Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIRKUK35
2006-02-13 16:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Kirkuk
Cable title:  

(C) SUNNIS ASCENDANT IN DIYALA

Tags:  PGOV KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO5203
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS
DE RUEHKUK #0035/01 0441607
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 131607Z FEB 06
FM REO KIRKUK
TO RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 0480
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0517
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0544
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000035 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) SUNNIS ASCENDANT IN DIYALA

REF: BAGHDAD 409

KIRKUK 00000035 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)



C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000035

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 2/13/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) SUNNIS ASCENDANT IN DIYALA

REF: BAGHDAD 409

KIRKUK 00000035 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (U) This is a SET Ba'qubah cable.


2. (C) SUMMARY: The announcement of the results of the December
15 Council of Representatives elections has punctuated a
scramble by the IIP to put together a coalition of Sunni Arab
leaders in Diyala that can claim to represent the interests of
the majority of the province's population. Sunni leaders, both
independent and partisan, seem ready to join the nascent
IIP-led, MARAM-modeled coalition. Meanwhile, Shi'a contacts are
beginning to grouse quietly about Sunni "cheating," though
without any concrete examples. While new provincial elections
seem unlikely to occur in the near future, the psychological
effects of Diyala's election are already having an effect on the
dynamics of power within the province. END SUMMARY.


3. (C) On February 10, the IECI announcement of final results
(Reftel) was greeted with a shrug - Diyala's political elite has
been operating for weeks on the assumption that Diyala's seats
would line up as they have now been certified. The results - in
which six of ten seats went to Sunni Arabs, and only two to
Shi'a Arabs - were a clear repudiation of the current structure
of Diyala's provincial council, where the Sunni Arab-led bloc
controls just over a third of the 41 seats and the Shi'a bloc
controls just under half. Prominent Sunni Arabs have been
scrambling to align themselves for upcoming provincial elections
in expectation of a realignment of power.


4. (C) The breakdown of the Sunni's six seats - in which only
four went to the Tawaffuq Front, while one apiece went to the
Iraqiyya and National Dialogue lists - indicates that space
exists in Diyala for secular Sunni representation. Two boycotts
in the January 2005 elections prevented secular Sunnis from
joining the current Provincial Council: a boycott by secular
Ba'athists, and one by supporters of then-Governor Abdullah
Rashid al-Juburi, after technicality kept his cross-sectarian
list off the ballot. In the December elections, both of these
constituencies appear to have come out in force to vote for the

Iraqiyya and National Dialogue lists.

--------------
MARAM FOR DIYALA
--------------


5. (C) The IIP appears to have noticed this space as well, and
to be moving quickly to close it. Diyala IIP Chairman Hamdi
Hassun al-Zubaydi claims that the IIP will be able to capture
the votes that went to the Iraqiyya and National Dialogue lists
by incorporating members of the organizations supporting those
lists, along with prominent Sunnis not affiliated with any
party. The result, Zubaydi believes, will be an absolute
majority going to a MARAM-like bloc (COMMENT: whose backbone
would be solidly composed of the IIP).


6. (C) This is not just idle talk. Khalid al-Sinjari, mayor of
Ba'qubah and the most prominent Sunni Arab officeholder in
Diyala not affiliated with the IIP, noted to SET that the IIP
had already approached him about participation in a potential
coalition for the upcoming election. Sinjari suggested that
others in his circle of independent Sunnis had been in contact
with the IIP as well. Like Zubaydi, he pictures the formation
of a coalition mirroring MARAM, with Sinjari himself in a
leading role.


7. (C) Party activists appear just as open to inclusion in an
IIP-dominated list as independents. Diyala INA Chairman (and
victorious Iraqiyya list CoR candidate) Hussam al-Azzawi
reluctantly admits that the INA will not be going it alone in
the next provincial election - nor will it stake its hopes for
representation on a coalition that mirrors the Iraqiyya list.
As for the National Dialogue list, Zubaydi claims that its
winning CoR candidate in Diyala - Muhammad Katuf Mansur, a
member of the Arab Democratic Front (ADF) - has already joined
Tawaffuq; the inclusion of the ADF into Tawaffuq should
presumably make it easy to secure the adherence of its partisans
to a MARAM-like coalition in the provincial elections.


8. (C) The lack of any majority bloc in the current provincial
council has forced all of the various factions to share power -
a good thing on balance for inter-sectarian relations, though
with some cost in governmental effectiveness. Zubaydi claims
that the IIP would ensure a new government with a Sunni Arab
bloc majority would include representatives of the other
sectarian groups in leadership positions in the provincial
government.


KIRKUK 00000035 002.2 OF 002


--------------
SHI'A UNEASE
--------------


9. (C) Meanwhile, we are hearing more and more grousing from
our Shi'a contacts about alleged Sunni Arab electoral violations
in the December election. Given the vague nature of the
complaints, the halfhearted way in which they have been pressed,
and the uniformly positive reaction to the election from Shi'as
prior to the announcement of the preliminary vote totals, these
complaints would more accurately be taken as an indicator of
Shi'a unease at the impending shift of power away from them
within the province. The complaints that we have heard have
involved voter intimidation by Sunni Arab pollworkers, the
alleged practice by Sunni Arab pollworkers of allowing the Sunni
heads of households to vote for their entire family while
ensuring that Shi'as and Kurds could only place a single vote,
and other vague glosses on the (not entirely unfounded) Shi'a
conspiracy theory surrounding IIP overrepresentation on the
Diyala IECI. (NOTE: A side effect of the reduction of the IECI
office from 308 employees to 52 should be the end of this
particular, recurring explanation for Sunni electoral success.)

--------------
COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) The provincial elections are still a long way off
(though this may not be clear to much of the province's
political elite),but perceptions are already driving a shift in
power towards the province's Sunnis, as Shi'a politicians appear
progressively more willing to compromise with both Sunnis and
Kurds. Conversely, the Sunni bloc appears to have become less
obstructionist in the limited political interaction that has
occurred since the election. Perhaps the latter change is a
result of an increased feeling that their position in the
province is secure; it also may be a desire on the part of the
disciplined provincial branch of the IIP not to make any move
that would affect negotiations for government formation at the
national level.
DEAN