KDP ASAYISH CHIEF ON SECURITY ISSUES IN KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000104

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/29/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PINS PINR PREL PTER PNAT IZ IR SY TU
SUBJECT: KDP ASAYISH CHIEF ON SECURITY ISSUES IN KIRKUK

KIRKUK 00000104 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: Scott Dean, Regional Coordinator (Acting),Reo
Kirkuk, Department of State .
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)

1. (C) SUMMARY. The chief of Asayish in Kirkuk said the Iraqi
Army and police in Kirkuk were neither effective nor serious in
their duties because their loyalties were based on ethnic bonds.
He said Hawijah was a terrorist safe haven and that its poor
security situation had a negative effect on the rest of Kirkuk
province. His sources indicated that Sadrists were sending
regiments to southern Kirkuk city. He complained that several
Ba'athist criminals still were employed at the Northern Oil
Company and that only 600 of the company's 12,000 employees were
Kurds. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) IPAO's on April 20 met with Colonel Hallo Najat Hamza,
KDP chief of Asayish (internal security forces) for Diyala,
Kirkuk, and Tikrit provinces, to discuss security issues in the
Kirkuk province. Hamza asserted that MNF-I recognized KDP
Asayish as a premier security force in these provinces. He said
his organization's primary purpose was to gather intelligence
and tips on the insurgency.

Iraqi Army, Police Hamstrung by Ethnicity Regulations
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3. (C) Hamza said the Iraqi Army and police in Kirkuk were
neither effective nor serious in their duties because their
loyalties were based on ethnic bonds. He noted that the army
and police were unable to fire incompetent personnel, due to the
set allocation of positions based on ethnicity. Hamza said that
four Iraqi intelligence officers in the former regime were now
employed as local police officers, which undermined the people's
trust in the police to eliminate terrorism.


4. (C) Hamza said the MNF-I units in Kirkuk were not
cooperating or coordinating with the Iraqi police because of its
ineffectiveness. He said the MNF-I were not reinforcing the
police's role, warning that if the MNF-I did not solve this
problem, the police would remain weak. Hamza added that
although the MNF-I and Kirkuk residents shared excellent
relations, U.S. security contractors were causing some problems.

Hawijah Hotbed for the Insurgency
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5. (C) Hamza identified the "new" Arabs as the main source of
Kirkuk's security problems, stating that the majority of
Kirkuk's security incidents occurred in the Arab neighborhoods
of southern Kirkuk. He said the poor security situation in the
Hawijah area had a negative effect on the rest of Kirkuk
province. Hamza argued that Hawijah was a terrorist safe haven
and complained that Hawijah's tribal leaders benefited from the
former regime and functioned only according to the feelings of
the people.


6. (C) Hamza said he believed the terrorists in Ninawa fled to
Hawijah following MNF-I operations in 2005. He described
Hawijah as IED infested, stating that AQI was responsible for
about 70 percent of the IED attacks. Hamza said that Ansar
al-Sunnah (AAS),however, was the strongest terrorist group in
Kirkuk province. Hamza said AAS recently changed its strategy
from planting IED's to assassinating senior officials, which he
described as more effective. He credited AAS of using the
armor-penetrating explosive devices made outside Iraq.

Sadrists - Potential Security Threat in Kirkuk
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7. (C) Hamza said the Shia Arabs began moving to Kirkuk in
large numbers around 1963. He said both the Badr Organization
and the Sadrists were armed and were prepared to engage in armed
resistance on command from their superiors. Hamza claimed that
Badr primarily targeted Ba'athists, particularly senior Ba'ath
officers and former Iraqi military pilots that bombed Badr posts
in Iran prior to OIF. Hamza claimed that the Kurds were trying
to protect the pilots in order to mitigate ethnic tensions.


8. (C) Hamza described the Sadrist presence in Kirkuk as much
stronger than Badr, but less organized. He claimed that
Sadrists recruited from all groups, including former Ba'athists
and criminals, which comprised a loose confederation bonded by a
loyalty to Muqtada al-Sadr.


9. (C) Hamza said Sadrist militia - Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) -
forces were located just south of Kirkuk city in Daquk and Tuz
Khurmatu. He claimed his sources reported that the JAM last
month established regiments of 120 members in both Daquk and Tuz
Khurmatu. The sources indicated that those JAM members prior to
arriving in Kirkuk met in Najaf with Muqtada al-Sadr, who
promised them adequate weapons to fight the Kurds in preventing
Kirkuk from becoming part of the Kurdistan Region.

Views on Article 58; Ba'athists in the NOC; and Civil War

KIRKUK 00000104 002.2 OF 002


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10. (C) Hamza stated that Kurdish leaders were telling their
people to respect Kirkuk's other ethnicities, but the Kurdish
community was losing patience. He said the Kurds were angry
that the Iraqi Government was not implementing Article 58, yet
many Kurds remained in tents, without schools and public
services. Hamza said that despite accusations of Kurdish
expansionism, many Kurdish natives of Kirkuk remained in Iraqi
Kurdistan because they had jobs and homes there.


11. (C) Hamza noted that many Ba'athist criminals remained
employed at the Northern Oil Company (NOC). He complained that
only 600 of the NOC's 12,000 employees were Kurds. Hamza told
us that the Baghdad Integrity Committee was coming to Kirkuk for
the next 30 days to remove those Ba'athists still employed with
the NOC.


12. (C) Hamza said Kirkuk had all the ingredients for civil
war but that it would not commence in Kirkuk. He added that
Ba'athists, who were abundant in some areas of Kirkuk province,
however, were trying to instigate a civil war.

Comment
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13. (C) Most of Hamza's assessments corroborated with
reporting we have received from other contacts. Hamza's
concerns about the Kurds' alleged low number of NOC employees
may suggest the Kurds are attempting to expand their strategy in
Kirkuk from political and security dominance to economic
supremacy, particularly in the city's important oil sector.

Biographic Note
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14. Hamza was born in 1974 in the mountains of Iraqi Kurdistan
during a time of fighting between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi
regime. His father was a strong supporter of Mullah Mustafa
Barzani and, following the Algiers Accord in 1975, fled with his
family to Iran for a year. Hamza in March 1991 was involved in
the fighting between the Peshmerga and the Iraqi regime for
control of Kirkuk. He earned a diploma in military science from
the Zhako Military Academy in 1991. Hamza worked as a liaison
officer between the KDP and Coalition forces in the runup to OIF.
BIGUS