SADRISTS SEEK TO BLOCK KURDISH DESIGNS FOR KIRKUK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIRKUK 000100

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

BAGHDAD FOR POL, POLMIL, NCT, ROL COORDINATOR, IRMO/IPCC

E.O. 12958: DECL: 4/25/2016
TAGS: PGOV KISL PHUM PINS PINR PREL IZ IR SY TU
SUBJECT: SADRISTS SEEK TO BLOCK KURDISH DESIGNS FOR KIRKUK

KIRKUK 00000100 001.2 OF 002


CLASSIFIED BY: JBIGUS, PRT LEADER, REO Kirkuk, DoS.
REASON: 1.4 (b),(d)




1. (C) SUMMARY. The Sadr group is searching for ways to
impede progress on the Kurdification of Kirkuk. A Sadr
representative in Kirkuk said the Sadrists, who represented
about 75 percent of the Shia Arab population in Kirkuk, were at
odds ideologically with the Badr Organization on Kirkuk issues.
He also said the Sadrists in Kirkuk had no problems with the
MNF-I; their problems were with the Kurds. The Sadr
representative warned that the Sadrists would not accept Kirkuk
going to the Kurds and were willing to fight against any group
that tried to remove Kirkuk from Iraq. END SUMMARY.

Rejecting Article 58
--------------


2. (C) IPAO's on 17 April met with Office of the Martyr Sadr
(OMS) representative Dr. Abdul Karim Khalifa al-Hassan to
discuss political issues in Kirkuk. Hassan rejected Article 58,
saying it contradicted "all rules on human rights." He
complained that since the Iraqi Constitution draft had kept TAL
Article 58, it also should have retained Article 53, which
prevented Kirkuk from becoming part of Kurdistan. Hassan
advocated reinstating Article 53 in the final Constitution.
When asked why the Sadrists voted yes on the October 2005
Constitution referendum, he responded that although the Sadrists
in the south favored the Constitution, the Sadrists in Kirkuk
did not.

Da'wa/Sadrists Rival Badr/Kurds in Kirkuk
--------------


3. (C) Hassan said that more Sadrists and Da'wa members lived
in Kirkuk than Badr affiliates. He claimed the Sadrists
represented about 75 percent of the Shia Arab population in
Kirkuk. Hassan said he grouped Da'wa and Sadrists together
because the two groups shared the same ideology of working
against Kurdish designs for Kirkuk and favoring administrative
federalism in Iraq. He said the Badr Organization, in contrast,
coalesced with the Kurds and, like the Kurds, advocated ethnic
federalism.

Kurds, not MNF-I, are Main Nemesis
--------------


4. (C) Hassan pointed out that Shia Arabs in Kirkuk had not
committed any terrorist attacks. He said OMS leader Muqtada
al-Sadr had given clear orders not to attack MNF-I forces in
Kirkuk; but instead to focus on protecting Shia Arabs from the
Kurds. Hassan proposed that if the Sadrists ever attacked MNF-I
forces in Kirkuk, Iraqi authorities could imprison him.


5. (C) Hassan said the Sadrists in Kirkuk had no problems with
the MNF-I; their problems were with the Kurds. Hassan argued
that the Kurds would not be satisfied with Kirkuk oil fields
alone, but would seek to annex other Iraqi oil territory into
the KRG. Hassan complained that the Kurds since Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF) had transferred approximately 250,000 of their
people, many of whom were PKK members, to Kirkuk. He claimed a
PKK community now resided in the northeast area of Kirkuk city.


6. (C) Hassan said Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) forces in Kirkuk were
gathering more support from the south. Hassan warned that the
Sadrists would not accept Kirkuk becoming part of the KRG and
were willing to fight any group that supported that stance,
stating, "this is our faith." He claimed JAM members from Sadr
City in Baghdad were armed and willing to come to Kirkuk to
block a Kurdish takeover. Hassan added that the Shia Arabs had
the right to defend themselves, saying he was confident the JAM
could occupy Kirkuk, as it had done in parts of southern Iraq.

Seeking External Help on Kirkuk
--------------


7. (C) Hassan said he favored allowing the international
community (i.e. UN) to decide Kirkuk's fate. He insisted,
however, that the large influx of Kurds that arrived in Kirkuk
following OIF needed to return to the north before finalizing
any decision. When asked if he would be willing to accept a UN
decision that gave Kirkuk to the Kurds, Hassan said he would
support that decision, as long as the international community
thoroughly and thoughtfully researched it. He said non-Kurd
groups in Iraq had formed a consultative committee to work to
keep Kirkuk part of Iraq, but the committee members had not yet
implemented any major decisions or plans.

Biographic Note

KIRKUK 00000100 002.2 OF 002


--------------


8. (C) Hassan was born in Kirkuk. His father moved to Kirkuk
from Al Basrah when the British began exploring oil in Kirkuk.
Hassan earned a Ph.D. in Philosophy. He is responsible for
general relations in Kirkuk for the OMS.

Comment
--------------


9. (C) Hassan appears to recognize that the Kurds are well on
their way to taking Kirkuk and is exploring ways to impede the
process. Hassan's suggestion that a sufficient number of JAM
members from the south would be willing to go to Kirkuk and be
able to defeat the Kurds militarily is an overly bold statement
at this point. Despite Badr assertions to the contrary, the
Sadrists seem to be the dominant Shia Arab group in Kirkuk
province.
BIGUS