UKRAINE/MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: EUR DAS KRAMER URGES

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002964

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS OSCE PINR RO MD UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE/MOLDOVA/TRANSNISTRIA: EUR DAS KRAMER URGES
CONTINUING ROLE WITH POLITICAL LEADERS, MFA

REF: CHISINAU 796

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In July 28 meetings with Party of Regions
leader Viktor Yanukovych, Socialist Party leader Oleksandr
Moroz, and Deputy Foreign Minister (and special negotiator on
Transnistria Issues) Andriy Veselovsky, EUR DAS David Kramer
praised Ukraine's leadership in resolving problems arising
from Moldova's separatist Transnistria region. He singled
out the Ukraine-Moldova customs agreement as a setback for
Transnistrian leader Igor Smirnov, since the majority of
Transnistria-based enterprises had signed on to it despite
Smirnov's opposition. DAS Kramer countered Yanukovych's
observation that both Moldovan President Voronin and
Transnistrian leader Smirnov needed to take steps toward a
compromise noting that Voronin was the legitimately elected
head of an internationally recognized country and Smirnov, as
the leader of an illegitimate regime, had to do more. Moroz
assured DAS Kramer of his support for the customs agreement.
Veselovsky said Ukraine planned to hold a conference on
international aspects of the Transnistrian conflict in
Brussels in late October/early November. He criticized
recent unhelpful Romanian statements on Transnistria and
warned that, if Moldova does not agree to open rail routes
through Transnistria, the Ukrainian government would deal
directly with the Transnistrian authorities to do so. End
summary.

Yanukovych's Partiality toward Transnistria
--------------


2. (SBU) In response to DAS Kramer's question about whether a
Regions-led Government would support keeping the
Ukraine-Moldova customs union in force, Yanukovych said that
Regions wanted to see a stable territory and the conflict
resolved. He noted that it was important to establish order
along the border and that the border should be protected.
When DAS Kramer pressed on the specific customs agreement,
Yanukovych finally said that he knew the really difficult
time was over and a new Ukrainian government would "not make
it worse,... it would even improve it."


3. (C) Yanukovych said that he knew both Moldovan President
Voronin and Transnistrian leader Smirnov well and that he
would help them reach agreement -- "both have to make steps
toward each other and find a compromise." DAS Kramer agreed,
but noted that Smirnov, as the leader of a separatist region
rather than a country, needed to do more. Yanukovych said he
understood, but Smirnov had been pushed into a corner with no
way out. It was important psychologically to give him a way
out and provide some guarantees. Noting that this answer
made him nervous, DAS Kramer stressed that Smirnov's support
from "the neighbor to the north" meant he did not need Kiev's
sympathy. Yanukovych came back, stating he was not talking
about support, but simply finding a way out for Smirnov.
Both agreed to discuss this issue further during Kramer's
next visit.

Moroz Better, Backs Customs Agreement
--------------


4. (SBU) Moroz said many mistakes were made in the early
1990's that had led to the current situation in Transnistria;
the solution would involve some kind of autonomy for the
region or a federal structure. However, with regard to the
customs agreement, Ukraine was committed to helping Moldova
improve the situation, and the Rada had no competency to
review or change the agreement. Indeed, Ukraine was very
concerned about problems of smuggling and contraband along
the border and was committed to maintaining control.

Veselovsky Praises New York Bar Report
--------------


5. (SBU) Veselovsky said the Moldova-based diplomatic corps
had been favorably impressed by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York (ABCNY) (ref A) report on international
law aspects of the Transnistrian conflict. Some other
post-Soviet countries, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, had
also been interested in the report's conclusions, since
separatist movements had the potential to arise in Central
Asia. To follow up potentially on the report's
recommendations, Veselovsky said MFA had tasked the Ukrainian
Embassy in Brussels with organizing an international
conference on the international law aspects of the
Transnistria conflict, to which European parliamentarians had
already been invited, to be held in Brussels in late
October/early November. MFA had also contacted good
specialists on legal aspects to prepare a draft agenda.


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6. (C) DAS Kramer said, although he had a positive and
constructive meeting with Yanukovych earlier in the day,
Yanukovych's comments on Transnistria had made him nervous.
Kramer had pushed for a commitment to maintain the
Ukraine-Moldova customs agreement and had made clear the USG
positions on Transnistria by the end of the meeting.
Nevertheless, Veselovsky would face a challenge ensuring that
a new Ukrainian government maintained its positive role on
Transnistria.

Romania a Recent Problem
--------------


7. (C) Veselovsky noted that Romanian officials, such as
President Basescu and Foreign Minister Severin, had made
statements that had alarmed Transnistria and thereby
complicated efforts to resolve the Transnistria issue.
Kramer agreed. Embassy Bucharest had responded immediately
to Basescu's statements and they were likely to be raised
again during Basescu's meetings in Washington, where he was
currently visiting. Veselovsky said some Romanians still
believed Moldova could be enticed into uniting with Romania
as a back-door into the European Union. The Ukrainian
Foreign Ministry planned to issue a statement noting that
friends of Moldova should seek to help Moldova on the basis
of Moldovan unity. DAS Kramer said he hoped to stop in
Bucharest in early September en route to a conference in the
region to reinforce the same point.

A Ukraine-Moldova Bilateral Issue
--------------


8. (C) Pulling out a map of Moldova, Veselovsky said Ukraine
had a bilateral issue with Moldova regarding Moldova's
transit fees for Ukrainian railroad cargoes. When
Transnistria blocked railroad traffic after the
Ukraine-Moldova customs agreement entered into force,
millions of dollars worth of Ukrainian cargo had to take a
substantially longer route around Transnistria to reach
destinations in Western Europe. The increased transit
distance had raised transit fees by U.S. $3.40 per ton of
cargo. This was a significant sum when multiplied by the
large volume of Ukrainian shipments. Transnistria was now
ready to reopen the rail routes, but the Moldovan government
was resisting, raising spurious objections. The Ukrainian
government suspected the Moldovan objections were based on
the desire to continue collecting the additional fees. The
Ukrainian Minister of Transportation would soon send a letter
to Chisinau stating that, if Moldova was not ready to open
the rail routes, the Ukrainian government would deal directly
with Transnistria to do so. Veselovsky promised to provide
an unofficial copy of the letter to the U.S. Embassy.


9. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor