US AMBASSADOR TO DRC VISITS RWANDA

C O N F I D E N T I A L KIGALI 000270

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR AF/C
EUCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL RW CG KE XA
SUBJECT: US AMBASSADOR TO DRC VISITS RWANDA

REF: A. 05 KIGALI 1404


B. KIGALI 0004

C. TD-314/17379-06

D. KINSHASA 000358

Classified By: Poloff GLearned. Reasons 1.4(b/d)


1. (C) Summary. US Ambassador Meece visited Rwanda March 2-4.
Highlights of the visit included a stop at Mutobo
Demobilization Camp; a meeting with National Security Service
(NSS) Secretary General Ndahiro; and a meeting with Foreign
Minister Murigande and Ambassador Sezibera, Special Envoy for
the President to the Great Lakes. Discussions with the
Foreign Minister focused on relations between the GDRC and
GOR; the security outlook in eastern Congo; the Congolese
political process; eastern Congo trade issues; and the future
of the Tripartite Plus. Although Murigande acknowledged that
the relationship between the two governments has improved
over the last three years, he stressed that the Tripartite
Plus still plays an important role in improving the political
situation in the Great Lakes Region. Ambassador Meece
described the transition government in Kinshasa as generally
dysfunctional and likely beset by increasing internal
tensions in the run-up to elections. End summary.

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Mutobo and National Security Service
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2. (C) On 2 March, Ambassador Meece crossed from Goma into
Gisenyi, met up with Ambassador Arietti, and proceeded to
Mutobo Demobilization Camp, located outside of the town of
Ruhengeri approximately 120 kilometers from Kigali. The camp,
run by the GOR,s Reintegration and Demobilization
Commission, had 236 ex-combatants in training, including
former Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)
commander Seraphin Bizimungu (a.k.a. Brig Gen Amani) (ref A).
Ambassadors Meece and Arietti were briefed by Philibert
Gakwenzire, Head of the Documentation Department, on the
camp, the demobilization and reintegration process and the
GOR,s policy on returning ex-combatants (ref B). The
Ambassadors also spoke with Amani and some FDLR ex-combatants
who had repatriated from the DRC. Upon returning to Kigali,
Ambassadors and SIMO met with NSS Secretary General, LtCol
Emmanuel Ndahiro (ref C).

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FM on GDRC and GOR Relations
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3. (C) In 3 March meeting with Minister Murigande and
Ambassador Sezibera, Murigande described the relationship
between the GDRC and the GOR as much improved, over the
last three years. Responding to a question, Murigande
asserted that lines of communication between GOR and GDRC
were open and utilized. In fact, he mused that
Rwandan/Congolese diplomatic contacts were more &intense8
than several other Rwandan regional relationships, possibly
as there are more issues to discuss. Murigande noted a
decrease in negative rhetoric from GDRC officials and
increased contact between high ranking officials but said
that it would still take time to establish full
normalization, including the exchange of embassies.
Murigande expressed hope that the DRC presidential elections
will occur on schedule and that the GDRC would turn the
page, regarding its attitude towards Rwanda. He said the
DRC has had the same problems throughout its history,
including the problems with the Mai Mai, and the GOR takes
into account the complicated history of the region for
context.


4. (C) Murigande said the International Community (IC) should
be "encouraged" to increase the pressure on the former Armed
Forces of Rwanda (FAR)-Interahamwe as it is the largest, most
battle hardened group, and represents the biggest security
problem in eastern Congo. He reiterated that the GOR
considers the Tripartite Plus as an important mechanism for
the four countries to discuss regional security issues.


5. (C) Ambassador Meece agreed with the assessment that the
FDLR (which Murigande referred to as ex-FAR-Interahamwe) is
the largest and most militarily capable negative force in the
region, but added that there are a number of threats to both
the general security and the upcoming elections. Other
groups in fact, such as the Ituri militias, the &Jackson8
Mai Mai group, and Laurent Nkunda,s troops have created
greater disruption to the elections process. He added that
available evidence suggests the FDLR leadership has thus far
made the decision to not directly threaten the DRC election
process. Ambassador Meece said that a more generalized
threat to the region is the slow pace of army integration,
the related disarmament, demobilization and re-integration
(DDR) process, and critically important administrative
reforms of the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC). He observed
that these problems will still be around after the elections.
He noted the International Committee to Accompany the
Transition (CIAT) has a unified approach in engaging with the
GDRC and, despite a broad range of interests there is
agreement on the fundamentals,.


6. (C) Murigande said that he had not heard anything about a
possible end to the Tripartite Plus after the elections, he
agreed that the challenges would remain after the elections
and restated his position that the Tripartite Plus should
continue. In response to questions, however, he was vague
about what he viewed as the desired objectives or format for
the future Tripartite Plus process. Ambassador Arietti noted
that the USG recognizes the eastern DRC problems will
continue after the elections and emphasized the need to
discuss the issues with the Tripartite Plus members while
assessing the process and the most helpful way to continue.



7. (C) Ambassador Meece summarized the latest DRC electoral
crisis over the territorial status of Minembwe (ref D) and
noted that all parties have hardened their positions, making
reasonable discussion more difficult and delaying the
implementation of the recently adopted election law.
Murigande acknowledged the situation as a problem and
expressed hope that the CIAT would be able to help with the
resolution.


8. (C) Ambassador Arietti noted that it is becoming more
important to focus on economic issues as economic development
will help both countries. Minister Murigande agreed, stating
that the GOR tried to "jump-start talks" to set up an
electrical power cooperation. The Minister confirmed,
however, that existing Rwanda/DRC/Burundi energy cooperation
arrangements continue to function. He said there is free
movement of people and goods due to the "laissez passer"
recognized by both countries, but claimed that the GDRC was
dragging its feet in further discussions on the tri-border
economic cooperative. Ambassador Sezibera added that the IC
could help to encourage this trade and noted that economic
cooperation is just as important as security. He said that
there is an unhelpful tendency by some groups to
"criminalize" free trade. (Note. In past discussion with
Emboffs, Ambassador Sezibera has been critical of some NGOs
and UN panels and organizations as being anti-free trade. End
note).


9. (C) Ambassador Meece observed that there is a perception
in Kinshasa that Rwanda and Uganda benefit from eastern DRC
trade at the expense of the GDRC. The GDRC,s existing lack
of ability to extend central authority, including the control
of borders and revenues, exacerbates the problem and furthers
the impression of large-scale illegal activity. Ambassador
Meece said trade regulation should be recognized as part of
the problems between the two countries but noted that a
post-election government will open up options and
possibilities that do not now exist.


10. (C) Ambassador Sezibera asserted that it was unfair to
blame Rwanda for both the illegal actions of individuals in
the Kivus and the inability of the of the GDRC to police
itself. Ambassador Meece agreed that Rwanda should not be
blamed for poor governance by the GDRC and noted that the Sun
City accords were not designed to set up an efficient,
self-supporting government, but to end the war and initiate a
transition process. A part of these arrangements was a deal
to allocate Ministerial and other positions, and authority,
making coherent decision-making in the Transition problematic
at best. Ambassador Arietti added that the budget and
capacity limitations of the DRC, eight-two times larger in
size than Rwanda, are not conducive to accurately tracking
revenue. All agreed that the scale of the problems in the DRC
is huge.
ARIETTI