(C) KRG MINISTER FOR PESHMERGA AFFAIRS ON MERGER, SECURITY,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000147

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 8/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PTER IZ TU KDEM
IR
SUBJECT: (C) KRG MINISTER FOR PESHMERGA AFFAIRS ON MERGER, SECURITY,
FOREIGN INFLUENCES

REF: KIRKUK 00000134; KIRKUK 00000136

KIRKUK 00000147 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, Omar Osman
Ibrahim, said on August 7 the KDP and PUK were ready to merge
their Peshmerga forces within six months (Septel.). Ibrahim
said Peshmerga were located below the 'Green Line' anywhere KDP
or PUK offices were based. No independent Peshmerga action
would be taken against the PKK unless they directly attacked
Peshmerga or Baghdad commanded such action. Ibrahim suggested
dividing Kirkuk into territories with each falling under the
control of police embedded with intelligence officers. Iraqi
Army (IA) protected the KRG border areas so any cross-border
attack from Turkey or Iran would encounter federal forces first.
However, local Kurds, probably former Peshmerga, supplied the
bulk of these forces. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

(C) KDP, PUK READY TO MERGE PESHMERGA
--------------


2. (C) KRG Minister for Peshmerga Affairs, Omar Osman Ibrahim,
told IPAO on August 7 that both of the two main Kurdish parties
were ready to merger their Peshmerga forces and that these would
be unified within six months (Septel.). He said that the merger
of the two KRG Erbil and Sulaymaniyah administrations last March
had changed the agenda of Peshmerga leaders, with defense of the
Kurdistan region, as well as Kurdish and Iraqi unity, being the
driving factors. Ibrahim said the sectarian divisions in the
rest of Iraq were only making the two Peshmerga forces more
determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past. (Note:
Between 1994 and 1996, a civil war broke out between KDP and PUK
Peshmerga forces. End note.) Ibrahim claimed formal
commissions had been formed to merge the two forces but had not
met to date, and declined to supply specific statistics on
Peshmerga numbers because he "had not revealed these to the PUK
leaders yet" (Ref. Para. 10). He said the goal of the Peshmerga
Ministry was to match the pay scales, ranking system, and order
of the federal government security forces.

(C) PESHMERGA PRESENT BELOW THE 'GREEN LINE'
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Ibrahim said Peshmerga forces were protecting oil
pipelines and roads into Mosul and Kirkuk. In some cases, he
claimed, such as in Tel Afar, Peshmerga have been merged with IA
but remain partially controlled by the KRG. He said that, in
the mixed Kurdish areas currently outside KRG administrative
boundaries, "any place with a KDP or PUK office received
Peshmerga protection" (Ref. Para. 8-10). (Note: Ibrahim kept
referring to the IA as "New Iraqi Army" which had formerly been
"Iraqi National Guard" forces. Post is working to obtain the
exact number and locations of all KDP and PUK offices in areas
outside the KRG boundaries. End note.)

(C) NO PESHMERGA ACTION AGAINST PKK WITHOUT BAGHDAD ORDER
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Ibrahim claimed the KRG considered the Peshmerga an
integral part of Iraq's security forces and would only take
action against the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, formerly
Kongra Gel/KGK) independently if the PKK attacked Kurdish forces
directly or if Baghdad ordered the Peshmerga to take action
against the PKK. Ibrahim said normal Kurds did not like the PKK
and would support action against this group within the Iraqi
Kurdish region. He cautioned, however, that the PKK also had
bases and offices in Iran, and that simply chasing PKK members
currently located in Iraq out of KRG areas would only multiply
the threat by creating new camps and branch organizations. He
claimed Turkey and Iran were coordinating their attacks against
alleged PKK camps in the KRG areas in an attempt to intimidate
the Kurds of Iraq, and added the courts had already closed a
PKK-affiliated office in Erbil and that this was under
investigation. (Note: The office operated under the control of
the Kurdistan Democratic Solution Party, an alleged PKK front
party (Ref. Kirkuk 00000134). Turkish government officials in
Baghdad and Ankara, however, claim that none of the PKK front
party offices in Iraq have been closed. Post is still trying to
clarify this matter. End note.)

(C) SOLVING THE "KIRKUK PROBLEM"
--------------


5. (C) Ibrahim proposed three solutions to the deteriorating
security in Kirkuk. He said Kirkuk should follow the Erbil

KIRKUK 00000147 002.2 OF 002


model by building a security trench around the city. (Note:
The KDP Asayish head also recommended this solution to Post on
July 25, 2006. (Ref. Kirkuk 00000136.) End note.) Second, he
claimed Kirkuk should be divided into territories with each part
falling under the control of police with embedded intelligence
officers. These forces should be posted along all access roads
into the city to stop and interrogate people routinely.
Currently, he said, security forces only performed random spot
checks. Ibrahim said Peshmerga security check-points along
Mosul, Kirkuk, and Salah ad-Din roads had been very successful
in using this method. Finally, he claimed imposing curfews was
critical to improving security.

(C) CURRENT ROLE OF FEDERAL FORCES IN KRG AREAS
-------------- --------------


6. (C) Ibrahim said currently IA patrolled border areas and
gates in the Kurdistan region, and received regular supplies
from the central government. He claimed Peshmerga leaders
supported the presence of federal forces in the border areas,
since a cross-border attack from Turkey or Iran would be
interpreted by the international community and Coalition forces
as a violation of Iraq's sovereignty. Ibrahim said that, as
with the Shia in Basra or Sunnis in other regions of Iraq, the
local population, in this case Kurds mostly, supplied the bulk
of IA staffing in these border areas and "coordinated with the
Peshmerga if requested."

(C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES
--------------


7. (C) Omar Osman Ibrahim (aka Kak Zaim Ali): Current KRG
Minister of Peshmerga Affairs; from Erbil; joined the Peshmerga
in 1979 and went on to become a Kurdish war hero; elected to the
KDP Central Committee and Politburo in 1989; currently serves as
the Politburo's Chief of Military Affairs.

(C) NOTES ON SPECIFIC PESHMERGA LOCATIONS BEYOND KRG BORDER
-------------- --------------


8. (C) Based on Ibrahim's comment regarding Peshmerga protection
for KDP and PUK offices, post estimates Peshmerga would be
located in several office centers for each party currently
located outside KRG boundaries. Post is working to obtain
specific information on current locations for PUK offices
outside the KRG.


9. (C) Post received information that the KDP had central
offices ("Branches") in the following locations outside current
KRG boundaries: Mosul, 14th Branch, Office Head: Khasru
Abdullah Goran; Khanaqin-Diyala, 15th Branch, Office Head:
Salahaddin Ibrahim; Shaykhan-Mosul, 20th Branch, Office Head:
Fariq Fayaq; Kirkuk, 3rd Branch, Office Head: Najat Hassan;
Baghdad, 5th Branch, Office Head: Mohmammed Amin Dalo.

(U) COMMENT
--------------


10. (C) Ibrahim's reticence to supply any specifics on Peshmerga
numbers or logistics because his office had not yet told the PUK
indicates communication between the parties and real desire to
merge the two Peshmerga administrations is still not what KDP
and PUK ministry leaders claim, most notably on security issues,
and that distrust still remains between the two parties which
needs to be overcome before any real progress on the merger can
be made. Ibrahim's thinly disguised reference to IA
coordinating "if requested" with the Peshmerga probably
indicates who really controls the mostly Kurdish forces along
the KRG's borders, namely the Peshmerga leaders.
JBIGUS