UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO MIFFED ON MAP? KIEV'S REACTION

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003570

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO MIFFED ON MAP? KIEV'S REACTION
TO YANUKOVYCH'S NATO SPEECH

REF: A. USNATO 538

B. KIEV 3489

C. KIEV 3029

D. KIEV 3463

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary. Despite the positive dynamics of PM
Yanukovych's September 14 visit to NATO HQ (ref A),
Yanukovych's declaration that Ukraine was not ready for a
Membership Action Plan (MAP) drew swift public complaints
from FM Tarasyuk and Defense Minister Hrytsenko September 15,
followed by a five-hour session between Yushchenko and
Yanukovych. Yushchenko subsequently delivered a late evening
statement to the press distancing himself from Yanukovych's
MAP comments and various actions of Yanukovych's government
and the Party of Regions over the past month. On NATO,
Yushchenko said that Yanukovych's statement on MAP had
represented the opinion of his party, was mistaken, was not
in Ukraine's national interest, and needed to be corrected.


2. (C) Comment: Yanukovych's comments in Brussels are not
inconsistent with the message delivered by A/S Fried
September 7 (ref D). Yanukovych's commitment to broaden
practical cooperation with NATO and his pledge for a public
information campaign to remove biases and misunderstandings
among Ukrainians about NATO and its relationship with Ukraine
(ref A) will form the basis of our near-term NATO-Ukraine
agenda.


3. (C) The implications for Ukrainian foreign policy making,
however, are less promising. Based on what Yushchenko told
us before Yanukovych's Brussels trip about his desires for
the message on NATO/MAP (refs B, C) and what Yushchenko,
Tarasyuk, and Hrytsenko said publicly September 15, it is
clear that Yanukovych's September 14 comments on MAP were not
fully coordinated with the President, Foreign Minister, and
Defense Minister. Yanukovych's speech raises questions
domestically not only about policy coordination (between the
President and PM, and within the Cabinet between PM and the
FM/Def Min),but institutional competencies in the wake of
political reform (including the President's constitutional
right to set foreign and security policy, and the role of the
National Security and Defense Council),and coalition
dynamics (both prior promises made in negotiating the
Universal National Unity agreement and ongoing efforts to
establish a formal broad coalition). (Note: the Universal
made no explicit mention of MAP despite strong attempts by
Yushchenko).


4. (C) Many of these issues were already playing out as
Ukraine's political elite and institutions feel their way
forward in the wake of constitutional reform, which changed
the power relationships between President, Premier, Cabinet,
and parliament. Yanukovych's MAP comments may serve as a
convenient lightning rod and catalyst for further discussion
about who speaks for Ukraine on foreign policy. End Summary
and Comment.

Yushchenko: Concern about Mistakes in General, and MAP
-------------- --------------


5. (SBU) Late September 15, Yushchenko summoned PM Yanukovych
to the Presidential Secretariat for what turned into a five
hour meeting so that Yushchenko could reinforce policy
directions laid out in the Universal National Unity
Agreement. Afterwards, Yushchenko told the press that he had
invited Yanukovych for a discussion to "carry out the first
political warning related to the activities of various
politicians and the administration which violated the
Universal and constitutional agreements. Unfortunately,
today I as the President must talk about the activities of
the new government and majority which, to be honest, are
cause for concern." (note: Yanukovych's statement in Brussels
does not appear to be inconsistent with the NATO language in
the Universal.)


6. (SBU) Several of Yushchenko's public comments touched on
economic, social, political and personnel developments,
echoing growing public complaints over the past week. He
called on the Prosecutor General to investigate the distorted
pattern of VAT refunds since early August, with flows going
nearly exclusively to Regions' political base in the Donbas
(Donetsk and Luhansk),as well as alleged tax pressure
against businesses. Yushchenko also called for the formation
of a broad coalition of national unity and decried pressure
against MPs in the Rada (parliament) to switch factions,
characterizing it as an unfortunate sign of political
pressure that violated the decisions of the people as
expressed in election results. On a positive note,
Yushchenko said Yanukovych agreed that it was important to

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give significant rights to the political opposition.


7. (SBU) Press coverage highlighted Yushchenko's critique of
Yanukovych's statement at NATO that Ukraine was not ready for
a MAP. Yushchenko said that Yanukovych had expressed the
views of his party (note: by implication, not the government)
and that Yanukovych had been mistaken in Brussels; his
position was not in accordance with Ukraine's national
interests and needed to be corrected.

All the President's Men: The PM Was Wrong
--------------


8. (SBU) Earlier September 15, Yushchenko loyalists lined up
to deliver public criticism of Yanukovych's MAP stance,
implying that he was not speaking for the government, and
suggesting remedial next steps. Yushchenko's legal adviser
Mykola Poludenny gave a press briefing in which he stated:
"what we are saying is that the Cabinet of Ministers was
supposed to give a signal in Brussels that Ukraine would join
the NATO MAP." Responding to questions about the
implications for institutional relations, Poludenny
suggested: "The president has enough instruments to protect
his position and adequately influence the situation."


9. (C) FM Tarasyuk and DefMin Hrytsenko held separate press
conferences to take issue with Yanukovych. Both bemoaned the
lost opportunity to secure an invitation to join MAP at the
Riga Summit. Presaging one of the lines Yushchenko would
later take, Tarasyuk characterized Yanukovych's statement as
made "by the leader of a political party," adding: "nobody
has canceled the basic priorities of Ukraine's foreign
policy." (Note: On September 13, NATO International staff
circulated copies of two letters. One from FM Tarasyuk sent
to the NATO SYG, dated August 24, asked for a positive
response on MAP. A second from PM Yanukovych, dated August
31, was positive on cooperation and strategic directions, but
was not the letter Yushchenko had signed in mid-August and
tried to get Yanukovych to cosign, apparently in vain. See
refs A-B.)


10. (SBU) While acknowledging that Yanukovych had spoken in
favor of cooperation with NATO and had not questioned the
ultimate objective of joining NATO, Hrytsenko previewed
another line Yushchenko would later voice when he described
Yanukovych's MAP statement as a mistake. "The president as
head of state and the official in charge of national
security, foreign and defense policy has clearly stated that
Ukraine should say that it is prepared and wants to join a
MAP, both verbally and in writing. This was not done."


11. (SBU) Hrytsenko said he planned to ask Yushchenko to
raise NATO policy at an executive session of the National
Security and Defense Council (NSDC),a constitutional body
with the President as its head that is able to set policy and
task government ministers with implementation. He also
brushed off suggestions that his criticism of Yanukovych
might lead to his dismissal: "Don't even dream about it. I
will continue working in my capacity until the president
decides otherwise."


12. (C) MFA Acting DG for NATO Slava Yasniuk, who has worked
on NATO issues since 1996, professed to us September 15 that
he had "seen it all on NATO" but still felt caught off guard.
Policymakers involved in the process knew that there had
been two scenarios, essentially the president's and the
premier's; however, in such cases of dispute a resolution is
usually worked out a week before an event. This time,
Yushchenko and Tarasyuk were engaging Yanukovych literally
"until the very last moment," but the final result was still
"a surprise for us." (Note: While Tarasyuk did not accompany
Yanukovych to Brussels because of a supposed illness, it may
have been mere diplomatic cover for bureaucratic jostling,
since Yushchenko had approved Tarasyuk's travel and Tarasyuk
subsequently agreed to see visiting former U.S. Ambassador
Pifer the morning Yanukovych was in Brussels).

Substantive Work Will Continue Regardless
--------------


13. (SBU) On a positive note, Hrytsenko told the press that
he would continue implementing the substance of what could
have been a MAP "because Ukraine and Ukrainians need
implementation of the plan," including a strong army,
well-paid personnel, and better living standards.


14. (C) The MFA's Yasniuk was also upbeat, stressing the
positive aspects of Yanukovych's speech, including his
emphasis on cooperation (Active Endeavor, Afghanistan/ISAF)
and the public education/outreach campaign. Yasniuk noted to
us that Ukraine had prepared its annual work plan for 2007,

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submitted to Brussels for review, in the format of a MAP,
rather than the previous annual target plan. Regardless of
the title, once NATO provided its feedback, the GOU would
task various government ministries with fulfilling the plan
of action and moving forward on steps and reforms Ukraine
needed to make on their own merit. Echoing Hrytsenko,
Yasniuk suggested Yushchenko may turn to the NSDC as an
implementing agent for his policy decisions.


15. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor