UKRAINE: DAS KRAMER'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 002962

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/31/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: DAS KRAMER'S NATO-RELATED DISCUSSIONS

REF: A. KIEV 2932

B. KIEV 2461

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary. Ukraine's relations with NATO in the
context of ongoing domestic political roundtable discussions
and fading chances for a Membership Action Plan (MAP)
invitation at the Riga Summit were discussed in EUR Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) David Kramer's July 28 meetings
with Acting Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, Acting Defense
Minister Hrytsenko, Rada Speaker Moroz, Party of Regions
leader Yanukovych, and deputy FM Veselovsky. Tarasyuk,
Moroz, and Yanukovych talked more generally in terms of
Ukraine's strategic course in the framework of the roundtable
discussions and a possible "broad coalition" involving their
three parties (Our Ukraine, the Socialists, and Regions).
The non-partisan Hrytsenko explored what Ukraine might do to
improve increasingly slim chances of receiving a MAP in Riga,
mulled his own future, described budgetary challenges, and
highlighted recent exercises to improve Ukraine's combat
readiness.


2. (C) Comment: Ukraine's roundtable discussions stalled
July 29 after ten hours of inconclusive discussions between
Yushchenko, Moroz, and Yanukovych; differences on NATO
policy, along with language policy and federalism, emerged as
the unreconciled issues in the talks (ref A). Hrytsenko's
frustration over the budget situation suggests that, no
matter who serves as Defense Minister in the next government,
advancing the defense reform agenda Hrytsenko has vigorously
implemented since coming into office in February 2005 will be
a challenge. Hrytsenko, who is non-partisan but expresses
opinions that more often align with the perspectives of
Yuliya Tymoshenko than Yushchenko, spent most of the meeting
discussing Ukraine's ongoing domestic political impasse,
revealing a personal preference for repeat elections rather
than a "broad coalition" with Yanukovych as likely Premier.
In this, Hrytsenko parted ways with Ukraine's other
enthusiastic endorser of early NATO membership, Acting
Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk, now a proponent of a "broad
coalition" involving Our Ukraine and Regions. End Summary
and Comment.

NATO policy in roundtable discussions, coalition negotiations
-------------- --------------


3. (C) Commenting on the July 27 roundtable talks which he
attended as an Our Ukraine (OU) representative, Acting FM
Tarasyuk highlighted Yushchenko's support for NATO membership
(ref A). Tarasyuk said OU and Regions had agreed on a
separate protocol, outside a possible formal coalition
agreement, on NATO that went further than previous agreements
with the Socialist Pary or Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT)
negotiated as part of the Coalition of Democratic Forces
formed June 22. Regions and OU had agreed that, as soon as
the new government was formed, the new PM would send a letter
to the NATO Secretary General expressing Ukraine's interest
in receiving MAP (note: Tymoshenko was to have sent a similar
letter had she become PM again; see ref B). Kramer cautioned
that, while such a letter would be helpful, Ukraine's chances
of receiving MAP at Riga remained slim.


4. (C) Regions' leader Yanukovych, whose chances to become PM
again seemingly rose in the aftermath of the July 27
roundtable discussions, told Kramer that Regions "supported
cooperation with NATO, but with a slight change in emphasis."
In Yanukovych,s view, Ukraine should not be making
declarations and repeating slogans about NATO. Ukraine and
NATO needed instead to focus on concrete actions; this
depended upon NATO, he claimed. On the issue of MAP,
Yanukovych responded simply, "we agree with the President"
before changing the subject.


5. (C) Speaker Moroz, whose Socialist party had balked at
more forward-leading NATO-language in the defunct Coalition
of Democratic Forces agreement and pushed similar positions
during the roundtable discussions July 27-28, nevertheless
confirmed to Kramer that the Regions-led "anti-crisis
coalition" supported the strategic goal of joining NATO and
the importance of making Ukraine a part of the European
security system. Moroz pledged that the Rada would soon pass
the annual authorization for foreign military exercises,
confiding that the Rada had not yet passed it to pressure
Yushchenko to forward Yanukovych's PM nomination for
approval.

Does Ukraine still have a shot at MAP in Riga?
--------------


6. (C) Deputy FM Veselovsky told Kramer that the roundtable
"Universal" document under discussion affirmed the Ukraine's

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desire for membership, with the issue of actually joining
NATO decided later on the basis of a referendum. He said
that once Ukraine received MAP, it would work on public
opinion over a period of two to three years before holding a
referendum. Veselovsky said there would be two occasions
when the next prime minister could personally convey
Ukraine's interest in MAP to his NATO counterparts. On
September 14, the PM attend a EU-Ukraine cooperation council
meeting in Brussels, making an additional visit to NATO HQ
possible. On October 27, President Yushchenko and a number of
cabinet members would attend the Ukraine-EU summit in
Helsinki. This meeting would be a second opportunity for
high-level contacts with European officials prior to Riga.


7. (C) Defense Minister Hrytsenko asked DAS Kramer the extent
to which the West would be willing to engage Ukraine if
Yanukovych were to become PM, and specifically whether
Ukraine still had a chance to obtain MAP at the Riga Summit.
Hrytsenko's interest was personal as well as professional; he
needed to "decide whether to stay or go" as Defense Minister
in the next government. Kramer reminded Hrytsenko of their
previous conversation in May, when he had stated that MAP
would be difficult if Ukraine did not have a government in
place by July. Ukraine's friends had little to counter the
Ukraine skeptics within NATO, and the May-June controversy
over the canceled Sea Breeze exercise in Feodosia, Crimea had
been an unfortunate setback, raising fresh doubts about
Ukraine's readiness and commitment.


8. (C) An early letter from a newly-seated PM Yanukovych to
NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer reiterating Ukraine's desire for
MAP at Riga would not be enough, stated Kramer. Two early
steps Ukraine could take would be passage of a long-stalled
bill authorizing foreign exercises in Ukraine, as well as
ratification of the 2004 NATO-Ukraine MOU on strategic
airlift signed by then PM Yanukovych. Hrytsenko opined that
both should be possible in September, once the Rada
reconvened from its August recess. Kramer stated that, were
Yanukovych to become PM, he would need to travel to Brussels
early on and to demonstrate sincere interest in relations
with NATO. Ukrainian officials needed to make their case
again in Paris, the Hague, and other capitals; there was no
magic formula, but such reinvigorated efforts after a
government formed could increase the currently slim chances
of a MAP invitation. Ambassador added that the GOU could
publicize the successful, recently completed Rapid Trident
computer simulation exercise, which had occurred without
fanfare or press coverage.

Possible Lebanon contribution?
--------------


9. (C) DAS Kramer also suggested that Ukrainian contributions
to a possible international peacekeeping force in Lebanon
would send a positive signal to NATO partners. Hrytsenko
asked that such a contribution not be added to a "must do"
list for MAP, since the requirement for Rada approval of any
unit deployment could complicate implementation; however, he
confirmed that he was already contemplating what Ukraine
might offer. If the air defense environment in southern
Lebanon were permissive, for instance, Ukraine could
contribute air lift capability.


10. (C) Note: Deputy Foreign Minister Veselovsky had told
Kramer and Ambassador earlier July 28 that Ukraine was
considering non-combat elements--airlift, trucks, and other
logistical support communications; medical; etc.--that
Ukraine would be ready to deploy within a month of being
asked. He implied that the Ukrainian military relished the
chance to move beyond UN PKO charges of past Ukrainian
military wrongdoing in forces in Lebanon (note: force
commanders in 2004 skimming money by manipulating fuel
rations). In order to avoid the need for Rada approval,
Ukraine would dispatch individual personnel, and not entire
units.

Defense Budget challenge for whomever is the next Minister
-------------- --------------


11. (C) Hrytsenko said the decision on who might serve as the
next Defense Minister is Yushchenko's, but that he would not
automatically agree to stay even if asked. A primary factor
would be the situation around the defense budget, which was
dependent in turn on who served as Prime Minister and Finance
Minister. Current PM Yekhanurov and Finance Minister
Pynzenyk had underfunded the Defense Ministry in 2006;
instead of the promised 8.6 billion hryvnia in the budget,
Yekhanurov and Pynzenyk had pre-allocated only 7 billion,
though Hrytsenko had fought for a partial reclama. The
preliminary 2007 budget resolution passed July 27 in the Rada
by the so-called "anti-crisis coalition" was similarly
worrisome. Hrytsenko had not discussed the matter with

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Regions' leader Yanukovych, but Budget Committee Chair (and
likely Minister of Finance in a Regions-led government)
Mykola Azarov was aware of the issue.


12. (C) Given fuel price increases, the 2006 underfunding had
set back operations by 5-6 years, endangering the ambitious
reform plans Hrytsenko had undertaken. In order to retain
motivated personnel, the military needed to increase basic
pay to the same level as that for troops in the Ministry of
Interior, the security services (SBU),and the Ministry of
Emergencies, as well as continue to fund exercises and
operations. If other GOU personnel only paid lip service to
the cause of defense reform without funding it, Hrytsenko saw
no reason to stay in office without an ability to implement
his agenda, merely to "push papers around my desk and serve
as a friendly face for the West to engage."


13. (C) Ending on a positive note, Hrytsenko described an
ongoing joint air-ground exercise, including what he said was
Ukraine's first night-time drop operations in 15 years, as
proof of a renewed commitment to improving the combat
readiness of Ukrainian forces. An anti-terror scenario had
forced air defense troops and the Air Force to react to a
potential terrorist threat against Ukrainian nuclear
facilities, scrambling to respond to army helicopters
approaching from different flight directions than those used
by international aviation. The army was also putting
together a new short-notice exercise to deploy three platoons
to Crimea and along the border to Transnistria as a initial
effort at "realistic scenario" training; Hrytsenko said the
efforts to make training exercises more relevant to
contemporary threats had been well received in the ranks.


14. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor