UKRAINE: EUR A/S FRIED'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 003553

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/18/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: EUR A/S FRIED'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS

REF: KIEV 3463

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Ukraine-NATO relations was a primary theme
in EUR Assistant Secretary Fried's meetings September 6-7
with FM Borys Tarasyuk, Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko,
and PM Viktor Yanukovych. Holdover "orange" Ministers
Tarasyuk and Hrytsenko have been the two staunchest advocates
of Ukraine's NATO aspirations since Yushchenko became
President in January 2005. PM Yanukovych is the linchpin
official looking forward; his September 14 visit to NATO will
be crucial in determining the way forward, and he will need
to play a key role in engaging his anti-NATO electorate of
the benefits of Euro-Atlantic integration. A/S Fried made
clear the two basic requirements for countries aspiring to
join NATO: exhibiting the serious political will to join; and
meeting the alliance's standards and values. Ukraine over
the past four months had not sent a clear signal of its
intent; the U.S. could not support Ukraine's aspirations more
than Ukraine itself. That said, the U.S. would support
Ukraine moving forward at a pace of its choosing; the U.S.
would not walk away from Ukraine. Yanukovych reacted to this
message with relief, Tarasyuk with acceptance, and Hrytsenko
with some distress. Reftel covers the Yanukovych meeting;
discussions on foreign policy, domestic politics, and
economic/gas issues are in septels. End Summary

Tarasyuk - NATO policy key for blue-orange
--------------


2. (C) FM Tarasyuk told A/S Fried September 6 that NATO
policy had been the major subject of roundtable negotiations
fiercely debated before the signing of the "Universal"
national unity agreement and the formation of a coalition
government under PM Yanukovych in early August. All parties
save the communists agreed that Ukraine needed to deepen its
beneficial relations, re-endorsing the landmark June 2003 Law
on National Security which states clearly that NATO
membership forms the basis for Ukraine's foreign policy.
While Regions "hid" behind the requirement to hold a national
referendum, Yushchenko had convinced Yanukovych that Ukraine
had no other strategic choice besides joining NATO, Tarasyuk
claimed. Tarasyuk appealed to the U.S. to take an expected
Yanukovych letter to NATO requesting that Ukraine be granted
MAP with a positive response.


3. (C) A/S Fried stressed that the road forward on
NATO-Ukraine relations depended on what Yanukovych said at
NATO September 14 and how he said it. NATO members had
adopted a "wait and see" approach to Ukraine after the long
delay in government formation, and MAP at Riga was highly
unlikely given all the unknowns. The major question now was
not how the alliance would react to Ukraine's NATO
aspirations, but what would be Yanukovych's attitude. Given
how crucial the September 14 meetings were, Tarasyuk
indicated he would seek Yushchenko's permission to break
precedent and travel with the PM to Brussels. (Note:
Normally the FM travels with the President, a DFM with the
PM. On September 8, the MFA told us that Yushchenko had
given his permission and that the FM had asked the PM for
approval to travel with him to Brussels. End Note.)


4. (C) A/S Fried emphasized that the Riga document would
include language on enlargement, some focused on the Balkans
aspirants, some on Ukraine and Georgia, although the text on
the latter two remained open. Many Europeans remained
cautious on Ukraine, worried about the Russian angle. In
contrast, what mattered most to the U.S. was: how committed
was Ukraine? Tarasyuk thanked Fried for the frank answer; in
reply he openly acknowledged that he could only guarantee the
response for President Yushchenko and himself, not for
Yanukovych. With the blue-orange team only a month into
cohabitation, the parties were still adjusting to each other
as partners.


5. (C) Tarasyuk asked whether the GOU could count on U.S.
support to convince skeptical alliance members on MAP if
Ukraine did its part. Fried stressed that the U.S. and the
alliance would respond if Ukraine demonstrated the serious
political will to join NATO and do the work necessary to meet
all the standards, not just in military reform. President
Bush's guidance had been clear on this point for the past six
years: if a country really wanted to join and was ready, the
U.S. would make it happen. The U.S. would not walk away from
Ukraine, but neither did we want a country in NATO which did
not really want to be in the alliance or was not ready to
contribute. Ukraine also needed to renew efforts to get key
European countries to resume thinking about Ukraine's future.

Hrytsenko - pushing for more to shape Yanukovych
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6. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko reacted with more concern
to the same NATO message September 7, suggesting adjustments
for A/S Fried's subsequent meeting with Yanukovych, who had
advisers like Orel and Radchenko spinning an anti-MAP
perspective and pushing for a focus on Ukraine-NATO
military-technical cooperation. Hrytsenko claimed that only
NATO membership and revised terms of its energy relationship
with Russia could guarantee Ukraine's genuine independence,
which should matter to the West. He appealed for the U.S. to
help shape Yanukovych's geopolitical perceptions and policy
priorities and options. Yanukovych would have to struggle to
escape the political baggage of the 2004 and 2006 campaigns
even as he sought respect among foreign partners in the West.
In the end, personalities like Yanukovych were transitory;
geopolitical choices would reverberate much longer.


7. (C) Acknowledging slim chances for MAP at Riga, Hrytsenko
nevertheless pitched for some substantive advance beyond the
current Intensified Dialogue (ID),both to send a signal to
Ukraine's pro-NATO forces and to take advantage of
Yanukovych's willingness to move beyond ID but reluctance to
embrace MAP immediately. MAP would solidify Yushchenko's
status in the country, the values and policy directions he
espoused. A/S Fried stressed that the U.S. could not want
Ukrainian membership in NATO more than Ukraine itself; it was
a decision for Ukraine's political class and Ukrainian
society to make, and the new government had not proved
capable of sending a clear signal.


8. (C) While acknowledging Fried's points, Hrytsenko feared
that, without a strong signal at Riga, and only the standard:
"the door is open, all up to you" message, there would be
backsliding in the minds and activities of those now in power
in Ukraine. The previous GOU, without any legal basis, had
given away equipment used by its contingent in Iraq, and
transferred an additional $15 million' worth of munitions,
for free. It had also provided strategic airlift, for
instance for the SEEBRIG to Afghanistan, at below cost (only
fuel and landing fees, not covering operating expenses),at
three times less than the Russian offer. In the past 18
months, the GOU had made such decisions to send positive
signals to NATO partners, but he feared the new government
would not make such decisions in the future.


9. (C) On a positive note, Hrytsenko stressed that many of
the steps Ukraine needed to take to meet NATO standards would
be taken regardless of the GOU's attitude towards MAP/NATO
and NATO's response: reform of the judicial system; continued
free and fair elections; maintenance of media freedoms; and
improvements in transparency/accounting standards. In the
defense sphere, there was less to be done in the short-term,
and less controversy: ratifying the NATO-Ukraine strategic
airlift support MOU, which Yanukovych said he backed;
initiating active participation in Operation Active Endeavor,
easier now that Russia itself had already started; and
securing a real defense budget allowing for continued reform.


10. (C) On a negative note, Hrytsenko claimed that the
German-based consortium that draws on both Russian and
Ukrainian Ruslan AN-124 planes to fill NATO stratlift
contracts on a preferred basis was a mini-RosUkrEnergo
nontransparent deal that skimmed profits to Russia's benefit.
Hrytsenko urged that NATO take a closer look.

Yanukovych - I'm the man, let's do business
--------------


11. (C) A/S Fried's discussion with Yanukovych on the primary
points of Ukraine-NATO relations and U.S. perspectives is
covered septel. Of additional importance, given the need for
the GOU to reach out to Yanukovych's overwhelmingly anti-NATO
electorate, was Yanukovych's assertion that he saw himself as
NATO's chief "imagemaker" in Ukraine, given the challenge of
public opinion to Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic integration.


12. (C) Yanukovych claimed he had a good sense for how
Ukrainians felt about NATO-related issues. In contrast, the
two orange governments in office from January 2005 - July
2006 had tried to rush the NATO accession issue, increasing
negative attitudes towards NATO. The May-June protests
against an exercise in Feodosia, Crimea lacking parliamentary
approval were an prime example in his view. However, once
the Universal was signed in August, the Rada had quietly
approved foreign exercises, and there was no negative
reaction to this approval (note: not entirely true; the
Communists and Natalya Vitrenko's Progressive Socialists
protested). Yanukovych stressed that it was essential that
the discussion on Euro-Atlantic integration be a balanced,
calm process to convince society; this would take time.


13. (C) As predicted by Hrytsenko, Yanukovych focused on

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potential military technology collaboration that could
benefit Ukraine and serve as a "heavyweight" argument for
Ukrainians in favor of NATO membership. He mentioned
detailed discussions with Polish PM Kaczinski September 6 on
Poland,s possible involvement in the AN-70 military
transport project, a nearly completed project now in jeopardy
after Russia had decided to pull out (note: in favor of
pursuit of a partnership with France instead. end note).
There was no clarity regarding how much the AN-70 would cost
to realize, but Yanukovych expressed confidence it could be
very profitable. He noted NATO had no aircraft with its
characteristics, particularly taking off and landing on
runways as short as 300 meters.


14. (SBU) The PM also floated the idea of armored personnel
carrier (APC) joint production. He claimed a Donetsk company
had developed an advanced design for an APC with a new type
of layered metal armor that was highly effective in
deflecting bullets. He suggested a joint project could be
launched to combine this design with NATO country components,
such as armaments, engines, and transmissions. Production
and assembly could be in Ukraine; the company's location
offered low production costs due to nearby subcontractors and
close access to a seaport. Yanukovych requested the USG
spread word about these two defense cooperation proposals.


15. (U) A/S Fried has cleared this message.


16. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor