GIZENGA'S PARTY MAKES COMMON CAUSE WITH KABILA IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KINSHASA 001485

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM KPKO CG ELECTIONS
SUBJECT: GIZENGA'S PARTY MAKES COMMON CAUSE WITH KABILA IN
PARLIAMENT AND ELECTIONS

REF: A. KINSHASA 1471


B. KINSHASA 1310

Classified By: PolOff CBrown, reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (C) Summary: Antoine Gizenga's Unified Lumumbist Party
(PALU) announced September 21 it would join a parliamentary
coalition of the Kabila-affiliated Alliance for the
Presidential Majority (AMP),and will support President
Kabila in the October 29 presidential run-off. While such an
alliance should ensure the AMP majority control of the
National Assembly, it is not clear whether even a direct
order from Gizenga himself can overcome the animosity many
traditional PALU members harbor towards Kabila. End summary.


2. (U) The September 21 decision to ally Antoine Gizenga's
PALU with Kabila's AMP was announced at the conclusion of a
PALU caucus meeting that day. Godefroid Mayobo, PALU's
spokesman and a newly-elected parliamentarian, confirmed the
decision on Voice of America. The alliance with PALU will
ensure the AMP a majority in the 500-member National
Assembly. While the AMP has already claimed 270 seats on its
own, PALU's 34 puts the alliance over the 300-seat
"supermajority" required to approve constitutional
amendments.


3. (SBU) PALU support for Kabila in the second round of
presidential voting improves Kabila's chances of victory,
mainly by expanding his potential electoral base westward
from his strongholds in the east. Nationwide, Gizenga won 13
percent of the first-round vote, over 90 percent of which was
concentrated in the western province of Bandundu (where he
won 80 percent) and in Kinshasa (where he won 22 percent).
Kabila tallied less than three percent of the Bandundu vote
and less than 15 percent in Kinshasa, two areas that
comprised less than five percent of his nationwide total.


4. (C) Mayobo and Gizenga political adviser Adolphe Muzito
told us earlier in the week that while there are no
guarantees, PALU members are "loyal" and will follow any
order given by Gizenga. Muzito said PALU members are
well-organized and well-disciplined, and understand the
importance of choosing wisely in the second-round vote.
Mayobo said that PALU is primarily concerned with maintaining
the unity and sovereignty of the DRC and its people, and this
will guide PALU supporters to choose Kabila.


5. (C) According to Muzito, PALU officials and Gizenga
himself concluded that supporting western-based Bemba would
make it appear as if there is truly an East-West divide in
the DRC. An alliance with Kabila, on the other hand, would
promote PALU's focus on the unity and integrity of the
country, rather than exacerbating regional differences. He
said that this made voting for Kabila the only "logical"
choice for PALU.


6. (C) Muzito also said Gizenga was not particularly
impressed with the way Bemba managed his first-round
campaign. He cited in particular Bemba's attempts to use
ethnicity ("Congolite") as a campaign tactic, an effort that
Muzito said only exacerbated tensions. He stated that PALU
officials also were not impressed with Bemba's or RENACO's
policies and governance programs, saying that officials
failed to provide any outline of their priorities. Mayobo
said that Gizenga considered Kabila to be someone who would
be more open than Bemba to different ideas and compromise.


7. (C) Mayobo told us prior to the announcement that the
decision to enter into an alliance with the AMP was made
largely out of consideration for PALU's future. He said
Gizenga knows the AMP will not need PALU's votes to gain a
majority in the National Assembly. Mayobo said Gizenga wants
PALU to be a part of the government and not remain outside
the system. PALU's 34 Assembly seats in the Assembly, Mayobo
said, will enable it to play a decisive role in a future
government.


8. (C) Mayobo and Muzito both emphasized that no deal has
been struck to install Gizenga as prime minister, and Mayobo
claimed the party is not currently insisting on receiving any
particular positions in a future government. Rather, he said
they are seeking "assurances" about the direction Kabila will
take as president, especially toward "good governance."


9. (C) Mayobo and Muzito were careful to portray PALU's
decision as one of creating a coalition with the AMP, not of

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joining the alliance. Muzito said PALU's support of Kabila
and the AMP will only go so far, and that PALU had no
intention of being "subsumed" into the larger alliance.
Mayobo stressed that PALU will be fielding its own candidates
against the AMP in the upcoming provincial assembly elections.


10. (C) Comment. The PALU-AMP alliance was not completely
unexpected, but the question remains whether PALU supporters
can be convinced to vote for an "Easterner" like Kabila.
Even with a order from Gizenga himself, Kabila's low totals
in western provinces in the July 30 vote makes additional
support in these areas a challenge. The political expediency
of joining hands with Kabila and the AMP is clearly
calculated to guarantee Gizenga and PALU at least a seat at
the table, and stands in stark contrast to the decisions
taken by Congo's other longtime opposition figure, Etienne
Tshisekedi, whose denunciations of the electoral and

SIPDIS
political processes have left him and his UDPS party out of
the picture and out of power. End comment.
MEECE