N. KIVU GOVERNOR POLITICAL POSITIONING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 000470

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KPKO CG
SUBJECT: N. KIVU GOVERNOR POLITICAL POSITIONING

REF: KINSHASA 0101

Classified By: Ambassador Roger Meece. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).


1. (C) During a February 28 dinner in Goma (North Kivu
Province) Governor Eugene Serufuli asserted to the Ambassador
his confidence about the electoral future of North Kivu.
Serufuli indicated that he has been coordinating with
President Kabila and his staff, ostensibly regarding handling
of the crisis centered on recent insurgent military activity
associated with renegade general Laurent Nkunda. Serufuli
obliquely implied, however, that he has been reaching some
political agreements as well. The Ambassador noted numerous
signs around Goma of an expected Presidential visit to Goma.
Serufuli confirmed that is the case, appeared sanguine about
the prospect, and acknowledged that Kabila would likely
receive a good reception in Goma.


2. (C) Regarding Nkunda, Serufuli appears to have hardened
his position following the late January/February insurgent
activity centered on Rutshuru,(reftel) and described what he
sought to characterize as his own central role in helping
defuse the immediate crisis. Serufuli outlined plans to move
former ANC (Note: the former army of the RCD-Goma party)
troops out of the area Nkunda uses as a base, reducing
Nkunda,s armed protection. Serufuli predictably
characterized his own role as key to this effort, but did
note that he is working closely with military district
commander Amisi and MONUC forces regarding the problem.
Serufuli reported four of six battalions had already been
moved to another town in the province, with more to follow.
Serufuli concurred on the need to arrest Nkunda, albeit in a
manner that does not destabilize the tenuous order of the
province. Asked from what source Nkunda continued to draw
support, Serufuli thought that the former FARDC 5th
integrated brigade commander had been diverting funds to
Nkunda, and also noted reports that exile politician Katete
Kototo may be providing support as well.


3. (C) Serufuli stated that while he has coordinated his
actions with Kabila, RCD-Goma President (and DRC Vice
President) Ruberwa had not been particularly helpful, indeed
perhaps a bit of a problem.


4. (C) In the political arena, Serufuli did not profess to be
particularly concerned about any political threat posed by
declared Presidential candidate Pierre Pay Pay, who is also
from the Kivus. Nor did he express particular concern about
northern North Kivu-based Mbusa Nyamwisi, current DRC
Regional Cooperation Minister, although Serufuli avoided much
specific discussion of Mbusa.


5. (C) A variety of other Goma business and community leaders
in other meetings in Goma confirmed to the Ambassador that
RCD-Goma President Ruberwa,s influence has all but vanished
in North Kivu. Many, however, were unsure about Serufuli,s
own position, particularly in the most northern reaches of
the province where Mbusa holds sway.


6. (C) Comment: While Serufuli is in theory Ruberwa,s deputy
in the RCD-Goma party hierarchy, it is clear that he has long
been working to marginalize Ruberwa in his province. It
appears he has largely succeeded. Serufuli,s statements of
regret over Ruberwa,s supposed lack of helpfulness in
dealing with Nkunda in fact are more likely simply signs of
Serufuli,s continuing efforts to discredit Ruberewa. It is
widely believed in Kinshasa that Kabila and his staff have
been seeking to broker some political deals in North Kivu
with Serufuli, and Serufuli,s demeanor and statements at the
dinner would tend to confirm this is the case. Kabila is
counting on major voting support in the Kivus and would be
happy to see further divisions within RCD-Goma. For his
part, Serufuli, a Hutu, may be counting on a working deal
with Kabila to help provide support among various Kivu ethnic
groups for Serufuli,s gubernatorial candidacy. Serufuli,s
professed lack of particular concern about Mbusa,s rival
political support in the north may have been bravado, or may
reflect some confidence that a deal with Kabila will help to
neutralize Mbusa, whose base is among North Kivu,s Nande
community. Regarding Nkunda, Serufuli has repeatedly told us
for months that he supports arresting Nkunda, but in fact
Serufuli appeared reasonably content with the existing
situation. The Rutshuru clashes may have changed that
position. Serufuli is fully capable of changing political
directions at will in whatever manner appears expedient. For
now, at least, he appears to want to go to elections, a
positive factor in helping to maintain order in the province,

KINSHASA 00000470 002 OF 002


and he seems convinced that an understanding with Kabila best
serves his interests - at least until after the elections.
End comment.

MEECE