THREE DAYS IN KINSHASA: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AND A

C O N F I D E N T I A L KINSHASA 001439

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM CG EUN UK SA
SUBJECT: THREE DAYS IN KINSHASA: HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS AND A
KABILA-BEMBA REUNION.


Classified By: PolCouns DBrown, reasons 1.4 b,d.


1. (C) Summary. Two days of high-level visitors to Kinshasa
September 11 and 12 were followed September 13 by the
long-awaited face-to-face meeting between President Joseph
Kabila and Vice President Jean-Pierre Bemba, the two
protagonists in the Congolese presidential elections and
August 20-22 partisan violence. While details remain
sketchy, the Kabila-Bemba optics were good, and the role of
the international community was strengthened, given meetings
South African President Mbeki, EU foreign affairs chief
Solana and UK development minister Benn had with them
separately beforehand. The UNGA next week in New York will
provide an opportunity for the USG to reinforce this
dialogue. End summary.


2. (U) The long-awaited meeting of President Kabila and Vice
President Bemba took place September 13 following the visits
of a number of high-level visitors to Kinshasa earlier in the
week. Kabila and Bemba, whose forces shot it out in the
streets of the capital August 20-22, met privately on the
margins of a scheduled meeting at the Presidential Palace
following weeks of posturing and negotiation. Spokesmen
pronounced themselves pleased with the meeting. Congolese
television showed the two chatting and smiling for the
cameras.


3. (U) President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, EU foreign
affairs chief Javier Solana and UK international development
minister Hilary Benn had all traveled to Kinshasa for
meetings with both Kabila, Bemba, UN and elections officials
earlier in the week. Mbeki arrived in the early hours of
September 11 and departed that afternoon. Details of his
meetings remain the subject of speculation, even by close
aides of the candidates. Mbeki told the press he had come to
listen, not to make proposals. Nevertheless, after his
meeting with Bemba, he announced that Bemba had agreed to
fully resume his functions in the government.


4. (C) We understand that Benn,s message focused on several
key points: reduce the military presence, respect media
rules, maintain the October 29 second-round date, campaign on
the issues. Benn held his meetings the same day as Mbeki,
and also delivered signed messages from PM Blair. We
understand from a readout of the Benn meetings that Kabila
blamed Bemba for the August violence, (and vice versa) but
Kabila was prepared to meet with Bemba, and that Bemba also
responded positively.


5. (C) Solana met with both separately on September 12, as
well as inspecting the 1000-odd European Union military force
(EUFOR) in place in the capital. He told the press he had
not come to mediate, but correctly predicted that Kabila and
Bemba would meet the following day. He was accompanied by
the head of his Africa task force, Koen Vervaeke, who told
USEU that Solana pushed both to adhere to the electoral code
of conduct, urged them to meet, and take responsibility for
ensuring peace. Solana also told them of his concern about
the increase in arms in Kinshasa on both sides.


6. (C) Vervaeke characterized the visit as positive, but
Solana,s briefing to ambassadors of EU governments later
appears to have been decidedly pro-Kabila. One participant
told us the overall sense was that Solana could not
countenance a Kabila loss, and that he viewed Bemba as a
"dirty rebel".


7. (SBU) Comment: Many of our Congolese interlocutors had
been calling for intervention by the international community
to bring Kabila and Bemba together. While only a step in the
much larger process, the quick succession of meetings at
least appears to have the desired effect. End comment.
MEECE