Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV2590
2006-07-05 15:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: ACTING NSDC SECRETARY ON ENERGY, RUSSIA

Tags:  PREL ENRG EPET ETRD MARR PGOV NATO RS UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9518
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2590/01 1861518
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 051518Z JUL 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0280
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 002590 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2016
TAGS: PREL ENRG EPET ETRD MARR PGOV NATO RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ACTING NSDC SECRETARY ON ENERGY, RUSSIA
RELATIONS, NATO

REF: A. KIEV 400


B. KIEV 57

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 002590

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/03/2016
TAGS: PREL ENRG EPET ETRD MARR PGOV NATO RS UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ACTING NSDC SECRETARY ON ENERGY, RUSSIA
RELATIONS, NATO

REF: A. KIEV 400


B. KIEV 57

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In a free-wheeling conversation during
Ambassador's July 3 introductory call, Acting National
Security and Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary Volodomyr
Horbulin focused on Russia and Russia's manifold impact on
Ukraine. In contrast to its obvious behavior during the 2004
presidential election, the Kremlin had shrewdly and subtly
worked to influence Ukraine's domestic political situation
through the Russian language media and surrogates such as
Nataliya Vitrenko and the "Ne Tak" bloc. The controversy in
Feodosiya surrounding the arrival of U.S. military reservists
had been one result. Despite Feodosiya, Horbulin declared
the Ukrainian government (GOU) would stay the course with
regard to NATO membership; PM-candidate Yuliya Tymoshenko
also supported Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic course. Ukrainian
electoral support for the Party of Regions had not been a
sign of Ukrainian political support to Russia but a sound
rejection in the East and South of President Yushchenko's
leadership. To build a durable governing coalition, Horbulin
opined that the Orange Coalition should allow Party of
Regions to chair more parliamentary committees; allocation of
responsibilities in Parliament after the 2002 elections
provided a sound precedent for this approach. Ukraine was
interested in the Single Economic Space only for its economic
benefits, but was trying not to rebuff Russia and Russia's
interest in establishing "supra-national entities" that
threatened Ukrainian sovereignty. Horbulin listened with
interest to Ambassador's suggestion that Ukraine issue a
statement regarding energy security to counter possible
Russian criticism at the G8 summit; he eagerly accepted
Ambassador's offer to put him in touch with USG-funded energy

experts. End summary.

Russia and Domestic Politics
--------------


2. (C) Considered by many to be Ukraine's top strategic
thinker, Horbulin agreed with former U.S. National Security
Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski's view, as related by Ambassador,
that the relationship with Ukraine is one of the USG's top
four strategic relations worldwide because of the impact that
Ukraine's strategic orientation, whether to the West or to
Russia, would have on Russia's internal development.
Horbulin opined that Russia's internal political
infrastructure would not change without a democratic Ukraine;
conversely, a Ukraine that remained in Russia's orbit would
serve to strengthen Russia's authoritarian tendencies.
Today, building on its energy relations, Russia increasingly
aspired to "great nation" status, seeking to consolidate its
hold among the successor nations of the former Soviet Union.
In post-Soviet space, a democratic Ukraine would become a
major obstacle toward reaching this goal.


3. (C) Horbulin observed that Russia had ratcheted up its
pressure after Ukraine's March elections, partly due to the
electoral success of the Russia-oriented Party of Regions.
During the 2006 election cycle, Russia had behaved more
shrewdly and subtly than during the 2004 presidential
election, providing media support and most probably financial
support to favorable candidates and parties. Results of the
parliamentary (Rada) elections, however, continued
developments evident in the presidential elections. With the
exception of the Communist Party, parties that ran on a
pro-Russia, anti-NATO platform, like Nataliya Vitrenko's
Progressive Socialist Party and the Social Democratic Party
of Ukraine (United)-led Ne Tak! bloc, had failed to achieve
the three percent threshold needed to obtain seats in the
Rada. The electoral preferences of the East and South of
Ukraine should not be seen as an endorsement of Party of
Regions' or former PM Viktor Yanukovych's policies, but as a
protest against President Yushchenko and his policies.

Chairmanships to Party of Regions
--------------


4. (C) Asking us not to take notes on his next comments,
Horbulin said that, in order to ensure that the Rada could
function and the government coalition would be effective and
durable, a good plan for distribution of Rada chairmanships
needed to be worked out. He felt that Regions had a valid
point in pushing to have more chairmanships. Horbulin
recalled that, when President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc
had made an unexpectedly strong showing after the 2002
parliamentary elections, Our Ukraine had filled the chair of
key influential Rada committees such as the Budget Committee
and Committee on Freedom of Speech. Regions would recall the
precedent that former President Leonid Kuchma's government

KIEV 00002590 002 OF 003


had provided concession to Our Ukraine bloc because it had
the largest plurality of seats in the Rada. (Note: The
non-partisan Horbulin has spoken favorably of Regions
previously. See ref B. In 2002, Our Ukraine filled the
chairman's seat on a number of other committees that Horbulin
did not cite, including the committees on human rights,
culture and spirituality, legal policy, and with Borys
Tarasyuk, now Foreign Minister, chairing the Committee on
European Integration.)

Russia and Ukraine's NATO Membership
--------------


5. (C) Horbulin said Russia continued to be active in Ukraine
on a broad front. A recent example of Russia's influence was
the anti-NATO hysteria, partially whipped up by the Russian
language media, over the arrival of U.S. military reservists
and construction equipment in the port city of Feodosiya on
the Crimean Peninsula. The GOU had settled the situation
down partly by bringing together all law enforcement agencies
and having them work together as one unit to avoid violence
in Feodosiya. This had been a good lesson, with other
lessons still to be drawn (comment: including, presumably,
some negative ones) in the GOU's handling of the situation.
The July 3 observation of Navy Day in Sevastopol had proven
that controversial events could take place without incident
if handled properly.


6. (C) Horbulin emphasized that, in the aftermath of
Feodosiya, Ukraine had not wavered from its Euro-Atlantic
course. President Yushchenko had made this clear. The new
government also had to reinforce this message with a clear
statement of its intentions. Without naming names, Horbulin
said, with respect to the key portfolios that President
Yushchenko could fill on his own prerogative (such as the
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense),Yushchenko had
candidates who would support the Euro-Atlantic course. If
the next Prime Minister were a woman, Horbulin commented that
he had no doubts regarding her orientation although, as a
woman, "she had her prerogatives." Ambassador responded that
President Yushchenko and the woman prime minister (Yuliya
Tymoshenko) had to be united regarding both NATO and EU
membership.


7. (C) Horbulin said, while Russia had grudgingly yielded on
NATO membership first for the central European states such as
Poland and then for the Baltics, Ukraine's NATO membership
was qualitatively different, of another order of magnitude.
While Ukraine did not object to Russia's efforts to ensure
its security in a European framework, he could not understand
why Russian did not allow Ukraine to do the same. Russia
today enjoyed a closer and more fruitful relationship with
NATO than Ukraine. U.S. aerospace company, Boeing, for
example, had begun working in Moscow on a project which also
involved Ukrainian engineers, to develop a wing using
titanium alloys. (Note: The Russian firm, VSMPO-Avisma,
leads the world in titanium production and supplies Boeing.
Horbulin may be referring to Russian involvement in designing
part of the new Boeing 787 "Dreamliner," a purely commercial
venture.) Russia was now cooperating with a French company
(note: possibly EADS, "European Aeronautics, Defense, Space")
in the development of an "Airjet" passenger aircraft, which
would be in direct competition with the Ukrainian-Russian
An-128, but Ukraine had not made a single demarche in protest.

Russia and EU Membership
--------------


8. (C) After Horbulin said Ukrainians were united on the
benefits of EU membership, with even the Party of Regions
supportive but only after Ukraine had joined the
Russia-sponsored Single Economic Space, Ambassador inquired
whether Ukraine could maintain the momentum to NATO or EU
membership while still a member of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) and other Russian-sponsored
organizations. Horbulin answered that basic membership in
the Single Economic Space (SES) (of Ukraine, Russia, Belarus,
and Kazakhstan) free trade zone would not be an obstacle to
EU membership.


9. (C) However, with respect to SES, Ukraine had to walk a
fine line akin to "balancing on a razor blade," since free
trade zones were only the first step to establishing the SES.
The next step would be the creation of a range of
supra-national entities, which, Horbulin implied, would be a
real problem. Ukraine was sincerely interested in promoting
closer economic cooperation particularly with Russia, with
which it has strong economic ties, but also with Kazakhstan.
While Ukraine was emphasizing the trade promotion and
economic elements, Russia evidently had the creation of the
supra-national organizations as its main goal with respect to

KIEV 00002590 003 OF 003


SES. Ambassador said he hoped Russia would not view U.S.
relations and its own relations with Ukraine as a zero-sum
game, with one side losing if the other gained.

Russia and Energy
--------------


10. (C) Horbulin stressed that energy was the number one
national security concern. Energy policy, however, was more
than just diversifying oil and natural gas supplies. It also
involved efforts to promote energy efficiency and
conservation. Energy policy required finding ways to solve
problems in the coal mining sector, including in the Donbas
region (of Donetsk and Luhansk regions),where accident rates
were still unacceptably high. Any assistance to the coal
mining sector would revise Ukrainian perceptions and have an
impact politically as well, he suggested. Ambassador said
the USG would continue and expand its assistance on coal
mining safety and energy efficiency, as well as continuing
providing expert advice to the Ministry of Fuels and Energy.


11. (C) Horbulin said he expected Russia to continue using
the natural gas issue to achieve political ends. During the
G8 summit, Russia was likely to do all that it could to
convince the world that Ukraine was an unreliable transit
country. Horbulin admitted that Ukraine had also contributed
to this perception problem, which he had realized after he
had begun delving into the question two weeks previously. He
had no solutions now, but he would work on the problem with
the NSDC staff and the new government. Horbulin recognized
that Ukraine had displayed weaknesses in its negotiations
with Russian over natural gas supplies. Ambassador agreed
with this perspective and said two USG-funded energy experts
had some suggestions on how Ukraine might overcome these
deficiencies. Horbulin eagerly accepted Ambassador's offer
to put him in touch with the energy experts.


12. (C) Horbulin continued that he expected Russian President
Putin, during his G8 summit speech, to use Ukraine's alleged
unreliability to support his proposals to find ways to
deliver natural gas to Western Europe without transiting
Ukraine. In addition to the pipeline project under the
Baltic Sea, the proposals would include shipment of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) through the Barents Sea and greater
reliance on a southern route through Turkey and Greece.
Ambassador suggested the GOU issue a statement before the G8
summit that would stress Ukraine's desire to ensure energy
security for Western Europe. The statement would confirm
Ukraine's commitment to ensure oil and natural gas transit
according to transparent arrangements that met European
standards and invite the Europeans and Russia to sit down
with Ukraine to establish such arrangements. The statement
would admit shortcomings of the past and commit to high
standards in the future. Horbulin smiled, clearly pleased
with Ambassador's idea, and said, while he could not make a
decision on Ambassador's proposal, he would relay it to
President Yushchenko.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor