Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KINSHASA1669
2006-10-28 13:07:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kinshasa
Cable title:
DRC ELECTIONS: MLC LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN AND
how-toVZCZCXRO3082 PP RUEHMR RUEHRN DE RUEHKI #1669/01 3011307 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 281307Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY KINSHASA TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5060 INFO RUEHXR/RWANDA COLLECTIVE RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC RHEFDIA/DIA WASHDC RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE RUFOADA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001669
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC ELECTIONS: MLC LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN AND
POST-ELECTION PERIOD
REF: A. KINSHASA 1485
B. KINSHASA 1652
C. KINSHASA 1622
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001669
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC ELECTIONS: MLC LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN AND
POST-ELECTION PERIOD
REF: A. KINSHASA 1485
B. KINSHASA 1652
C. KINSHASA 1622
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.
1. (C) Summary: Key officials of Vice President Jean-Pierre
Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) say they
are confident that Bemba will hold key strongholds in the
October 29 presidential election and increase his tally
elsewhere. They complain that MLC supporters are being
harassed by pro-Kabila campaigners. In the event of a Kabila
victory, they believe he and his supporters will attempt to
marginalize or threaten the MLC, and would be based on
"exclusion" and "arrogance." End summary.
2. (U) Two key advisers to Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba
discussed presidential campaign and post-election issues with
PolCouns and PolOff in separate meetings October 20 and 23.
Delly Sesanga, former Bemba chief of staff and spokesman for
the Union for the Nation (UN) electoral alliance, and Thomas
Luhaka, Executive Secretary of Bemba's Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo (MLC) party, held senior positions in
the transitional government until taking seats in the new
parliament installed in late September. They have formed,
with Francois Muamba, the core of strategists and negotiators
for Bemba's dealing with the Kabila camp and the
international community.
--------------
MLC CONFIDENT BEMBA WILL HOLD THE WEST
--------------
3. (C) Both expressed optimism about Bemba's chances in key
western provinces for the October 29 presidential vote. They
agreed Bemba would carry Kinshasa as he did in the first
round. Luhaka, who is coordinating Bemba's campaign in the
capital, thought Bemba might even improve his showing in
Kinshasa. He was also confident about Bemba's chances in
Bandundu province, stronghold of Antoine Gizenga's Unified
Lumumbist Party (PALU),which has allied with President
Kabila's Alliance for the Presidential Majority (AMP) (ref
A). In Luhaka's view, Gizenga's decision to back Kabila is
being rejected by PALU's supporters. He also claimed PALU
would be unable to motivate voters to head to the polls
because it lacks a "big political machine."
4. (C) Sesanga said he believes Bemba will also do well in
Equateur and Bas-Congo provinces, as he did July 30. He also
maintained Bemba has strong support in Eastern and Western
Kasai provinces. A native Kasaian, he agreed that the winner
there will most likely be determined by voter participation,
particularly in the provincial capitals of Kananga and
Mbuji-Mayi (ref B).
5. (C) Sesanga claimed Kabila's support in the East is in
fact weak, despite Kabila's strong showing there in the first
round. He said the MLC campaign there aimed at revealing
Kabila's "lies" about his efforts to secure the country and
restore peace.
--------------
BUT CONCERNED ABOUT CAMPAIGNING
--------------
6. (C) Both Sesanga and Luhaka raised concerns about the
conduct of the current political campaign. They claimed MLC
supporters were being targeted throughout the country, and
that Kabila supporters were misusing state resources. Luhaka
reiterated the MLC's criticism of the decision to limit the
presidential campaign to 15 days because it did not provide
enough time to travel throughout the country.
7. (C) Sesanga confirmed that Bemba would not campaign
outside Kinshasa because the party has "no confidence" in
Kabila or Congolese security forces to provide adequate
protection. He said Bemba did not accept MONUC's offer of a
helicopter for campaigning because he would have had to
travel via Kabila-controlled airports before being able to
use it. Luhaka claimed some party members had been harassed
by Kabila's Republican Guard while attempting to campaign in
Kinshasa and in Kisangani.
8. (C) Sesanga complained that the recently signed campaign
code of conduct was not being respected by Kabila's AMP. He
cited what he saw as AMP-inspired violence in the eastern
KINSHASA 00001669 002 OF 002
cities of Lubumbashi, Lodja, and Bukavu (ref C). He also said
the AMP had effectively "privatized" the
government-controlled RTNC television station, using it to
broadcast messages exclusively favoring Kabila.
--------------
THINKING ABOUT LIFE IN THE OPPOSITION
--------------
9. (C) Sesanga and Luhaka expressed confidence in a Bemba
victory, but it is clear they are considering the possibility
of a Bemba loss. Both spoke openly about the potential future
of the MLC as an opposition party. Each expressed different
views of what form such a future might take, but were certain
that it would be driven by attempts by the Kabila camp to
exclude others from power.
10. (C) Sesanga said he believes a Kabila-AMP victory would
create a "government of exclusion" to monopolize power. He
expressed doubt that Kabila would recognize or respect the
rights of a political opposition, and might use the state
security apparatus to monitor the MLC and harass its members.
11. (C) Sesanga stated that the party had every right to
defend itself and would react strongly if Kabila attempts to
intimidate the MLC following the election. He sketched out a
scenario in which the MLC, in alliance with the Kasai-based
Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS),would
effectively make Kinshasa, Equateur, Bas-Congo and Eastern
and Western Kasai, "ungovernable."
12. (C) In Luhaka's view, life for the MLC in opposition
would be "comfortable," but Kabila and his supporters in the
National Assembly would govern "with arrogance" if they won.
He said this would lead to an eventual breakdown in the AMP
coalition, leaving the MLC the only party remaining able to
provide leadership in the parliament.
-------------- -
COMMENT: BELIEVING THEY AT LEAST HAVE A CHANCE
-------------- -
13. (C) Comment: Sesanga and Luhaka were clearly wanted to
send the message that the MLC has at least a chance of
winning the election. Bemba faces significant challenges,
however, if he is to defeat Kabila in the October 29
election. End comment.
MEECE
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: DRC ELECTIONS: MLC LEADERS ON CAMPAIGN AND
POST-ELECTION PERIOD
REF: A. KINSHASA 1485
B. KINSHASA 1652
C. KINSHASA 1622
Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.
1. (C) Summary: Key officials of Vice President Jean-Pierre
Bemba's Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC) say they
are confident that Bemba will hold key strongholds in the
October 29 presidential election and increase his tally
elsewhere. They complain that MLC supporters are being
harassed by pro-Kabila campaigners. In the event of a Kabila
victory, they believe he and his supporters will attempt to
marginalize or threaten the MLC, and would be based on
"exclusion" and "arrogance." End summary.
2. (U) Two key advisers to Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba
discussed presidential campaign and post-election issues with
PolCouns and PolOff in separate meetings October 20 and 23.
Delly Sesanga, former Bemba chief of staff and spokesman for
the Union for the Nation (UN) electoral alliance, and Thomas
Luhaka, Executive Secretary of Bemba's Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo (MLC) party, held senior positions in
the transitional government until taking seats in the new
parliament installed in late September. They have formed,
with Francois Muamba, the core of strategists and negotiators
for Bemba's dealing with the Kabila camp and the
international community.
--------------
MLC CONFIDENT BEMBA WILL HOLD THE WEST
--------------
3. (C) Both expressed optimism about Bemba's chances in key
western provinces for the October 29 presidential vote. They
agreed Bemba would carry Kinshasa as he did in the first
round. Luhaka, who is coordinating Bemba's campaign in the
capital, thought Bemba might even improve his showing in
Kinshasa. He was also confident about Bemba's chances in
Bandundu province, stronghold of Antoine Gizenga's Unified
Lumumbist Party (PALU),which has allied with President
Kabila's Alliance for the Presidential Majority (AMP) (ref
A). In Luhaka's view, Gizenga's decision to back Kabila is
being rejected by PALU's supporters. He also claimed PALU
would be unable to motivate voters to head to the polls
because it lacks a "big political machine."
4. (C) Sesanga said he believes Bemba will also do well in
Equateur and Bas-Congo provinces, as he did July 30. He also
maintained Bemba has strong support in Eastern and Western
Kasai provinces. A native Kasaian, he agreed that the winner
there will most likely be determined by voter participation,
particularly in the provincial capitals of Kananga and
Mbuji-Mayi (ref B).
5. (C) Sesanga claimed Kabila's support in the East is in
fact weak, despite Kabila's strong showing there in the first
round. He said the MLC campaign there aimed at revealing
Kabila's "lies" about his efforts to secure the country and
restore peace.
--------------
BUT CONCERNED ABOUT CAMPAIGNING
--------------
6. (C) Both Sesanga and Luhaka raised concerns about the
conduct of the current political campaign. They claimed MLC
supporters were being targeted throughout the country, and
that Kabila supporters were misusing state resources. Luhaka
reiterated the MLC's criticism of the decision to limit the
presidential campaign to 15 days because it did not provide
enough time to travel throughout the country.
7. (C) Sesanga confirmed that Bemba would not campaign
outside Kinshasa because the party has "no confidence" in
Kabila or Congolese security forces to provide adequate
protection. He said Bemba did not accept MONUC's offer of a
helicopter for campaigning because he would have had to
travel via Kabila-controlled airports before being able to
use it. Luhaka claimed some party members had been harassed
by Kabila's Republican Guard while attempting to campaign in
Kinshasa and in Kisangani.
8. (C) Sesanga complained that the recently signed campaign
code of conduct was not being respected by Kabila's AMP. He
cited what he saw as AMP-inspired violence in the eastern
KINSHASA 00001669 002 OF 002
cities of Lubumbashi, Lodja, and Bukavu (ref C). He also said
the AMP had effectively "privatized" the
government-controlled RTNC television station, using it to
broadcast messages exclusively favoring Kabila.
--------------
THINKING ABOUT LIFE IN THE OPPOSITION
--------------
9. (C) Sesanga and Luhaka expressed confidence in a Bemba
victory, but it is clear they are considering the possibility
of a Bemba loss. Both spoke openly about the potential future
of the MLC as an opposition party. Each expressed different
views of what form such a future might take, but were certain
that it would be driven by attempts by the Kabila camp to
exclude others from power.
10. (C) Sesanga said he believes a Kabila-AMP victory would
create a "government of exclusion" to monopolize power. He
expressed doubt that Kabila would recognize or respect the
rights of a political opposition, and might use the state
security apparatus to monitor the MLC and harass its members.
11. (C) Sesanga stated that the party had every right to
defend itself and would react strongly if Kabila attempts to
intimidate the MLC following the election. He sketched out a
scenario in which the MLC, in alliance with the Kasai-based
Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS),would
effectively make Kinshasa, Equateur, Bas-Congo and Eastern
and Western Kasai, "ungovernable."
12. (C) In Luhaka's view, life for the MLC in opposition
would be "comfortable," but Kabila and his supporters in the
National Assembly would govern "with arrogance" if they won.
He said this would lead to an eventual breakdown in the AMP
coalition, leaving the MLC the only party remaining able to
provide leadership in the parliament.
-------------- -
COMMENT: BELIEVING THEY AT LEAST HAVE A CHANCE
-------------- -
13. (C) Comment: Sesanga and Luhaka were clearly wanted to
send the message that the MLC has at least a chance of
winning the election. Bemba faces significant challenges,
however, if he is to defeat Kabila in the October 29
election. End comment.
MEECE