Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA175
2006-02-01 17:28:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:
VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA STILL CONFIDENT OF
how-toThis record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 011728Z Feb 06 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3043 INFO RWANDA COLLECTIVE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY CIA WASHDC DIA WASHDC HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000175
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA STILL CONFIDENT OF
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 000175
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA STILL CONFIDENT OF
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
1. (C) During a January 25 discussion, VP Azarias Ruberwa
(President of the Rally for Congolese Democracy party) told
PolCouns that he is confident of his chances to win election
as president of the DRC. (Note: Ruberwa was unanimously
nominated as his party's presidential candidate during the
party's convention in early December 2005. End Note.) He
continues to point to his increasing popularity (a recent
poll showed him outperforming fellow Vice President
Jean-Pierre Bemba, head of the rival party Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo or MLC) as evidence that he can win a
national election. When pressed, Ruberwa admitted that if he
cannot actually win the election he would like to be in
second or third position after the first round of the
presidential elections (the Congolese constitution envisions
a runoff among the top two aspirants if no candidate achieves
51% of the vote initially),in order to be well positioned to
negotiate for the Prime Ministerial post.
2. (C) Ruberwa is less confident of his party's chances,
however, and continues to actively consider possible
electoral alliances to bolster the possibility that his RCD
party will form part of the majority coalition (the most
likely outcome) in the elected National Assembly. (Note: This
is a crucial consideration, as the constitution requires the
president to name the prime minister from the majority -- or
a majority coalition -- in the Assembly. Even if Ruberwa
performs above expectations, his party would not benefit
unless Ruberwa's coattails are long since both the first
presidential election and the parliamentary elections will
take place at the same time, thereby removing any "boost"
that a party might otherwise have achieved from the
positioning of its presidential candidate. End Note.)
Ruberwa is continuing his two-pronged strategy in relation to
Etienne Tshishikedi's UDPS party; i.e., publicly urging
Tshishikedi to take part in elections while simultaneously
SIPDIS
using his RCD candidates in the UDPS stronghold provinces of
Kasai West and East to woo disaffected UDPS voters at the
grassroots. (Comment: It is still far from clear that
Tshishikedi will actually take part in the elections. His
SIPDIS
non-participation could effectively give Ruberwa's campaign,
and that of his party, a boost. End Comment.) Ruberwa also
wondered, rhetorically, if President Kabila's PPRD party
would be open to an alliance with the RCD (party hard-liners
in both groups oppose such a coalition),and at what cost.
3. (C) Comment: Ruberwa, a decent and intelligent man, is not
a professional politician, and therefore continues to
overestimate his electoral potential. The reality is that in
this election, neither he nor his party will do as well as he
hopes, in large part because prevailing
anti-Tutsi/anti-Rwanda prejudices remain strong and are
easily inflamed by real or perceived Rwandan aggression. (The
RCD party originally was established by Rwanda as a proxy and
until relatively recently many of its officials still
responded more to Kigali than Kinshasa.) Some of the party's
non-Tutsi members, such as its candidates in the Kasais, seem
to stand a good chance in their own electoral districts, but
Ruberwa's candidacy will not benefit from their success.
Ruberwa and Kabila have spoken privately on at least two
occasions about a possible alliance, but Kabila remains
concerned about the "Tutsi factor," while Ruberwa is
unwilling to abandon his presidential aspirations. (One of
the PPRD's demands reportedly is that whoever wishes an
eventual alliance with the party cannot have a candidate
running against Joseph Kabila for election.) Likewise,
Ruberwa is an unlikely choice for Prime Minister,
particularly if Olivier Kamitatu (formerly of the MLC but now
heading his own newly-formed group, and who may be mending
fences with Kabila and his party) is available. Ruberwa
likely will have a role to play in the post-electoral
government, although a post such as Attorney General or
Minister of Justice might better suit his personality and
talents.
MEECE
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/01/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: VICE PRESIDENT RUBERWA STILL CONFIDENT OF
ELECTORAL PROSPECTS
Classified By: PolCouns MSanderson, reasons 1.4 b/d.
1. (C) During a January 25 discussion, VP Azarias Ruberwa
(President of the Rally for Congolese Democracy party) told
PolCouns that he is confident of his chances to win election
as president of the DRC. (Note: Ruberwa was unanimously
nominated as his party's presidential candidate during the
party's convention in early December 2005. End Note.) He
continues to point to his increasing popularity (a recent
poll showed him outperforming fellow Vice President
Jean-Pierre Bemba, head of the rival party Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo or MLC) as evidence that he can win a
national election. When pressed, Ruberwa admitted that if he
cannot actually win the election he would like to be in
second or third position after the first round of the
presidential elections (the Congolese constitution envisions
a runoff among the top two aspirants if no candidate achieves
51% of the vote initially),in order to be well positioned to
negotiate for the Prime Ministerial post.
2. (C) Ruberwa is less confident of his party's chances,
however, and continues to actively consider possible
electoral alliances to bolster the possibility that his RCD
party will form part of the majority coalition (the most
likely outcome) in the elected National Assembly. (Note: This
is a crucial consideration, as the constitution requires the
president to name the prime minister from the majority -- or
a majority coalition -- in the Assembly. Even if Ruberwa
performs above expectations, his party would not benefit
unless Ruberwa's coattails are long since both the first
presidential election and the parliamentary elections will
take place at the same time, thereby removing any "boost"
that a party might otherwise have achieved from the
positioning of its presidential candidate. End Note.)
Ruberwa is continuing his two-pronged strategy in relation to
Etienne Tshishikedi's UDPS party; i.e., publicly urging
Tshishikedi to take part in elections while simultaneously
SIPDIS
using his RCD candidates in the UDPS stronghold provinces of
Kasai West and East to woo disaffected UDPS voters at the
grassroots. (Comment: It is still far from clear that
Tshishikedi will actually take part in the elections. His
SIPDIS
non-participation could effectively give Ruberwa's campaign,
and that of his party, a boost. End Comment.) Ruberwa also
wondered, rhetorically, if President Kabila's PPRD party
would be open to an alliance with the RCD (party hard-liners
in both groups oppose such a coalition),and at what cost.
3. (C) Comment: Ruberwa, a decent and intelligent man, is not
a professional politician, and therefore continues to
overestimate his electoral potential. The reality is that in
this election, neither he nor his party will do as well as he
hopes, in large part because prevailing
anti-Tutsi/anti-Rwanda prejudices remain strong and are
easily inflamed by real or perceived Rwandan aggression. (The
RCD party originally was established by Rwanda as a proxy and
until relatively recently many of its officials still
responded more to Kigali than Kinshasa.) Some of the party's
non-Tutsi members, such as its candidates in the Kasais, seem
to stand a good chance in their own electoral districts, but
Ruberwa's candidacy will not benefit from their success.
Ruberwa and Kabila have spoken privately on at least two
occasions about a possible alliance, but Kabila remains
concerned about the "Tutsi factor," while Ruberwa is
unwilling to abandon his presidential aspirations. (One of
the PPRD's demands reportedly is that whoever wishes an
eventual alliance with the party cannot have a candidate
running against Joseph Kabila for election.) Likewise,
Ruberwa is an unlikely choice for Prime Minister,
particularly if Olivier Kamitatu (formerly of the MLC but now
heading his own newly-formed group, and who may be mending
fences with Kabila and his party) is available. Ruberwa
likely will have a role to play in the post-electoral
government, although a post such as Attorney General or
Minister of Justice might better suit his personality and
talents.
MEECE