UKRAINE: ORANGE OPTIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 002678

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/10/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ORANGE OPTIONS IN THE WAKE OF THE
MOROZ-REGIONS MANEUVER

REF: KIEV 2651

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador met with Presidential Chief of
Staff Rybachuk, former PM Tymoshenko, Our Ukraine (OU) Party
leaders Roman Bezsmertny and Roman Zvarych, and OU Political
Council member and former National Security and Defense
Council Secretary Anatoliy Kinakh July 8 and Acting Foreign
Minster (and OU Political Council Member) Tarasyuk July 10 to
discuss orange options in the wake of the stunning
collaboration between Socialist Party Leader Moroz and Party
of Regions to elect Moroz Speaker and form a new majority of
Regions-Socialists-Communists (reftel). The options
included: President Yushchenko dismissing the Rada, which
looked very unlikely as of July 10 (though Tymoshenko said
she was ready to facilitate a dismissal through a blockade of
the Rada if Yushchenko found the courage to take the tough
decision); OU joining Regions in a broad coalition (which OU
leaders said could happen if someone other than Yanukovych
was PM and if the coalition accepted Yushchenko's strategic
external and domestic policy directions); or OU going into
opposition with Tymoshenko's bloc (BYuT). Rybachuk said that
Yushchenko was closely examining the first two options;
Bezsmertny indicated July 8 he thought OU would most likely
end up with the third option; Tarasyuk's comments late July
10 suggested the broad coalition was most likely. Tymoshenko
was a firm advocate of Rada dismissal and warned she would go
into hard opposition to both a Regions-OU broad coalition and
Yushchenko if OU cut a deal.


2. (SBU) Yushchenko himself sent mixed signals in his public
messages on the political turmoil, both in a July 8 Radio
address and a July 10 public statement. Seemingly ruling out
the Rada dismissal option, he said he would "not accept any
confrontational scenarios which can harm the people of
Ukraine and undermine the country's stability. I impartially
demand that parliamentary parties legitimately form a
coalition." Setting up a potential confrontation, he said he
would not forward a PM nominee to the Rada until
Constitutional Court judges were sworn in. Attempting to
shape the policies of the government, he said: "there will be
no return to Kuchmism. Ukraine will move forward towards the
European Union. The chosen domestic and foreign policies
will remain the same."


3. (C) Comment: Given Yushchenko's character, it is not
surprising he seems to have ruled out the path of
confrontation a Rada dismissal and a new election campaign
would entail. It is clear that Regions intended the
Socialists-Communist pairing as an "in the bag" Option B,
useful leverage on Our Ukraine to force a broad coalition,
which has always been Regions' preferred Option A. The major
downside for Our Ukraine in agreeing to a broad coalition,
even on its own terms: an energized Tymoshenko in opposition
to both the coalition and President Yushchenko, with her eyes
set on the Presidency in 2009. End Summary and Comment.

Three Options for Orange
--------------


4. (C) Orange leaders Tymoshenko, Bezsmertny, Kinakh, and
Rybachuk separately described the three options currently
under consideration by Yushchenko and the two orange parties
to Ambassador July 8:

--Rada dismissal/New elections: Yushchenko dissolves the Rada
and calls for new elections (strongly favored by Tymoshenko,
attractive to Bezsmertny, under consideration by Yushchenko,
according to Rybachuk). Would require coordinated action,
including blockage of Rada business until Yushchenko had
authority to dismiss the Rada, and agreement on how to run in
repeat elections (OU wants a single list, Tymoshenko separate
but coordinated). Yushchenko's public statement July 10
seemed to rule dismissal out.

--Broad Coalition (OU joins Regions): OU joins Yanukovych's
Party of Regions in a broad coalition to pursue Yushchenko's
stated external/domestic agenda; Tymoshenko goes into hard
opposition and prepares for the 2009 Presidential campaign.
(All OU interlocutors claimed that Yushchenko/OU would not
accept Yanukovych as PM in this arrangement. Acting PM
Yekhanurov and Kinakh were the two OU candidates mentioned,
with Yushchenko favoring Yekhanurov. Given OU's weak record
of negotiating competence, though, Yanukovych should not be
ruled out.)

--United opposition: OU follows Tymoshenko into opposition
together against a Regions-Socialist-Communist government
that would have to attract another 60 defectors from OU and
BYuT to override Yushchenko vetoes (note: 238 MPs supported

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Moroz as Speaker; 300 votes are required to override a
Presidential veto).

What does Yushchenko want? (avoid conflict)
--------------


5. (C) Yushchenko's Chief of Staff Oleh Rybachuk told
Ambassador July 8 that Yushchenko received PM-hopeful
Yanukovych in the Presidential Secretariat for well over an
hour earlier July 8. Tymoshenko claimed to Ambassador during
a mid-day meeting that Yushchenko was receiving Regions
financier Rinat Akhmetov as they spoke (note: when Yanukovych
was headlining a Regions Party Conclave). Yanukovych was
pushing hard for the broad coalition option, which Regions
had formally broached with OU late July 7, when the ink on
Regions' coalition agreement with the Socialists and
Communists was barely dry. Rybachuk said that Yanukovych
promised fealty to all of Yushchenko's policies and
Yushchenko's reelection in 2009...if Yushchenko would endorse
Yanukovych's PM candidacy. Rybachuk said that Yushchenko
listened but did not commit. Yushchenko/OU really wanted to
name one of their own as PM; otherwise, they would get little
out of such a coalition. The two names floated had been
Acting PM Yekhanurov and former PM Kinakh. (Note: Yanukovych
told a visiting delegation in May that Regions would consider
supporting Yushchenko's reelection in 2009 if OU joined a
broad coalition with Regions.)


6. (C) According to Rybachuk, Yushchenko was also seriously
considering the option of dismissing the Rada and calling new
elections. While Regions had been pushing for new elections
during their blockade of the Rada, they now had gone silent,
with the prospect of a Regions-led government in hand. OU
was seriously looking at the new elections prospect, said
Rybachuk (note: with opinion polls showing current OU support
ratings a fraction of the less than 14% they received in
March, running separately from BYuT would be close to
political death. OU Chair Roman Bezsmertny told Ambassador
July 8 that OU would agree to new elections only if BYuT
agreed to a single orange list. For the same reasons,
Tymoshenko told Ambassador July 8 that she would not agree to
a single list, only close cooperation between two orange
camps that needed to include all national-patriotic forces).


7. (SBU) Yushchenko himself sent mixed signals in his public
messages on the political turmoil, both in a July 8 Radio
address and a July 10 public statement. The latter seemingly
ruled out the Rada dismissal option when he called for the
formation of a coalition and presentation of its program as
the next step forward, adding that he would "not accept any
confrontational scenarios which can harm the people of
Ukraine and undermine the country's stability." But
Yushchenko also laid a marker down for new Speaker Moroz and
aspirant PM Yanukovych, stressing that he would not forward a
PM nominee to the Rada until Constitutional Court judges were
sworn in (note: the Court has been without a quorum since
October 2005 because the previous Rada, with Yanukovych and
Moroz colluding with former Speaker Lytvyn, prevented the
judges nominated by Yushchenko and the judiciary from being
sworn in, out of fear that the Court might overrule the
changes in the Constitution which took power away from the
President in favor of the Rada).


8. (SBU) Yushchenko made some effort to shape the policies of
the government, stating publicly what OU said it was
demanding in private from Regions as a condition for a
possible broad coalition: "there will be no return to
Kuchmism. Ukraine will move forward towards the European
Union. The chosen domestic and foreign policies will remain
the same."

What does Tymoshenko want? (dismissal and new elections)
-------------- --------------


9. (C) In fighting form July 8, Tymoshenko told Ambassador
that dismissal and new elections was the only option, but
Yushchenko the problem. She appealed for like-minded forces
inside the country and out to work together to convince
Yushchenko to dismiss the Rada and avoid the fatal mistakes
of a Broad coalition or what a narrow coalition would
represent: the return to (Russian) empire and/or communism.
She claimed that all of Yushchenko's closest people save
Yekhanurov, who wanted to be a PM in a Regions-OU coalition,
agreed with her "for the first time." Yushchenko's mentality
and character would be the biggest challenge.


10. (C) Time was short, because BYuT would need to arrange a
blockade before the Rada resumed work July 11. A blockade
could prevent official registry of the new coalition and
forwarding of the nomination of Yanukovych as PM to the
Presidential Secretariat, which had received her own

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nomination July 7 and could act on it, even though it faced
certain defeat in the Rada, "a loss I could bear."
Acknowledging the lack of complete legal/constitutional
clarity in such a situation, Tymoshenko said the President
had sufficient authority to act; he simply needed to use it.
(note: on this point, Tymoshenko and OU Chair Bezsmertny were
in complete agreement; Bezsmertny sounded nostalgic when
recalling Kuchma's iron will in times of crisis, such as the
1994-95 Crimean flirtation with separatism. Yushchenko
needed to find such will, said Bezsmertny, or find a "bastard
who can terrorize people for him." He jokingly suggested
calling Kuchma out of retirement, before adding: "or appoint
Yuliya to run the National Security and Defense Council for
him.")


11. (C) Tymoshenko said that BYuT and OU's negatives would
compound each other if they were to run together; instead
BYuT and OU needed complete coordination and gather all
national-patriotic-Maidan forces under two tents (note: the
"run separately" strategy would clearly result in BYuT
eclipsing OU as the only full-fledged Orange political
force). New elections would produce a better Rada that the
current swamp; "Moroz would have betrayed us eventually
anyway," she added.


12. (C) In contrast, if OU-Regions allied in a broad
coalition, Tymoshenko vowed to be in hard opposition to both
the coalition and Yushchenko as president; she would start
preparing her run for President in 2009. She claimed that
Akhmetov would dangle the prospect of Yekhanurov or Kinakh as
PM to Yushchenko. She saw the broad coalition as more
dangerous than the narrow one because Yushchenko/OU would
provide temporary cover for Regions as it consolidated power
via controlling the rest of the government. Regions would
seek to buy out Yekhanurov/Kinakh (both could be bought, she
said) or jettison them after six months.

What does Moroz want? (Presidency after the Speakership?)
-------------- --------------


13. (C) Comments from Socialist insiders made clear that
Moroz was willing to agree to anything to become speaker
again (reftel). While some OU types still harbored hopes
July 10 that Moroz could be enticed to work with Orange
again, Tymoshenko claimed to Ambassador July 8 that Moroz was
lost forever to democratic forces. Sounding like a
Mediterranean father whose daughter has eloped, she said:
"forget about Moroz; he no longer exists in Ukraine for our
efforts." His betrayal and ambition were greater than first
appeared, she claimed. Moroz and Akhmetov had agreed to more
than just the Speakership and a Regions-led coalition; Moroz
would be "the East's" candidate for President in 2009, since
Akhmetov had concluded that Donetsk could not elect one its
own (note: Regions' deputy leader Makeyenko, originally from
Chernihiv, told us the same last May). Tymoshenko also
predicted an elated Kremlin would soon invite Moroz to Moscow
to resolve the gas issue "personally."

What does OU want? (doesn't know)
--------------


14. (C) Separate meetings with Bezsmertny/OU Secretary
Zvarych and OU Political Council member Kinakh July 8 and
Tarasyuk July 10 showed OU wavering between the possible
options. Bezsmertny analyzed the Rada dismissal, broad
coalition, and go into opposition options, giving the
coalition with Regions a 15% chance of happening, implying
that he favored Rada dismissal/new elections if Tymoshenko
would agree on a single list, but suggested OU going into
opposition was the most likely course. OU's terms for
Regions were: Yanukovych could not be PM (OU wanted one of
its own),and Yushchenko's policy directions needed to guide
the next government's policy.


15. (C) Noting Regions' formal invitation to OU late July 7
to open coalition negotiations, Kinakh indicated that he had
already carried out informal consultations with Yanukovych
and would have another session with him later July 8. Kinakh
said that OU's two conditions were steadfast; OU was prepared
"in principle" to go into opposition; its political council
would meet late July 10 to assess options and the way forward
after consulting with Yushchenko.


16. (SBU) OU and BYuT MPs held a joint caucus meeting at the
Rada mid-day July 10. OU Press Secretary Tatiana Mokridi
told us that OU still harbored hope that Moroz might "come
back" to the orange team, though Socialist outcast Iosef
Vinsky warned them to forget such "prodigal son" scenarios.
Tymoshenko pushed for the dissolution/new elections option
and said her supporters were ready to start picketing the
Rada July 11; OU did not commit on any course of action,

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merely noting that its Political Council would meet late July

10.


17. (C) Tarasyuk told Ambassador late July 10, prior to
joining the OU Political Council meeting, that the preferred
outcome would be a broad coalition with Regions on OU's
terms. Going into opposition "would be very awkward for the
President's party." It would be better for OU to be inside
the government and affect policy; otherwise, Regions could
more easily change the country's strategic direction.
Tarasyuk's party Rukh had met July 8 and given him new
flexibility in pursuing a different coalition; the previous
mandate had been narrow, only for the orange option. OU had
told Yanukovych that it did not want either the Communists or
the Socialists as partners; Yanukovych had told them fine on
the Communists but that the Socialists would stay.

What does Regions want? (coalition with OU, Yanu as PM)
-------------- --------------


18. (C) Note: Septel will report Ambassador's July 10 meeting
with Yanukovych. It makes clear what we have known all
along: Regions prefers partnering with OU and is willing to
jettison the Communists. For now, Yanukovych resists the OU
demand on the PM's slot. The remaining question on what
increasingly appears to be the most likely alternative: who
will give? While OU appears to think it has leverage on this
point, Yanukovych is very confident of his return as PM.


19. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor