UKRAINE: RADA ADDRESSES ELECTION-RELATED CONCERNS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000987

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: RADA ADDRESSES ELECTION-RELATED CONCERNS,
WITH POLITICS INTRUDING

REF: A. KIEV 912


B. KIEV 936

Classified By: Charge d'affaires, a.i., reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary: On March 14, the Rada (parliament)
addressed election-related concerns about deficiencies in
Polling Station Commission (PSC) staffing and in the voters'
lists voiced by Central Election Commission Chair Davydovych,
NGOs, and political parties in recent days (refs A-B) by
passing a series of technical amendments to the election law
and budget law. While some changes were clearly necessary,
other proposals proved fodder for the election campaign and
mutual charges of intent to commit fraud. The amendments in
Bills 9222 and 9208 to improve PSC staffing and fund higher
stipends and last-minute voter education outreach received
wide-ranging support, and Yushchenko is expected to sign
them.


2. (SBU) The bill to allow election day changes to voter
lists was politically polarizing, however, and President
Yushchenko's representative in the Rada suggested Yushchenko
would veto the version of Bill 9185 that passed, which would
authorize local courts to approve election day additions to
voter lists. The initial proposal by Party of Regions to
authorize the PSCs to amend their own lists was rejected; a
compromise version verbally offered by Rada Speaker Lytvyn
passed after the Socialists switched to support the bill.
Yushchenko's Rada representative warned Yushchenko would veto
9185 due to concerns about fraud and procedural
irregularities, and Orange parties fingered the Regions'
ability and track record of mischief in Donetsk as the
primary reason for their opposition. In contrast, the head
of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) Ihor Popov
supported all of the amendments; Popov also expressed concern
that those who wished Ukraine ill would take advantage of
expected election day difficulties to question the election's
legitimacy. End Summary.

Addressing staffing shortfalls, other glitches
-------------- -


3. (SBU) A staffing shortfall problem at PSCs was created
inadvertently by an election law that mandated committee
representation by any Rada faction with 15 MPs at the time of
the passage of the law (September 2005) at all 33,000 PSCs.
This was exacerbated by low compensation for PSC service, the
inability of the Yushchenko government to organize a
nationwide effort effectively, and PSC commissioners' legal
responsibility for elections violations, according to the
CVU's Popov. The Rada's March 14 fix, Bill 9222, authorized
District Election Commissions (DEC),which form the
intermediate level between the CEC and PSCs, to staff the
PSCs with candidates nominated from a range of sources: the
DEC itself, PSC, party organizations, NGOs, and local
administration officials (mayors, district chiefs). Bill
9208 amended the budget law to increase stipends for those
serving as commissioners from 16 hryvnia ($3.20) to 150
hryvnia ($30) for three days' work.


4. (SBU) Note: 9222 also allowed changes to the local
election ballots without requiring the ballots be reprinted;
authorized printing of ballots in private printing houses,
since government-owned printing firms could not produce all
required ballots for all districts; clarified the allocation
mechanism under proportional representation for the local
elections; allowed PSC commission members to cast ballots at
the PSC where they will work on election day; clarified the
procedure for voiding election results at a PSC; and required
the CEC to provide distance instruction via TV and Radio for
PSC commissioners and to conduct additional public education
outreach for voters.

Addressing voter list concerns...in politicized fashion
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Proper staffing of PSCs should help address a second
concern: the quality of the voters' lists. In the absence of
many functioning PSCs, some voters did not have the
opportunity to check whether they were listed properly in the
lists. CVU head Popov told us March 14 that he estimated
more than 20 percent of PSCs remained non-functioning at the
beginning of March; when CVU representatives had examined
lists in detail, up to 50 percent of the names had mistakes,
mainly from transliteration (Russian to Ukrainian).


6. (SBU) Party of Regions attempted to secure passage of a
separate bill March 14 that would have authorized PSCs to
amend voter lists on the spot on election day; Regions, the
Communists, SPDU(o),and Lytvyn's two factions supported the
proposal, but the motion failed to gain the required 226
votes. When Rada Speaker Lytvyn verbally offered an "amended
version" authorizing additions by court order only, the
Socialist Party switched its votes to support the measure,
allowing 9185 to pass. An AmCit working on U.S. political
consultant Paul Manafort's advisory team to the Yanukovych
campaign told Charge March 14 that Regions found the version
that passed an acceptable compromise. CVU head Popov told
Charge at a March 14 Embassy-hosted election roundtable that
the requirement to stamp a voter's passport after a
court-issued directive to add the name to the voter's list
provided some protection against malfeasance.


7. (SBU) All the "Orange" factions voted against both
versions of 9185: Our Ukraine; Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT);
Rukh; Reforms and Order; Kostenko's Ukrainian People's Party
(UPP); plus the reportedly Yekhanurov-affiliated
"Vidrodzhennya" (Revival) faction. Their objections focused
on the potential for malfeasance in Regions-dominated
Donetsk, where Regions still wielded overwhelming
administrative strengths. Our Ukraine MP Yuri Karmazin said
that Our Ukraine voted against 9185 because even five or ten
people simultaneously submitting appeals at a PSC on voting
day could create a diversion for ballot stuffing and other
violations. Ivan Zayets from UPP added that some Donetsk
precinct commissioners had added up to five thousand people
to their voter lists on previous election days; Our Ukraine
representatives held a press conference March 10 alleging
that PSC voter list alterations had already occurred, with
flawed 2004 lists replacing the newer 2006 lists.


8. (SBU) Yushchenko's Rada representative Yuri Klyuchkovsky
told a USG-funded elections project implementer after the
vote that Yushchenko was almost certain to veto 9185 on two
accounts:

-- the fraud that occurred during the 2004 Presidential
elections, which he did not want repeated; and
-- the violation of procedures for introducing a draft bill;
the vote had been taken on a verbally expressed idea, without
anything on paper indicating specifically what was the
subject of the vote.


9. (C) Commenting on the expected bill on March 13, BYuT
campaign chair Turchynov told visiting EUR DAS Kramer and
Charge that BYuT saw no need for legislation which only
heightened the potential for abuses in administering the
elections. He noted that while the voter list had problems,
Party of Regions had effective administrative control in
eastern Ukraine and he did not want to give them a tool to
facilitate falsification (he added that Our Ukraine had
similar control in some parts of western Ukraine).


10. (C) When Charge raised the procedural concerns with
Presidential Chief of Staff Rybachuk March 13, Rybachuk asked
what the CVU thought (note: a notable embrace of the
positive role an NGO can play in the democratic process).
Rybachuk pledged to talk to the CVU and to CEC Chair
Davydovych, adding: "We're in charge of ensuring the
elections go well."

Can there be a downside to no admin resource abuse?
-------------- --------------


11. (C) The Rada's March 14 amendments show a determination
to try to address technical problems in the administration of
the electoral process identified in the run-up to the
election before it is too late. According to CVU's Popov,
some of the weaknesses stem from the Yushchenko
administration's aversion to using administrative measures to
force local officials to carry out election-related duties;
Popov noted that under Kuchma, chief of staff Medvedchuk
would bully local officials to ensure proper PSC staffing,
but Yushchenko was intent on avoiding accusations of
administrative pressure on the process. Popov said an
unintended result was that oblast officials were more
concerned about cutting deals with potential new members of
oblast councils to prevent themselves from being impeached
than effectively organizing the elections.


12. (C) Popov noted that it was entirely possible that a
party bloc that was likely to fall under the three-percent
threshold to enter the Rada could challenge the results at
almost any PSC, citing that the PSC was not functioning by
the legal deadline, that voters were unable to check their
names on the list, or that voters were unable to vote due to
long lines. In Popov,s opinion, any party with enough
lawyers could lock up the election results in the courts,
leading to several months of judicial gridlock. Popov said
that election administration could prove very messy March 26.
He stressed twice that the disarray could open the GOU to
criticism "by the Russians, black forces, and bad guys" and
be used to question the results of the election.


13. (C) Comment: Political parties continue to seek
advantage by politicizing the electoral process, and some
will no doubt try to call into question the legitimacy of the
March 26 elections. The same parties behind the original
version of Bill 9185 (which would have authorized PSCs to
approve election day additions to voter lists) -- Regions,
Communists, SPDU(o),and what is now the Lytvyn Electoral
Bloc -- fought tooth and nail in the Rada in December 2004,
prior to the December 26 revote which elected Yushchenko,
against amendments designed to prevent fraud carried out by
Yanukovych's legions in the first two rounds, claiming that
limits to absentee and mobile balloting impeded the
constitutional right to vote. Yanukovych's lawyers then
exhausted every legal recourse after the revote to try to
invalidate the results, delaying Yushchenko's inauguration.


14. (C) It appears that similar dynamics may again be in
play. The expected election day confusion March 26 (long
lines, overcrowded polling stations) may be an inconvenience
to average citizens and neutral observers, but it could well
provide an easy pretext for domestic parties dissatisfied
with the results to bring multiple legal cases in the courts,
and for external actors with an axe to grind in Ukraine to
try to create doubt about the validity of the elections.
Longstanding and recurring problems with inaccurate voter
lists and imperfect polling station commissions appear to be
a fact, but what makes this election different from its
predecessors in Ukraine is the absence of evidence that the
central authorities plan to systematically use these
weaknesses, or any others, as tools to determine the outcome.


15. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Gwaltney