Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV2358
2006-06-16 15:04:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE/ROMANIA/BLACK SEA FORUM: FRIENDLY

Tags:  PREL PBTS ETRD SENV KDEM RO UP 
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VZCZCXRO1732
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2358/01 1671504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 161504Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9962
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 002358 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB, EUR/NCE, AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS ETRD SENV KDEM RO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE/ROMANIA/BLACK SEA FORUM: FRIENDLY
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN

REF: A. BUCHAREST 981

B. KIEV 1785

C. BUCHAREST 730

D. BUCHAREST 287

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael Uyehara for reasons 1
.4(b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 002358

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/UMB, EUR/NCE, AND EUR/SE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PBTS ETRD SENV KDEM RO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE/ROMANIA/BLACK SEA FORUM: FRIENDLY
BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN

REF: A. BUCHAREST 981

B. KIEV 1785

C. BUCHAREST 730

D. BUCHAREST 287

Classified By: Acting Political Counselor Michael Uyehara for reasons 1
.4(b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary: Ukraine and Romania have enjoyed markedly
warmer relations post-Orange Revolution, according to
Romanian Embassy counselor Stanciu, with Romanian President
Basescu visiting Kiev three times. MFA Romania desk officer
Popyk told us three areas continued to be irritants in the
bilateral relationship: demarcation of the continental shelf
and the associated issue of Zmeiny Island's status, Ukraine's
construction of a Danube-Black Sea Canal, and the status of
each countries' ethnic minorities in the other country. Both
officials, however, downplayed the seriousness of the three
issues. While Romania takes an active interest in
negotiations to settle the separatist Transnistria region of
Moldova, according to Stanciu, Romania was not pushing to
have a seat at the negotiating table. Popyk considered
Ukraine's participation in the June 5 Black Sea Forum to be
an unqualified success. End summary.


2. (U) We met with Romanian Embassy Counselor Romeo Stanciu
June 2 and MFA Romania desk officer Serhiy Popyk June 9 to
obtain an overview of Ukraine-Romania relations.

Neighbors and Friends
--------------


3. (U) Although Ukraine shares a relatively short 375-mile
border with Romania, the changing tides and shifting boundary
lines of 19th and 20th century European history have created
a definite historic link between the two countries. About
150,000 ethnic Romanians are estimated to live in Ukraine,
with 114,000 located in Chernivtsi region (oblast),32,000
resident in Zakarpattiya oblast (both statistics according to
the 2001 Ukrainian census) and another significant community
located in the southwestern part of Odesa oblast near the
Romanian border. Chernivtsi oblast is the northern part of

the historic area of Bukovina, which during the period
between World Wars One and Two was part of Romania. The
Ukrainian Embassy in Bucharest website states that, according
to the 2002 national census, 61,400 ethnic Ukrainians live in
Romania, although alternative sources claim the Ukrainian
community in Romania numbers as much as 200,000. The
majority of Ukrainians and Romanian also share the Orthodox
Christian faith.



4. (U) In 2005, total trade volume between Ukraine and
Romania was U.S. $702 million (representing 3.5 percent of
Ukraine's total trade),which was down 97 percent form the
$1.38 billion of 2004 (or 3.8 percent of Ukraine's total
trade). This strong decline was on the export side. At the
same time, Ukraine's imports from Romania increased from a
very small base. Ukraine had a $280 million trade surplus
with Romania in 2005, down from a $648 million surplus in

2004. In the first three months of 2006, Ukraine's exports
to Romania showed a further decline (down 20 percent from the
same period a year earlier),while Ukraine's imports from
Romania continued to increase steadily. Ukraine's main
exports to Romania were principally metal ores and metallic
products, such as ferrous alloys, rolled steel, unalloyed
steel products, etc., as well as chemical products, coal,
coke and semi-coke, and wood. Romania's exports to Ukraine
included more manufactured products -- cars, furniture,
synthetic threads, machinery and spare parts, paper and
cardboard, and chemicals and drugs. According to Romanian
statistics, Ukrainians invested almost U.S. $1.5 million into
the Romanian economy, placing Ukraine 74th among foreign
investors into Romania.

Warm Bilateral Relations
--------------


5. (SBU) Stanciu told us that Ukraine-Romania relations had
warmed considerably after the 2004 Orange Revolution events
brought President Yushchenko to power. Yushchenko wanted to
follow a path toward EU and NATO membership already trod
successfully by Romania, so Ukraine looked to Romania for
advice and support for its European and Euro-Atlantic
aspirations. As evidence of the close relationship, Stanciu
noted Romanian President Traian Basescu had visited Kiev
three times, first to attend Yushchenko's inauguration, a
second time to attend the December 1-2, 2005, Community of
Democratic Choice Summit, and the last and most recent on an

KIEV 00002358 002 OF 004


official visit February 2-3. President Yushchenko also
visited Bucharest April 21-22, 2005 and most recently to
attend the June 5-6 Black Sea Forum. During Basescu's
official visit, the two presidents signed a protocol formally
establishing an interstate commission (the Yushchenko-Basescu
commission) to discuss matters of mutual interest. The
commission has three committee
s: one for regional, European, and Euro-Atlantic security, a
second for cooperation in the fields of culture, education,
and minorities, and a third for environmental protection and
sustainable economic development.


6. (U) Popyk agreed the two countries enjoyed good relations
overall, but noted problems still remained over three issues:
delimitation of the continental shelf, status of ethnic
minorities, and the Danube Delta canal.

Boundary Issues
--------------


7. (U) After then-Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and
then-Romanian President Ilion Iliescu signed a treaty June
17, 2003, confirming the land boundaries set by a 1961 treaty
between the Soviet Union and Romania, Ukraine and Romania
only had demarcation of their respective exclusive economic
zones (EEZ) to be settled. The remaining disagreement in
calculating the EEZs centers around the status of Zmeiny
("snake" or "serpent" in Russian) Island, with an area of
just under a square mile, which Romania however agrees is
Ukrainian territory. Romanians argue that Zmeiny Island is
not a true island, which would allow it to act as a reference
point to set the EEZ, while Ukraine argues the reverse since
Zmeiny Island is capable of supporting a population and
economic infrastructure. Zmeiny Island, which lies 30 miles
offshore from Ukraine and 80 miles from Odesa, reportedly has
unproven reserves of 10 million tons of oil and ten billion
cubic meters of natural gas offshore.


8. (U) In September 2004, Romania referred the dispute to the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) at the Hague for
resolution, in accordance with a 1998 agreement with Ukraine
that stipulated either country could refer the case to the
ICJ if a mutually acceptable solution was not reached in two
years. Ukraine lodged a counter-claim against Romania with
the ICJ in May 2006. An oral hearing on the case is likely
to take place in 2008, with a final judgment sometime in

2009. In the meantime, the two countries resumed bilateral
negotiations on the maritime border demarcation in April 2005
that paralleled the court case. Both Stanciu and Popyk took
the view that the issue was a technical one to be resolved by
experts and one that did not impact on the overall
relationship. Both sides appeared willing to accept the
results of whichever process ended first. In the meantime,
however, Popyk complained Ukraine was prevented from
developing Zmeiny Island until the case was settled.

Danube Canal
--------------


9. (U) On May 16, 2004, a Ukrainian government contractor
began the dredging and related work of the pre-existing
Bystroe canal to allow ocean-going vessels access to the
Danube river. The shipping through the new Danube-Black Sea
shipping canal was intended to allow the Ukrainian government
to collect millions of dollars of annual fees currently paid
by shipping companies for the use of the Sulina canal located
in Romania and to resuscitate Ukrainian Black Sea ports that
were closed due to lack of traffic. The canal was
ceremonially opened August 26, 2004, after the first stage of
work was completed, and traffic began to flow through it.


10. (U) The Ukrainian government started Phase two in October
2004, but then suspended activity within a few weeks.
Failure to conduct proper maintenance, winter storms, and
spring floods undid much of the earlier dredging by April

2005. The Minister of Transportation state enterprise, Delta
Pilot, which is responsible for canal development and
maintenance, resumed work on the canal in April-May 2005,
then again suspended the work in mid-May. Additional
flooding in July and August brought more sediment and
returned the Bystroe canal's depth to its measurement before
the start of construction, 10.4 feet.


11. (U) The canal project, located in the middle of the
Ukrainian part of the ecologically sensitive Danube Delta,
which it shares with Romania, ignited stiff opposition from
environmental groups. The European Commission and the
Romanian, U.S., and other governments joined the protests.
The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) notes that the Danube Delta, a

KIEV 00002358 003 OF 004


UNESCO World Heritage Site since 1991, is home to 70 percent
of the world's white pelicans and half of its pygmy
cormorants. Supported by other expert opinion, WWF argues
the deepened canal will adversely affect water flow through
the Danube Delta, construction activity that disturbs the
water will kill fish fry, and removal of sand banks will
destroy sensitive habitats.


12. (SBU) Ukraine, however, accuses Romania of mounting its
protest for economic reasons and not out of genuine concern
for the ecological health of the Danube Delta. The Ukrainian
government has resisted considering various alternative
approaches raised by the environmental and international
communities. In a positive development, the Ministry of
Transportation reported in April 2006 that it had begun
considering options other than the Bystroe canal to meet
Ukrainian transportation needs in the Danube Delta. Since
the project is in abeyance, neither Stanciu nor Popyk had
much to say on the topic, although Stanciu offered that the
Romanian government had the court of world opinion on its
side.

Ethnic Communities
--------------


13. (U) Although friction over the status of ethnic
communities in each country is regularly cited as a constant
bilateral irritant, Stanciu and Popyk also did not have much
to say on this topic. Popyk argued that, when the Romanian
government raised the topic, it was merely trying to protect
its flanks against the revanchist claims of the Party of
Greater Romania. Stanciu complained mildly about the
Romanian government and Romanian ethnic organizations'
difficulties in providing Romanian language texts for use in
Ukrainian state schools. He said, by law, the Ministry of
Education had to review and approve all texts, and sometimes
disapproved texts for flimsy reasons. Stanciu noted the
requirement was a general one and not on directed only at the
ethnic Romanian community. On the other hand, the Romanian
government did not impose such a procedure for Ukrainian
language texts donated to Romanian schools.


14. (U) Stanciu noted the EU's designation of special
cultural zones that straddled both Ukraine and Romania had
promoted a wide range of official contacts at the local
government level as well as non-governmental interaction.
The three regions were the Lower Danube, the Upper Prut, and
Carpathians.

Transnistria
--------------


15. (SBU) Although provided an opportunity, Stanciu did not
push for a greater Romanian role in negotiations over
Moldova's separatist Transnistria region. He noted, however,
that the Romanian government continued to take a keen
interest in Moldova/Transnistria developments and appeared to
appreciate our update on the situation. Popyk said Romania
had been a negotiating party in the early 1990s in talks to
settle the Transnistria issue, but did not figure in the
"Yushchenko plan" on Transnistria settlement. He had seen in
the media Romania intended to propose its own initiative and
would be interested in learning the details, once it was
finalized.

Black Sea Forum
--------------


16. (U) Popyk said his reading of the Romanian press
suggested the Romanian public was divided over whether the
Black Sea Forum, held June 5 in Bucharest (ref A),had been a
success, with some questioning the U.S. $700,000 cost of the
meeting. From Ukraine's perspective, he noted complacently,
the Black Sea Forum had been a complete success. President
Yushchenko had attended and bolstered Ukraine's status as a
regional leader by proposing to initiate "the energy dialogue
of three seas" (i.e., Baltic, Black, and Caspian),a new
consultative mechanism within the framework of the Community
of Democratic Choice. The proposal envisioned bringing
together supplier, transporter, and consumer countries in the
development of a coordinated regional energy policy,
including consideration of energy projects and other aspects
of such cooperation. Yushchenko had also made suggestions
toward resolution of the so-called "frozen conflicts."


17. (C) Popyk said, in the end, the Black Sea Forum
declaration failed to make any reference to the Ukrainian and
Georgian Community of Democratic Choice (CDC) initiative,
although, at Romanian government insistence, the CDC

KIEV 00002358 004 OF 004


declaration had been modified to refer to the Black Sea
Forum. He said the Romanian government had decided not to
include the CDC reference in order not to ruffle Russian
feathers with the hope that Russian president Putin might be
induced to attend. In the end, however, Putin had not
attended and, instead of participating, Russia had sent the
Russian ambassador to Romania as an observer. (Note:
Popyk's description contradicts MFA's earlier claim to us,
ref B, that Greek government objections had kept out the CDC
reference.)


18. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor