Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV479
2006-02-03 16:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: TYMOSHENKO LIEUTENANT TURCHYNOV ON GAS

Tags:  PGOV 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000479 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TYMOSHENKO LIEUTENANT TURCHYNOV ON GAS
CONTRACTS, PROSPECTS FOR MAIDAN REUNITED

REF: A. KIEV 466

B. KIEV 459

C. KIEV 367

D. KIEV 408

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 000479

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016
TAGS: PGOV
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: TYMOSHENKO LIEUTENANT TURCHYNOV ON GAS
CONTRACTS, PROSPECTS FOR MAIDAN REUNITED

REF: A. KIEV 466

B. KIEV 459

C. KIEV 367

D. KIEV 408

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ex-PM Tymoshenko lieutenant Oleksandr
Turchynov told Ambassador February 3 that he thought the
Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) would obtain the additional
unpublicized documents related to the January 4 gas deal and
the newly arranged joint venture by the end of the day; he
thought the documents would be made public within days and
promised to pass copies to the Embassy. Turchynov dampened
expectations of any deal to reunite the Maidan team prior to
the March 26 election, despite talks between Our Ukraine,
BYuT, and the Socialists, citing the mutually differing
preconditions. Turchynov claimed that Our Ukraine governors
were committing administrative resource abuses and showed
Ambassador "dirty" campaign advertisements, which he said had
appeared recently in western Ukraine seeking to denigrate
Tymoshenko; one sought to play on anti-Semitic sentiments.
End summary.

Unpublicized gas deal documents to go public soon
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Former Security Services of Ukraine (SBU) chief and
Tymoshenko lieutenant Oleksandr Turchynov told Ambassador
February 3 that BYuT hoped to secure copies of documents
related to the January 4 gas deal with Gazprom and
RosUkrEnergo (RUE) by the end of February 3 and would make
them public soon thereafter. The RUE role was not just a
problem for Ukraine; it involved the criminalization of
European capital and handing over Europe's energy security to
organized crime kingpin Mogilievich and his cronies. As head
of the SBU, he had launched an investigation of RUE and
queried his counterparts in Hungary, Austria and Germany
about the anonymous shareholders who were the true
beneficiaries behind the front companies and who were not
listed on the primary documents. He did not succeed prior to
resigning September 8; such information would have been very
useful at this juncture.


3. (C) Turchynov claimed that there had been five agreements
signed January 4, not just one, as Naftohaz Chair Ivchenko
and Government of Ukraine (GOU) officials had initially
announced. The documents gave the Russians fixed transit
prices for another 25 years and access to Ukraine's storage

facilities, in effect handing control over Ukraine's entire
gas infrastructure to the Russians. Ambassador noted that
the emerging details of the agreements had surprised us as
well, and we had registered our concern with senior GOU
officials. In response to a question about whether licensing
of the newly formed joint venture might offer an opportunity
to clarify points and improve elements of the deal, Turchynov
stated that receiving a license in Ukraine was no more than
a technicality: once certain documents were signed properly,
license issuing was automatic.


4. (C) Turchynov suggested that GOU officials would attempt
to hold back information on the gas deal through the March 26
elections to avoid a negative impact on Our Ukraine ratings
that public reaction to full disclosure would likely trigger.
It was ridiculous to expect that the Rada would not demand
to see all documents related to the gas deals. Ambassador
noted that the current Cabinet secrecy surrounding the gas
deal stood in contrast to the behavior of the Tymoshenko
cabinet and of the Yekhanurov government prior to this issue.
Turchynov agreed, claiming that the colossal sums of money
involved in this deal and the inevitable corruption had
overcome any resistance Ukrainian officials might have
initially offered.


5. (C) Ambassador noted that several journalists had been
allowed to review copies of the documents February 2 and that
their resulting stories seemed to stress that the deal would
give Ukraine gas at a price of USD 95/thousand tcm for five
years. Turchynov responded that the "good news" line was
part of the GOU effort to distract critical attention through
the March elections. The idea that Russia would wage a "milk
war" on Ukraine (ref A) and cut a deal on gas that was good
for Ukraine at the same time was nonsensical, he added.
Turchynov scoffed at PM Yekhanurov's bravura February 2
statement that he had signed the final approval for the joint
venture himself because ministers with shaking hands and
knees were afraid to act; Turchynov knew of many Naftohaz
executives who had suddenly "taken ill" to avoid any
association with documents that would come back to haunt
anyone who approved them, he predicted.

Will the Maidan team reunite? Not soon
--------------


6. (C) Turchynov dismissed chances for a pre-election deal
between the main Maidan parties (note: see ref B for claims
by Our Ukraine campaign operative Roman Zvarych that such a
deal might be imminent; ref C for the launch of the process).
Turchynov confirmed consultations had occurred, with
Socialist Party (SPU) leader Moroz and deputy leader Iosyp
Vinsky participating along with Our Ukraine figures. But
mutually exclusive conditions by BYuT and Our Ukraine meant
no deal was likely. Turchynov claimed that BYuT's proposal
had introduced the concept of rotational selections of jobs:
the top finishing party could fill the PM slot, the second
party the Rada Speaker, the third party a position of their
choice, and the rest to be divided on a proportional basis.
But BYuT also insisted that no names should be fixed prior to
election results, and that in the meanwhile the parties
needed to agree upon a government platform -- what the
principles, policies, and priorities would be for the
coalition.


7. (C) Turchynov said that Our Ukraine, for its part, had
countered that all positions should be approved by the
President as head of the coalition. With the reality of
constitutional reform, the idea of a presidential veto was
patently ridiculous, as was the Our Ukraine insistence that
the agreement also express support for the current, Our
Ukraine-dominated government. The talks were about the
future coalition, future government, and future program, not
boosting Our Ukraine before the elections, he stressed. At
the same time, Turchynov added, the BYuT representatives in
the consultations expressed a willingness to acknowledge
Yushchenko's leadership of the coalition...if Our Ukraine
endorsed Tymoshenko as the next PM. With Our Ukraine
rejecting that offer, BYuT returned to its earlier stance,
confident that BYuT would finish ahead of Our Ukraine on
March 26.

BYuT campaign going well, but dirty PR appearing
-------------- ---


8. (C) Turchynov acknowledged BYuT had conducted discussions
with Yanukovych's Regions but claimed that the parties'
perspectives differed so much that there was little chance
they could work together. Turchynov suggested that BYuT
(near 20 percent) was currently in clear second place to
Regions (27-28 percent),with Our Ukraine fading at 13-14
percent. BYuT aspired to secure 25-30 percent of the vote
and was mounting a strong campaign in the "light blue"
regions of Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Mykolayiv, Kherson, and
Zaporizhzhya (note: see ref D for another BYuT campaign
insider assessment that these efforts had made no impact).
Regions had Donetsk, Luhansk, and Crimea locked up, said
Turchynov.


9. (C) Turchynov complained that Our Ukraine governors were
engaged in administrative resource abuse, specifically citing
ex-deputy Interior Minister and current Luhansk governor
Henadiy Moskal as pressuring policemen to vote Our Ukraine.
(Note: Moskal replaced Oleksiy Danylov, dismissed by
Yushchenko without a stated cause but allegedly for pushing
the BYuT line in Luhansk; Danylov had been the Yushchenko
2004 presidential campaign chair for Luhansk. Turchynov
acknowledged BYuT was running second to Regions in Luhansk,
with Our Ukraine support negligible.)


10. (C) Equally troubling was dirty PR that Turchynov claimed
had appeared in western Ukraine in recent days. Turchynov
showed posters purportedly pulled off of lamp posts that
sought to associate Tymoshenko with people presumably thought
to discredit her. One had Tymoshenko in the center,
surrounded by all the party leaders who had joined in the
January 10 vote to dismiss the Yekhanurov Cabinet --
Yanukovych, SPDU(o)'s Medvedchuk, the Communist Party's
Symonenko, plus Rada Speaker Lytvyn, surrounded by a shower
of U.S. dollars and a Russian flag. A small handflier
featuring Tymoshenko advertised a feminine product to enhance
orgasms. A third product was a parody of a Christmas scene.
The "Merry Christmas" poster featured the faces of Tymoshenko
and other BYuT leaders in the roles of a traditional mountain
Christmas caroling party. Instead of a Christian star
mounted on the pole, however, Mykhaylo Brodsky carried a blue
and white Star of David on a pole, and Bohdan Hubsky a flag
of Israel; the caption read, "Yuliya and her friends."
(Note: Brodsky is Jewish; we are not aware of Hubsky's
ethnic or religious background. Others depicted were
Turchynov and Mykola Tomenko. Not surprisingly, absent were
prominent BYuT nationalists like Levko Lukyanenko, who has
expounded anti-Semitic views in the past.) Turchynov said he
would try to get a second copy of the poster to pass to the
Embassy and predicted more such dirty PR would appear in the
coming weeks.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
HERBST