Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA897
2006-06-06 11:39:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:  

DRC'S ELECTION CALENDAR: LONG-TERM VIEW

Tags:  PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO GC ELECTIONS 
pdf how-to read a cable
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FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
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RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
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RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000897 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO GC ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC'S ELECTION CALENDAR: LONG-TERM VIEW


Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason: 1.4 (b/d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KINSHASA 000897

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO GC ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC'S ELECTION CALENDAR: LONG-TERM VIEW


Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reason: 1.4 (b/d)


1. (C) Summary: While there are still many hurdles to clear
to ensure a successful July 30 first-round election as
scheduled, the Independent Election Commission (CEI) and the
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT)
have initiated detailed planning for the second round, and
the corresponding successful completion of the DRC,s
long-running Transition. The picture is somewhat
discouraging, with a relatively optimistic scenario featuring
an October 15 second-round election date, and a possible new
President and government taking office by the end of November
or December. The CEI and CIAT members are trying to find
ways to shorten this timetable, but requirements of the
election law and practical realities of the DRC render this
difficult. The CEI will not announce a second round
timetable until it is confident the timeline is as short as
possible, and that the schedule can be maintained. Increased
fiscal pressures and inadequate budget revenues will compound
problems in coming months. The bottom line is an extended
period of uncertainty and weak government, and increased
pressure from domestic critics, all contributing to a
particularly vulnerable period. It will be important for the
international community to offer strong assurances of
support, and hopefully solidarity in coming months (see para
8),to help realize a successful end to the DRC transition
and installation of a democractically elected government.
End summary.

Campaigning, Counting, Contesting and the Calendar
-------------- --------------


2. (SBU) Nobody in the DRC is yet taking the announced July
30 first-round election target for granted. Various
opposition politicians have already announced positions
opposing any continuation of the existing Transition
institutions beyond June 30 and threatening demonstrations
and disruptions. Major logistical and organizational hurdles
remain as well to be overcome for a successful July 30
election exercise. Nonetheless, preparations are proceeding,

including distribution of polling place "kits," the printing
of ballots - with an expected 1,800 tons of printed ballots
expected to be delivered to holding points in the DRC by the
end of this month - and preparation of final voter
registration lists. In recent weeks, members of the
Independent Election Commission (CEI) and the 16 member
International Committee to Accompany the Transition (CIAT)
have been looking at requirements to complete the election
process, and thus the DRC,s Transition. Specifically, both
groups have been studying what is needed for the planned
second election round and full completion of the Transition.
The second round election will include a potential
presidential run-off if no candidate gains an absolute
majority in the first round, and elections for provincial
legislatures who will in turn select national Senators and
provincial governors.


3. (C) Initial discussions involving CEI President Malu Malu
and the CIAT have not encouraged hopes for a short, tidy
process. For example, given logistics difficulties and legal
requirements, current CEI planning indicates that all 64
regional compilation centers across the DRC may not be able
to compute and verify provisional election results for
Congo,s 169 voting districts before August 20, with official
results verified and announced by the CEI in Kinshasa by
September 2. Legally required periods to contest these
results would result in final official results of the
presidential race published on September 14. A thirty-day
campaign would then result in a second round election around
October 15. This assumes that work already underway to
prepare candidate lists and ballots for provincial elections
will also be completed by that time.


4. (C) Similar calculations for an October 15 second round,
including compilation, transmission of ballots and
provisional results to the compilation centers, final
verification in Kinshasa, and required resolution of
inevitable legal challenges would bring a final definitive
announcement of the presidential winner around the end of
November. At best, this would likely result in a new
government being formed and taking office before the end of
the calendar year. The possibilities for further delays in
the complicated process are clear, potentially pushing dates
back further. Happily, none of these internal discussions
have yet found their way into the local press or public
debate. CEI President Malu Malu has assured CIAT members
that he has no intention of announcing a timetable for a

KINSHASA 00000897 002 OF 004


second round until work to identify the required time has
been completed, and the CEI has full confidence that the
announced target date can be met.

And the Consequences
--------------


5. (C) The scenario outlined above poses many obvious risks.
The already barely functional Transition government will
increasingly lose its authority, as well as its already
limited ability to function as the country progresses through
the campaign and election cycle. The prospect of a very lame
duck and weak government limping through months of electoral
ambiguity is not comforting. Worse still, the March 31
suspension of the IMF,s formal program with the DRC implies
major and growing financial pressures on the GDRC,s
relatively small budget, further hobbling Kinshasa,s ability
to manage its policies and programs. Given the elimination
of budgetary support from various sources associated with the
IMF program suspension, an IMF mission last week calculated
that the GDRC will have available about USD 68 million per
month in revenues. Roughly half of that is needed for
salaries, and another USD 10 million for debt service (if
paid) and other legal recurring obligations, leaving around
USD 23 million for everything else - clearly insufficient for
a normal range of government operations. Various spoilers,
including the opposition UDPS party and those who see
themselves as election losers, are also likely to choose to
step up anti-government activities during the time of
greatest government weakness. Overall, stability of the
Kinshasa government will be under substantial threat over a
period of several months until a new government is named and
begins to function.

Questions Over Succession
--------------


6. (C) A final element of uncertainty of this final
Transition period is the how and when of the move from
Transition government to post-election government. The new
DRC Constitution specifies, for example, that the future
Prime Minister should be named from the "parliamentary
majority" following consultations between the President and
the Parliament. It is unclear, however, if this refers
uniquely to the National Assembly, expected to be elected in
the July 30 first round, or both the Senate and National
Assembly. Future Senators are to be chosen by provincial
legislatures, themselves elected in the second round, pushing
likely formation of a Senate well into 2007. CEI President
Malu Malu recently told the CIAT that he believes that only a
National Assembly majority is relevant to the choice of Prime
Minister, and a number of legal experts argue that other
constitutional references, precedents set in France (which
also uses a mixed Presidential/parliamentary system),and
relevant laws support this position. In practical terms, it
will be important for the "National Assembly only" view to
prevail, at least for the first post-election government, to
avoid an even longer and likely untenable period of
uncertainly before a new government is formed. There is not
yet, however, a consensus view in Kinshasa on this question.


7. (C) Given the obvious weakness of the Transition
government and the increasingly clear period of uncertainty,
others are beginning to debate the merits of interim
structures. For example, one idea is the formation of some
kind of caretaker government to oversee daily operations
until a post-election government is formed. Such ideas are,
however, impractical and even potentially dangerous. Many
Congolese politicians view such an idea as a great
opportunity to reposition themselves and/or get access to the
trough. Negotiations among the DRC political class to form
yet another interim government could drag on forever.
Related, a number of parties, led by the UDPS but including
some with the government as well, have been calling for a new
"dialogue" to chart the future, a pretext for at least some
to attempt to reset the entire electoral process. Not
surprisingly, President Kabila and his PPRD party strongly
oppose such a proposal as an unacceptable risk to further
delays in the election process and completion of the
Transition. Should talk of new negotiations gain traction,
the risk to the election timetable is clear.

What We Can Do
--------------


8. (C) Given the factors described above, there is no magic
answer to assure safe and successful Congolese passage

KINSHASA 00000897 003 OF 004


through the period of uncertainty ahead and successful
installation of a democratically elected government. The
success of this process, however, is of great importance for
the country and general regional stability. There are a
number of steps which can be taken to help get through this
difficult period.

a) Strong and hopefully unified international community
support to the process will be critical. It will be
important for all major international players to offer
repeated and strong public messages of support to the CEI and
the general Transition process to reassure the Congolese
public, and keep political leaders on notice that actions
will not be tolerated which threaten the timely and
successful completion of the Transition. The CIAT will be
maintained as an institution until an elected President is
sworn in, and it represents one vehicle for such messages.
Bilateral messages or senior-level visits from key
governments, the Security Council and MONUC, the European
Commission and other interested parties will also be
important. The principal and overriding messages must be to
focus on the progress of the election process, underscore the
importance of the established calendar, and reiterate the
determination of the international community to support the
Congolese people to see this process through to successful
completion. Such international solidarity and support has
been critical to the achievement of peace agreements and
generally helping shepherd the Transition to its current
point. It will be even more important during this final
phase.

b) The CIAT, the Elections Steering Committee, and technical
working groups must continue to identify all possible
measures to compress the election calendar as much as
possible. The CEI retains final authority for setting the
election calendar and is well aware of the need to keep the
election period as short as possible, but all potential
viable measures to reduce the required time should be
explored. One item already identified, for example, is to
reduce the planned 30 day second-round campaign period to 15
days.

c) MONUC,s mandate is scheduled to expire September 30.
While most if not all observers recognize the need to extend
MONUC,s operations, hopefully the Security Council debate
and decisions accompanying a presumed extension resolution
will provide further reassurances of international community
will to see the DRC,s Transition through to timely and
successful completion.

d) We should encourage other institutions and governments to
avoid overloading the agenda. The list of critical needs in
the DRC is huge, but the government during this remaining
Transition period will have a very limited ability to deal
with problems. We should avoid levying too many demands in
coming months, focusing only on elections, critically
important security sector issues, key humanitarian crises,
and general fiscal discipline sufficient to ensure essential
needs are addressed.

e) We should identify anything we can do to mitigate the
fiscal pressures that will increasingly be felt in the DRC as
a result of the IMF formal program suspension, and the
resultant cut-off of budgetary support from a variety of
sources. The fact is there will be insufficient GDRC budget
revenues for many government operations under any realistic
scenario. We must not only insist on strict GDRC budget
discipline, but as well seek to assist to moderate the
negative impact on Congolese of program and service cuts, and
encourage other governments and institutions to do likewise.

f) We should also ensure that potential regional tensions are
kept in check. Relations in recent months between the DRC
and Rwanda have improved, although those with Uganda have
deteriorated. Whatever the specifics of regional relations
among these key players, as well as with Burundi,
Congo-Brazzaville, and other countries in the region, it will
be important that regional tensions or actions do not
exacerbate destabilization pressures inside the DRC during
the fragile period leading to establishment of the
post-election government.

Final Comment: Hope and Fear
--------------


9. (C) The Congolese and their international partners,
certainly including the U.S., have traversed a long, painful,

KINSHASA 00000897 004 OF 004


and often circuitous path to bring an end to years of
conflict and offer the prospect of a democratically-elected
government for the first time to the Congolese people. The
country is now closer to legitimate and credible elections
than at any point since independence over 40 years ago, with
the first round elections now less than two months away.
Fundamental changes are taking place in the country, and
there are now grounds for more hope and optimism for a
positive future than has been the case for decades - possibly
ever. With the opportunity are also grave risks, however,
and the next few months represent a particularly difficult
and vulnerable period.

MEECE