (C) Corruption is the main economic problem in the north.
Corruption chases away much legitimate investment (although the
Kurds have been wise enough to wield corruption as a tax and not
a confiscatory device),delegitimizes the whole idea of free
markets and democracy, increases the (still small but growing)
support for Islamic parties and increases the power of the
corrupt, making it less likely they can be pried out of their
positions. Furthermore, intra-Kurd corruption feeds the fears
of Arab, Christian and Turcoman minorities in Kirkuk that they
will be completely shut out of government jobs (still the vast
majority of all jobs here),contracts and markets by KDP and PUK
loyalists. This is a legitimate concern and it makes a violent
explosion over the future final status of Kirkuk more rather
than less likely. However, real internal reform is unlikely
until after the Kirkuk issue is settled and the other borders of
Kurdistan finalized. Only then will the reformers and their
supporters have the space to undertake internal reforms.
DEAN