Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV2278
2006-06-09 15:26:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: ENCOURAGING GREATER SUPPORT TO BELARUSAN

Tags:  PREL PINR BO UP 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO3959
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #2278/01 1601526
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 091526Z JUN 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9838
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002278 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR BO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ENCOURAGING GREATER SUPPORT TO BELARUSAN
DEMOCRATIC REFORM


Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b,
d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 002278

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PINR BO UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ENCOURAGING GREATER SUPPORT TO BELARUSAN
DEMOCRATIC REFORM


Classified By: Political Counselor Aubrey A. Carlson for reasons 1.4(b,
d)


1. (C) Summary: During a June 8 meeting with DFM Khandohiy,
U.S. Ambassador to Belarus Krol encouraged Ukraine to develop
contacts with Belarus at a level below cabinet minister and
suggested that Ukraine could use such contacts to promote
more responsible Belarusan government behavior. He also said
the U.S. and EU embassies in Minsk would welcome the
Ukrainian Embassy's efforts to coordinate more closely with
them and to meet with the Belarusan democratic opposition
efforts (which it has neglected to do to date). End summary.


2. (U) Visiting U.S. Ambassador to Belarus George Krol met
June 8 with Deputy Foreign Minister Volodymyr Khandohiy to
exchange views on Belarus. MFA First Secretary Oksana
Kytsun, Belarus desk officer in the Central and Eastern
European Countries Division, and PolOff (notetaker) sat in.

The Same Balancing Act
--------------


3. (C) Khandohiy began that, while Ukraine wanted to be and
could be helpful on Belarus due to close cultural and
historical ties, Ukraine needed to be mindful of the sizable
volume of trade with Belarus and of Belarus' economic
importance to Ukraine. The Ukrainian government had hoped to
gain pragmatic objectives by offering a meeting between the
two countries' presidents, but the Belarusan government,
which wanted the meeting for political reasons to advance
Belarusan President Lukashenka's legitimacy, did not accept
Ukrainian preconditions. The Belarusan government had wanted
to link demarcation of the Ukraine-Belarus border to the
settling of Ukrainian debts that it claimed were still owed.
Now, Khandohiy noted, Ukraine-Belarus relations were
"stagnant," particularly after the Belarusan authorities had
arrested or detained Ukrainian citizens.

Ukrainian Good Offices
--------------


4. (C) Ambassador Krol agreed that Ukraine was in a unique
position to be helpful. Most Belarusans still viewed
Ukrainians as "us" unlike Poles, Lithuanians and others whom
Belarusans saw as "them." Even the Belarusan state media was
not as aggressively hostile in its characterization of

Ukraine, suggesting that Ukraine instead was a victim of
Western, especially U.S., manipulation. Ambassador Krol
opined that Ukraine might now have more of an opening, since
in his travels along the border with Ukraine he had heard
Belarusan citizens and local officials express interest in
resuming a broad range of contacts with Ukraine. The
Belarusan Foreign Ministry might also desire to open a
dialogue to find cooperative ways of resisting Russian
economic pressure directed against both countries.

Well, Maybe Yes
--------------


5. (C) Khandohiy said he had known Belarusan Foreign Minister
Sergei Martynov for many years, since both had been personal
assistants to their respective Socialist Republic "foreign
ministers" in Soviet times. They had subsequently been
assigned to the United Nations in New York at the same time,
both working on arms control issues. The EU, however, had
recently become increasingly more cautionary about
interactions with Belarus. Khandohiy asked whether Ukraine
could actually play a role with respect to Belarus.


6. (C) Ambassador Krol said the EU was probably concerned
about possible presidential summits. Meetings at lower
levels, however, might offer a useful channel to discuss
Ukraine-Belarus bilateral issues. For example, Ambassador
Krol said he knew Lithuania met regularly with Belarus at the
deputy foreign minister level, and he understood Poland had
done the same in the past. Ukraine might do the same at the
deputy foreign minister or department director level. In
fact, Ambassador Krol suggested, Khandohiy might even visit
Minsk since he already knew Martynov well. During such a
visit, however, Khandohiy should also meet with individuals
outside the government. The Belarusan government would be
unhappy, but this was a normal practice of U.S. and EU
officials visiting Minsk.

An Out-of-Step Ukrainian Embassy
--------------


7. (C) Ambassador Krol noted the Ukrainian Embassy in Minsk
did not meet with democratic opposition and civil society
representatives. The U.S. Embassy, on the other hand, met
frequently with Ten-Plus presidential candidate Aleksander

KIEV 00002278 002 OF 002


Milinkevich, but Krol did not believe that Milinkevich had
ever been received at the Ukrainian Embassy. EU embassies
also met frequently with, and listened to, the democratic
opposition. The U.S. Embassy, and likely EU embassies, would
welcome the Ukrainian Embassy's more active role and closer
consultation with U.S. and EU embassies on a common approach
to the Belarusan government. Western embassies would also
welcome Ukrainian Embassy input on ways to make the Belarusan
government more open to democratic values. Ambassador Krol
stressed that no other mission or country had the same
credibility with the Belarusan government and people. The
Ukrainian government would be in a unique and delicate
position if it could simultaneously be a trusted confidant of
the Belarusan government and of the U.S. and EU.


8. (C) Ambassador Krol encouraged greater Ukrainian
interaction with the Belarusian people, exposing them as much
as possible to democratic and market economic alternatives.
Pension and health reform initiatives in Ukraine could be
useful to Belarusans as well, as they faced the same issues
as Ukrainians. Ambassador Krol stressed that U.S. and EU
joint policy toward Belarus was not to isolate the Belarusan
people; Lukashenka and those in his regime responsible for
repression should be isolated and squeezed, but outreach to
the Belarusan people should be dramatically increased in all
spheres and particularly in the information field. Ukraine
could play a major role in this joint policy initiative.


9. (C) Khandohiy looked thoughtful upon hearing these points.
As the meeting ended, he smiled and suggested that he might
see Ambassador Krol again, in Minsk.


10. (U) Ambassador Krol cleared this cable.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Taylor