Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIRKUK11
2006-01-28 19:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
REO Kirkuk
Cable title:
(SBU) KURDS EXPECT SHIITES WILL AGREE KIRKUK CAN JOIN KRG
how-toVZCZCXRO5103 OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHMOS DE RUEHKUK #0011 0281958 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O R 281958Z JAN 06 FM REO KIRKUK TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0485 RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD IMMEDIATE 0449 INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE RUEHKUK/REO KIRKUK 0511
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIRKUK 000011
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
POL, ECON, NCT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT EFIN PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (SBU) KURDS EXPECT SHIITES WILL AGREE KIRKUK CAN JOIN KRG
REF: 05 KIRKUK 285
CLASSIFIED BY: RBELL, PRC, PRC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KIRKUK 000011
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
POL, ECON, NCT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT EFIN PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (SBU) KURDS EXPECT SHIITES WILL AGREE KIRKUK CAN JOIN KRG
REF: 05 KIRKUK 285
CLASSIFIED BY: RBELL, PRC, PRC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. Kurdistan Regional
Government-Sulaymaniyah (KRG-S) leaders complained to RC and DRC
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out
of seats, though this would not prevent the Kurdish alliance
from participating in the government. PUK Dep GenSec Noshirwan
Mustafa seemed to think the U.S. had created the compensatory
seat mechanism to move seats from, e.g., the Kurds to smaller
parties. KRG-S PM Omar Fattah reported that the Kurdistan
Islamic Union would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major
votes, but not join the alliance itself. Mustafa predicted the
Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war over Kirkuk by guaranteeing
minorities rights in the KRG constitution. The Arab district of
Hawijah could split off to remain in Arab hands as part of the
deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG. He predicted the status of
Kirkuk would not be a controversial point in government
formation negotiations: both Kurds and Shiites wanted to go back
to 1968 provincial boundaries. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
(C) DECEMBER ELECTIONS CHEAT KURDS?
--------------
2. (C) Both Fattah and Mustafa complained to RC and DRC
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out
of seats. The PM charged that the Kurds lost six seats (from 59
to 53) because the IECI had changed voting districts and thrown
out returns. He said this would not prevent the Kurdish
Alliance from participating in the government. Mustafa charged
the compensatory seat mechanism had moved four seats from the
Kurds to smaller parties; he clearly thought the U.S. had
created this mechanism at Kurdish expense to manipulate the
outcome of the election, but seemed willing to accept this
grudgingly. When RC explained the electoral commission (IECI)'s
formula for allocating compensatory seats, it was plain that
this was news to Mustafa.
3. (C) PM Fattah reported that the Kurdistan Islamic Union
would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major votes, but not
join the alliance itself.
4. (C) Mustafa argued the new national government should
divide cabinet seats both according to a party's number of votes
and an ethnicity's percentage of the population. He thought a
national unity government could move forward on agreed elements
such as economic development, but not on disputed points such as
ownership of natural resources and federalism.
(U) PRIORITIES FOR A NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
--------------
5. (C) Mustafa said the Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war
over Kirkuk: the Kurds were the strongest party in Kirkuk and
they wanted a peaceful transition (to KRG rule). The Kurds
could avoid problems by guaranteeing minority rights in the KRG
constitution, e.g., through autonomy along the lines of the
Ottoman millet system with limited self-rule, right to use of
language, and by promising certain political jobs to
ethnicities, as in Lebanon. The Kurds were not hard over on
Kirkuk province's borders: Hawijah could split off to remain in
Arab hands as part of the deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG.
6. (C) Mustafa predicted the status of Kirkuk would not be a
controversial point in negotiations to form a new national
government. Both the Kurds and the Shiites wanted to go back to
1968 provincial boundaries, so both would turn a blind eye to
this in government formation negotiations.
7. (C) When asked, Mustafa said that the new government should
spur the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in 2006 and
2007. He was unconcerned that the national government had not
budgeted enough to compensate claimants: the KRG had a $5
billion annual budget from monthly revenues and could contribute
funds; KRG revenues would increase if oil production rose.
8. (SBU) When asked why the KRG had opened an education office
in Qarah Hanjir (inside Kirkuk province),PM Fattah said it was
to pay and otherwise deal with (Kurdish) teachers that the KRG
had sent to Kirkuk province to fill the void left by the local
authorities' failure to hire enough teachers.
BELL
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
POL, ECON, NCT
E.O. 12958: DECL: 1/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PNAT EFIN PREL IZ
SUBJECT: (SBU) KURDS EXPECT SHIITES WILL AGREE KIRKUK CAN JOIN KRG
REF: 05 KIRKUK 285
CLASSIFIED BY: RBELL, PRC, PRC, DOS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)
1. (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION. Kurdistan Regional
Government-Sulaymaniyah (KRG-S) leaders complained to RC and DRC
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out
of seats, though this would not prevent the Kurdish alliance
from participating in the government. PUK Dep GenSec Noshirwan
Mustafa seemed to think the U.S. had created the compensatory
seat mechanism to move seats from, e.g., the Kurds to smaller
parties. KRG-S PM Omar Fattah reported that the Kurdistan
Islamic Union would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major
votes, but not join the alliance itself. Mustafa predicted the
Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war over Kirkuk by guaranteeing
minorities rights in the KRG constitution. The Arab district of
Hawijah could split off to remain in Arab hands as part of the
deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG. He predicted the status of
Kirkuk would not be a controversial point in government
formation negotiations: both Kurds and Shiites wanted to go back
to 1968 provincial boundaries. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
(C) DECEMBER ELECTIONS CHEAT KURDS?
--------------
2. (C) Both Fattah and Mustafa complained to RC and DRC
January 26 that the December elections had cheated the Kurds out
of seats. The PM charged that the Kurds lost six seats (from 59
to 53) because the IECI had changed voting districts and thrown
out returns. He said this would not prevent the Kurdish
Alliance from participating in the government. Mustafa charged
the compensatory seat mechanism had moved four seats from the
Kurds to smaller parties; he clearly thought the U.S. had
created this mechanism at Kurdish expense to manipulate the
outcome of the election, but seemed willing to accept this
grudgingly. When RC explained the electoral commission (IECI)'s
formula for allocating compensatory seats, it was plain that
this was news to Mustafa.
3. (C) PM Fattah reported that the Kurdistan Islamic Union
would vote with the Kurdish Alliance on major votes, but not
join the alliance itself.
4. (C) Mustafa argued the new national government should
divide cabinet seats both according to a party's number of votes
and an ethnicity's percentage of the population. He thought a
national unity government could move forward on agreed elements
such as economic development, but not on disputed points such as
ownership of natural resources and federalism.
(U) PRIORITIES FOR A NEW NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
--------------
5. (C) Mustafa said the Kurds would avoid an Iraqi civil war
over Kirkuk: the Kurds were the strongest party in Kirkuk and
they wanted a peaceful transition (to KRG rule). The Kurds
could avoid problems by guaranteeing minority rights in the KRG
constitution, e.g., through autonomy along the lines of the
Ottoman millet system with limited self-rule, right to use of
language, and by promising certain political jobs to
ethnicities, as in Lebanon. The Kurds were not hard over on
Kirkuk province's borders: Hawijah could split off to remain in
Arab hands as part of the deal to join Kirkuk to the KRG.
6. (C) Mustafa predicted the status of Kirkuk would not be a
controversial point in negotiations to form a new national
government. Both the Kurds and the Shiites wanted to go back to
1968 provincial boundaries, so both would turn a blind eye to
this in government formation negotiations.
7. (C) When asked, Mustafa said that the new government should
spur the Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC) in 2006 and
2007. He was unconcerned that the national government had not
budgeted enough to compensate claimants: the KRG had a $5
billion annual budget from monthly revenues and could contribute
funds; KRG revenues would increase if oil production rose.
8. (SBU) When asked why the KRG had opened an education office
in Qarah Hanjir (inside Kirkuk province),PM Fattah said it was
to pay and otherwise deal with (Kurdish) teachers that the KRG
had sent to Kirkuk province to fill the void left by the local
authorities' failure to hire enough teachers.
BELL