(C) PUK ASAYISH HEAD - KIRKUK SECURITY WORSENING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000135

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

FOR BAGHDAD POL, POLMIL, NCT, IRMO

E.O. 12958: DECL: 7/31/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PINR PINS PNAT PREF PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: (C) PUK ASAYISH HEAD - KIRKUK SECURITY WORSENING

KIRKUK 00000135 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Jim Bigus, PRT Leader, POL, Department of State.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) Asayish head, Hallkawt Abdullah Aziz, said on
July 24 that the security situation in Kirkuk was getting worse.
He said terrorists had sympathizers among the Iraqi Police (IP)
officers and checkpoint guards who facilitated transit of
explosives into the city. He claimed Iraqi Army (IA) commanders
did not trust half their officers and that the majority of
people in Kirkuk believed the IA and IP in the city were
cooperating with terrorists in Baghdad. Aziz said he favored
replacing certain ineffective leaders and assigning Asayish to
checkpoints along the Baghdad-Tikrit-Kirkuk highway to increase
security. He claimed that if Kirkuk were annexed into the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) the Asayish could solve the
security situation in ten days. END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.

(C) KIRKUK SECURITY GETTING WORSE
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2. (C) PUK Asayish head, Hallkawt Abdullah Aziz, told IPAOs on
July 24, 2006, that security in Kirkuk was getting worse due to
several factors. He said first among them was the weakness of
the IP in Kirkuk Province. For example, he said the Asayish had
information that terrorists were going to attack the courthouse
and gave this information to the IP but the attack still
occurred. (Note: A cafi adjacent to the courthouse was bombed
on July 23. End note.) Aziz claimed the problem was not in the
northern parts of Kirkuk, where Kurdish security forces
predominated, but in the southern, Arab parts of the city and
province where terrorists continued to do whatever they wanted.
He also claimed that each government director in Kirkuk had
10-20 bodyguards who assumed no responsibility for protecting
the buildings where they operated or its inhabitants. Aziz said
the majority of terrorists came from the city of Kirkuk and Amal
al-Sha'bi in Hewija.

(C) WEAK LEADERS, NO TRUST IN IRAQI SECURITY FORCES
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3. (C) Aziz said there was growing confusion between legitimate
IP and terrorists because it was easy to get uniforms and
impersonate IP at checkpoints. For this reason, he claimed, the
public was just as afraid of the IP as they were of the
terrorists. The majority of people in Kirkuk, according to
Aziz, believed the IA and IP were cooperating with the
terrorists, and he claimed explosives have been found in the
homes of senior police who had been arrested. He added IA
commanders in Kirkuk did not trust half their officers because
many of them were Arabs or suspected former Bathists. Aziz
asserted that the current Police Chief, General Sherko Shirku,
was weak and ineffective, but continued to remain in his
position thanks to President Talabani's support.

(C) SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING SECURITY
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4. (C) Aziz said security on the Baghdad-Tikrit-Kirkuk highway
needed to be tightened and that some captured terrorists
confessed they had received IP assistance to smuggle bombs
through the checkpoints on this route. He suggested sending
Asayish to oversee these vital spots outside Kirkuk. In
addition, Aziz said he would favor replacing IP and IA with
private security companies. These companies would be assigned
to protect specific cites and buildings, such as the hospital or
courthouse, which Aziz said would decrease terrorist attacks
because these guards were professionals trained for this
purpose. He said the purpose of the IP was to eliminate crime,
not terrorists. Aziz also claimed that if Kirkuk were annexed
into the KRG, the Asayish could "solve the security problems in
ten days." Aziz also said he favored sending the IA generals in
Kirkuk to Sulaymaniyah, and vice versa, to control terrorist
sympathizers in the IA. Finally, weak leaders in the security
sector, such as General Sherko Shirku, must be replaced.

(C) NO COMPARISON BETWEEN KIRKUK AND BAGHDAD
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5. (C) Although some Shia citizens were recently kicked out of
Hewija, their small numbers in Kirkuk would prevent the
Shia-Sunni conflict in Baghdad from spreading to Kirkuk, Aziz
claimed. The majority of Kirkuk's Arab and Kurd population was
Sunni; he said the city lacked enough Shia to fall into the
sectarian struggles currently seen in the south.

(C) "DUE PROCESS" RELATIONS WITH IP AND PESHMERGA
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6. (C) Aziz said it had taken four years, but the Asayish in
Kirkuk finally had an official liaison position between the
Peshmerga and the IA and IP to help with security. He claimed
IP and IA had authority to carry out arrests and that the
Peshmerga did not arrest suspects in Kirkuk. However, he said
the Peshmerga could send a letter to the IP or IA Brigadier
Commander to request an arrest, and that the majority of
arrested suspects were sent to Sulaymaniyah for trial. He
claimed many Arab families had fled to Sulaymaniyah due to poor
security and that the Asayish had taken their information and
had agents in every neighborhood to watch them.

(C) KDP-PUK ASAYISH RELATIONS IN KIRKUK
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7. (C) The PUK and KDP Asayish were both official forces,
according to Aziz, and shared in monitoring security in Kirkuk
and in providing the IP with information. Aziz said both
parties' Asayish operated everywhere in Kirkuk Province and
worked separately. He claimed the KRG merger would resolve this
and did not anticipate problems but acknowledged the KRG
ministries of Interior and Peshmerga would remain separate for
now because these were the most sensitive of all KRG ministries
and many obstacles for their merger remained. Aziz opined the
merger of the two would not happen until after next year.

(C) ASAYISH PRESENT BELOW 'GREEN LINE'
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8. (C) Aziz claimed the PUK had 1800 active Asayish officers,
with an additional 400-500 assets gathering intelligence. He
said the Asayish had branches in all districts and sub-districts
of Kirkuk Province, and also had offices in other locations
outside the formal KRG administrative borders. In Mosul the
Asayish performed full security services, while in other places,
such as Diyala, they worked secretly and limited their
activities to collecting information, which was then forwarded
to the Director General in Sulaymaniyah. He claimed there were
Asayish in Tuz Khurmatu as well, but that these fell under the
control of the Asayish office in Kalar. Asayish would monitor
polling centers in the disputed areas during the upcoming
provincial elections, he said, to inform the IP and IA of any
"irregularity."


(C) BIOGRAPHIC NOTES
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9. (C) Halkawt Abdullah Aziz: Head of PUK Asayish, Kirkuk
Province Office, located in Qarahanjer (north of Kirkuk); born
in Kirkuk, 1959; joined the PUK in 1982; graduated from
Qalachalan College for Military Science, 1998; Aziz claimed he
led PUK Peshmerga forces into Kirkuk during Operation Iraqi
Freedom and held the city for 72 hours until ordered to leave by
Coalition Forces.

(U) COMMENT
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10. (C) Neither the PUK nor the KDP Asayish leaders seemed
enthusiastic about merging their security services and
cooperated more out of allegiance to merger efforts within the
KRG Erbil administration than any real commitment to a unified
Asayish in Kirkuk (Septel). Post has noted Kurdish leaders
talking more about privatization of security services in Kirkuk,
by which the Kurds probably mean that Peshmerga would assume
full responsibility for patrolling the city. The Kurdish
leaders are also calling for Asayish to be posted at checkpoints
south of the city, where we have heard reports of Arabs being
turned away from coming to Kirkuk.
JBIGUS