Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV3862
2006-10-05 07:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH -- DEFENDER OF THE

Tags:  PGOV PREL PINR UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO0347
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #3862/01 2780710
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 050710Z OCT 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1830
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 003862 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH -- DEFENDER OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 003862

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/04/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PM YANUKOVYCH -- DEFENDER OF THE
CONSTITUTION?

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych stressed
with EUR DAS Kramer and Ambassador October 4 that
constitutional reform had created a new governing framework
in which Parliament (Rada) established government policy, and
President Yushchenko together with Yanukovych and the cabinet
of ministers implemented it. Yanukovych claimed that he was
holding "radical elements" of the governing coalition in
check and attempting to preserve presidential prerogatives
within this new framework. A strong president would benefit
the government as a whole. Yanukovych said he was attempting
to maintain good relations with Yushchenko and had downplayed
an incident when Yushchenko had snubbed him by failing to
appear at an event after saying he would attend. Yanukovych
predicted Our Ukraine would join the coalition within "a
week." (Embassy Note: Yanukovych's statement was made as
OU's Bezsmertniy was announcing to the press that his faction
had voted to move into opposition. End Note.)


2. (C) Comment: Yanukovych projected himself as a reasonable
and statesman-like politician, beginning the meeting with an
anecdote about his youthful aversion to becoming a
politician, and placed the blame for continued political
wrangling entirely on President Yushchenko. His comments
regarding his intention to try to work with the president, to
fight corruption, and to seek WTO membership were clearly
targeted toward his audience. His relaxed attitude also
indicated that he senses that he has the upper hand over
Yushchenko. His argument that the Rada sets government
policy, however, favors his position as leader of the Rada's
largest political force and glosses over the real ambiguities
regarding the process by which constitutional reform was
adopted. Whether the pro-presidential Our Ukraine bloc joins
his coalition or not, Yanukovych could begin turning his
attention from politics to the serious issues of governance
still facing him. President Yushchenko's lack of sustained
engagement increases Yanukovych's chance of success. End
summary/comment.



3. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer and Ambassador met with Prime
Minister Viktor Yanukovych October 4 in a 2 1/2-hour meeting
that was supposed to be just one hour. PM Foreign Policy
Adviser Anatoliy Orel, MFA DFM Andriy Veselovsky, and PM
Chief of Staff Sergiy Lovochkin also joined the meeting.
This report covers Yanukovych's comments on the domestic
political situation; his comments on economic and bilateral
issues will be reported septel.

Relations with Our Ukraine
--------------


4. (C) Yanukovych said that, while a governing coalition had
been formed on the basis of a democratic process, the
coalition still did not include the pro-Presidential Our
Ukraine bloc (OU) for both objective and subjective reasons.
Principally, the governing coalition and OU had a different
understanding of the implications of new constitutional
reforms. Yanukovych and his supporters were working
patiently to overcome this difference so that powers could be
properly allocated between the President and the government.
Once this was done, Yanukovych intended to work on creating a
mechanism of cooperation between the President and
government. Yanukovych said cooperation with the President
was a personal priority and he would not allow "radical
elements" in his Party of Regions to divert him from this
goal. Of the 186 Regions deputies in the Rada, no more than
10 were radicals, so he would be guided by the majority view
of his party.


5. (C) Another obstacle to the formation of a coalition with
OU was the lack of unity within OU that resulted because OU
was a coalition of six different parties, Yanukovych
explained. Unfortunately, OU's expectations exceeded the
strength of its seats in the Rada. OU's leadership
constantly appealed to President Yushchenko when dissatisfied
with the results of direct talks with Party of Regions,
putting Yushchenko in an awkward position. After all,
Yanukovych noted, Yushchenko could not take cabinet minister
posts from other parties and arbitrarily award them to OU.
In one-on-one meetings, Yushchenko requested Yanukovych's
help in satisfying OU, but Yanukovych had replied frankly
that OU should have worked harder to get a higher proportion
of Rada seats. Yushchenko had said he could not reply in
such a fashion to his supporters.

The Rada's Role
--------------


6. (C) Yanukovych said he could understand Yushchenko's
demand that he preserve his prerogatives to the maximum

KIEV 00003862 002 OF 002


possible, but, while "desire is desire, the constitution is
the constitution." Yushchenko should have tried to preserve
his powers during negotiations on the constitutional reforms,
but now it was too late. Rather than resorting to the
Constitutional Court, Yanukovych preferred to leave
constitutional reform implications for the legal experts of
the Presidential Secretariat and Cabinet of Ministers to sort
out.


7. (C) Constitutional questions had arisen during his visit
to Brussels, but Yanukovych argued that he had acted
properly. He had taken a balanced and careful approach to
questions of European and Euro-Atlantic integration after
consultations with the Rada and in line with policies worked
out between the Rada and the Cabinet of Ministers. This was
in line with the constitutional reforms, Yanukovych argued,
that made the Rada responsible for establishing government
policies, which the President and Cabinet then implemented.
Yanukovych had discussed the Rada's directives with
Yushchenko beforehand, but Yushchenko had not agreed with the
Rada.


8. (C) Yanukovych said he urged Yushchenko to hold a meeting
of the coordinating council. Yanukovych did not want to be
put in the position of former Prime Minister Yekhanurov, who
had been unable to obtain the Rada's passage of an
international military exercises bill. Future cooperation
with NATO would require the Rada's support. With Rada
support, public understanding and support for NATO membership
would grow. Otherwise, public support for NATO would not
recover from the 20 percent decline of the last few years.

Yanukovych the Statesman
--------------


9. (C) Yanukovych later in the meeting cited Yushchenko's bad
faith. He said Yushchenko had agreed to participate with
Yanukovych and Rada Speaker Moroz at a September 28
presentation of the government plan of action. Yushchenko
said he wanted to meet an hour beforehand to discuss the plan
of action. Yanukovych and Moroz arrived at 9:00 a.m., but,
at 10:00, a member of Yushchenko's staff telephoned to say
that Yushchenko would not be showing up. Journalists had
asked why Yushchenko was absent at a high-level event that
included every other important government figure, but
Yanukovych had said the question of whether to attend had
been Yushchenko's. Yanukovych had waited two days to sign
the plan of action in order to allow Yushchenko and his staff
to provide comments, but none had been received.


10. (C) Yanukovych ended his initial presentation by
stressing he wanted to be honest and predictable in his
relations with other partners. He wanted to be sure to
follow through on his commitments so that his partners
trusted him and were not humiliated by broken promises.
Yushchenko's agreement with his views was immaterial;
everyone had to obey the constitution. OU should sign the
agreement soon, since continued uncertainty was bad for the
country. (Later, when Kramer asked, Yanukovych confidently
predicted that OU would join the coalition "in a week.")
Yanukovych added that he wanted to move Ukraine in a more
positive direction by targeting corruption, moving toward WTO
membership, and working steadily to enhance European and
Euro-Atlantic integration.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor