ITURI'S MILITIAS: WHY THEY CONTINUE TO FIGHT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KINSHASA 000978

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KPKO KDEM CG UG
SUBJECT: ITURI'S MILITIAS: WHY THEY CONTINUE TO FIGHT


Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Ituri District's security has long been
threatened by the presence of local armed militias backed by
Congolese and Ugandan elements seeking to profit from the
region's abundant natural resources, instability, and lack of
central government authority. Over the past three years, a
series of joint MONUC-FARDC military operations, along with
significant demobilization efforts and the arrest of several
militia leaders, has slowly reduced the overall threat these
militias pose. The current Ituri militias -- an estimated
2,000 fighters -- are however the hard-core remnants of the
former groups. Consequently, the Ituri militias have become
more difficult to eliminate, requiring more comprehensive
economic, political, and security solutions. End summary.

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ORIGINS OF ITURI MILITIAS
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2. (C) The DRC's northeastern Ituri District faces security
challenges resulting from its geographic location, ethnic
composition, and wealth of natural resources. The instability
in this region has often been separate and apart from the
larger threats and waves of violence which have swept through
the eastern part of the country. At the base of the original
conflicts were tensions between indigenous Hema and Lendu
ethnic groups, which fought one another for control of land
for agricultural or pastoral use. Subsequent clashes between
Hema and Lendu continued throughout the wars which engulfed
the rest of the DRC beginning in the late 1990s. However, as
Ituri shares a 200-mile land border with Uganda -- in
addition to 90 miles of shoreline along Lake Albert --
outside interest in the District and neglect by Kinshasa left
it vulnerable to manipulation by its neighbors.


3. (C) In late 2002 and early 2003, Ituri saw the creation of
a host of militia groups backed by individuals in Uganda and
Rwanda. These militias -- including the Union of Congolese
Patriots (UPC),the Front for National Integration (FNI),the
Patriotic Force of Resistance in Ituri (FRPI),and the
People's Armed Forces of Congo (FAPC),among others -- were
founded predominantly along existing ethnic lines. As central
government authority in Ituri was almost non-existent during
this period, these militias effectively controlled the region
politically, economically and military. One of their goals
was to gain control of the region's abundant natural
resources, including gold and wood. The militias fought to
control land, particularly the gold mining region of central
Ituri, and to prevent rival ethnic groups from achieving
economic dominance. Militia groups engaged in extensive
illegal cross-border trade in exchange for money, or more
often, weapons. The lack of central government controls in
Ituri provided an ideal environment for the groups to operate
and thrive.

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SLOWLY REGAINING CONTROL
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4. (C) At its peak, the conflict involved some 25,000 militia
throughout Ituri, which descended by mid-2003 into a complete
state of lawlessness. The French-led Operation Artemis that
year ultimately established a tenuous beachhead in Bunia that
allowed MONUC to resume operations there. As MONUC deployed
several thousand peacekeepers to the region, and the Armed
Forces of the DRC (FARDC) dispatched tens of thousands of its
own troops, joint operations slowly eroded the militias'
overall control of Ituri. While neither MONUC nor FARDC
officials can quantify how many militia members have been
killed, the estimated number of those remaining in Ituri in
mid-2006 is approximately 2,000. MONUC officials and others
in Ituri report that those militias still operating --
primarily the FNI and FRPI -- are concentrated in specific
areas; namely, the Nioka-Fataki axis north of Bunia, and the
Tchei-Semiliki axis south of Bunia.


5. (C) Three other factors, aside from military operations,
have contributed to the decrease in militia numbers. First,
approximately 9,000 ex-combatants have been demobilized and
reintegrated back into their communities. While the
demobilization programs in Ituri have faced significant
financial and logistical problems, they have nonetheless
provided an opportunity for thousands to turn in their arms.
In addition, government authorities have captured several
high-ranking militia leaders over the years, including Thomas
Lubanga of the UPC and Chief Kahwa Mandro of PUSIC. While

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removing these militia commanders from the field has not
resulted in the dissolution or disappearance of the militias
themselves, the arrests have had a chilling effect. Members
of Mahagi's civil society told PolOff on a recent visit that
the handing over of Lubanga to the International Criminal
Court in The Hague was viewed with alarm among militia
supporters -- an indication that militia leaders may no
longer be able to evade justice.


6. (C) A third important factor in addressing the militia
threat in Ituri was the creation of an interim administration
by the GDRC to govern the District as a semi-autonomous
region. Led by District Commissioner Petronille Vaweka, the
interim administration has been able to establish some
measure of control and provide limited services to the
population. Vaweka herself became a central force in
successful efforts to demobilize and disarm militias by
virtue of the authority of her office, as well as her own
tireless efforts to negotiate peace settlements. But lacking
full support and virtually any funding from Kinshasa, Vaweka
and the administration did not -- and still do not -- have
the resources to impose governmental control and to build
economic infrastructure.

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REDUCED NUMBERS, BUT PERHAPS MORE DANGEROUS
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7. (C) Despite their reduced numbers, militias in Ituri still
pose a significant threat to security and stability. The May
28 capture of seven MONUC peacekeepers from Nepal illustrates
the capability these groups possess and the resulting danger
they can cause, even to forces that are better-equipped.
During a May 6-10 visit to Ituri District, PolOff spoke with
a variety of local politicians, civic leaders and MONUC
officials, all of whom said the militias are still a constant
concern. Former MONUC Head of Office Sharouh Sharif reported
that captured or killed militia members have regularly been
found with significant weapons caches, including grenade
launchers, mortars and other light arms. The administrator of
Mahagi territory, Jean-Paul Likambo, said the area around
Nioka is effectively ungovernable because of the presence of
the FNI militia led by Peter Karim. Likambo said the militia
there often sets up road blocks and levies illegal taxes from
local merchants and traders. In Djugu and Irumu territories,
MONUC humanitarian officials report that thousands have been
forced to flee their homes due to the threat from militias.
(Note: The IDP problem in Ituri is made worse because local
populations will often leave an area in advance of expected
military operations against the militias. End note.)
Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) officials in Bunia and
Mahagi said their operations were often hampered because they
are not able to access areas controlled by the militias, and
therefore are unable to deliver voting equipment or conduct
civic education campaigns.

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WHY THEY FIGHT: THE ECONOMIC ANGLE
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8. (C) Militias continue their fight in Ituri largely to
retain control of Ituri's resource wealth. Any remaining
pretense that Ituri's militias had been engaged in an ethnic
conflict dissolved in 2005 with the creation of the umbrella
organization called the Congolese Revolutionary Movement
(MRC),which sought to bring together Ituri's various
militias. The focus of militia activities has shifted towards
a common enemy, as militias now battle MONUC and the FARDC
rather than each other in order to protect their economic
interests. Ituri District Commissioner Vaweka said militias
only fight now to control resources and to secure illegal
trade routes to Uganda. Vaweka added that because the GDRC
cannot provide jobs or money to the population, joining the
militias becomes an attractive option. Bunia's Bishop
Monsignor Dieudonne Uringi agreed, saying the militias are
further supported by local businessmen with known economic
ties in Uganda. These local merchants, Uringi said, often
facilitate the illegal transfer of goods across the border
and use the proceeds to purchase and smuggle weapons to the
militias.


9. (C) By extension, Ituri's militias have become the
facilitators for illegal trade across the border. Since the
GDRC is unable to provide basic needs or regular employment,
militia members see their only chances of economic survival
coming from illicit commerce. District Commissioner Vaweka
said demobilized ex-combatants are often lured back into

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militia ranks by the promise and security of regular pay and
food, things they cannot secure for themselves in civilian
life because of the dismal state of the economy. MONUC
officials in Ituri said this explains why militias have been
successful in recruiting members in recent months,
particularly from the ranks of ex-combatants.

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THE WAY FORWARD: POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
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10. (C) Resolving Ituri's militia problem requires an
approach that addresses the intertwined economic and security
dynamics of the DRC and Uganda. Attempts by MONUC, the
international community and local officials to convince
militias to surrender their arms and re-enter the community
have produced limited results, and are hampered by
ineffective management and funding of the DRC's
demobilization program. The military solution to neutralize
militias, in the form of joint MONUC-FARDC operations, has
also proven to be less than fully effective in establishing
security, particularly as the FARDC itself often contributes
to the region's instability. Aside from more focused efforts
in these areas, though, there is a need for greater
governmental presence and authority in Ituri, along with a
robust economic development program. With increased
government control and oversight in the border region, the
illegal trade that now exists can be monitored, regulated,
taxed, and legitimized, thereby improving economic conditions
on both sides of the border, and reducing the incentive for
militias to continue their fight.


11. (C) The region's economic infrastructure must be rebuilt.
This should include the creation of substantive job-training
and job-creation programs, including for ex-combatants. Also
important is economic integration with Uganda. The aim should
be to benefit both countries through legitimizing and
regulating regional economic trade, with the implementation
of border and customs controls and the collection of
legitimate revenue.


12. (C) In terms of security, steps can be taken in several
areas to reduce the militia threat, apart from direct
military confrontation. First and foremost, the central
government needs to establish authority in Ituri after years
of neglect. The GDRC will need to work directly and
cooperatively with the newly-elected governor and local
representatives to ensure economic development and
reconstruction programs are implemented, and the central
government needs to share revenues with Ituri District.
Border security remains a pressing issue for military, police
and customs officials to resolve, as large portions of the
DRC-Uganda border are not monitored. Finally widespread
illegal arms trafficking needs to be brought under control.

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COMMENT: FIXING THE HEART OF THE MATTER
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13. (C) The solution to the Ituri militia threat is no longer
just a matter of neutralizing or disarming combatants.
Instead, it requires the creation of legitimate and capable
local government authorities that can address the region's
underlying economic, political, and security problems and
thereby eliminate the incentives for militias to continue
their fight. End comment.
MEECE