UKRAINE: KRAMER-WOOD 5/22 MEETING WITH FORMER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001994

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINR SOCI ECON PREL UP RS
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: KRAMER-WOOD 5/22 MEETING WITH FORMER
CHIEF OF STAFF OLEKSANDR ZINCHENKO


Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) In a May 22 meeting with visiting EUR DAS David
Kramer, OVP Deputy NSA Joseph Wood, and Ambassador, former
State Secretary Oleksandr Zinchenko stressed that Ukraine's
next prime minister should be a politically independent
technocrat -- not a politician. Zinchenko had advised
President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine (OU) to build bridges to
the rival Party of Regions, the first-place finisher in the
March 26 parliamentary elections; without Regions' support,
President Yushchenko would not be able to govern effectively
in the east and south. Zinchenko characterized OU as a
"mess," asserting that "nobody in OU listens to Yushchenko."
Ukraine's relations with Russia were in "total chaos,"
according to Zinchenko. The Russian mass media, at the
behest of the Kremlin, was presenting the Russian public with
an extremely negative image of Ukraine; Kiev's official
reaction, championed by Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, had simply
further antagonized Moscow. Zinchenko stressed that
Yushchenko needed a respected, competent special envoy to
patch up relations with Russia; Zinchenko said he would take
such a job if he had Yushchenko's full support. In
particular, Zinchenko said that he would smooth the rough
edges of Ukraine's NATO accession effort, listening to
Russian concerns and building Ukrainian public support for
accession. Zinchenko complained about the Ukrainian
government's failure to reach out to Kazakhstan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to diversify energy supplies;
the controversial January gas deal with Russia had been "a
crime," Zinchenko said, adding that "somebody" had betrayed
Ukraine "because he wanted to become a millionaire."
Zinchenko claimed that Yushchenko still did not know all the
details of the January deal -- or "does not want to know."
End summary.

The Man Who Lit the Fuse
--------------


2. (C) EUR DAS David Kramer and Deputy National Security
Adviser to the Vice President Joseph Wood, accompanied by
Ambassador, met May 22 with former State Secretary Oleksandr
Zinchenko, whose September 2005 public allegations of
corruption against members of President Yushchenko's inner
circle sparked the breakup of the original Orange coalition.
Yushchenko answered Zinchenko's accusations by sacking Prime
Minister Yuliya Tymoshenko (who was not the subject of
Zinchenko's corruption allegations) and removing
anti-Tymoshenko close associates National Security and
Defense Council (NSDC) Secretary Petro Poroshenko and senior
presidential aide Oleksandr Tretyakov (who were in
Zinchenko's sights). The moves sent Ukraine into a period of
political limbo from which it has yet to fully emerge.
(Note: The media reported on May 24 that Zinchenko may soon
be dismissed as leader of his Party of Patriotic Forces of
Ukraine, which finished 30th -- with 0.10 percent of the
total vote -- in the March 26 parliamentary and local
elections.)

Next Prime Minister? Technocrat
--------------


3. (C) Addressing the current prolonged Rada majority
coalition formation negotiations that have followed the March
26 parliamentary elections, Zinchenko said he could not
answer the question of who would serve as the next prime
minister. Zinchenko dismissed current Prime Minister Yuriy
Yekhanurov as weak and characterized Tymoshenko as decisive
and charismatic but unable to create a winning team.
Zinchenko asserted that Yushchenko would be best served by
choosing a compromise figure who was capable and politically
independent; the country needed a strong, professional
manager in the prime minister's chair -- not a politician.

Building Bridges With Regions
--------------


4. (C) Zinchenko said that the results of the March
parliamentary and local elections made it clear that, while
distasteful, Our Ukraine (OU) had to build bridges to the
rival Party of Regions. Regions had won decisive political
control in seven eastern and southern oblasts; unless
Yushchenko reached out to Regions and included it in a "Grand
Coalition," Yushchenko would not be able to govern these
oblasts. Zinchenko speculated that the price of coaxing
Regions into the proverbial Big Tent would be a deputy prime
minister and a deputy Rada Speaker slot, as well as some key
Rada committee chairmanships. Zinchenko had advised OU to
work directly with Regions politicians at the local level,

KIEV 00001994 002 OF 002


which he claimed would weaken and isolate Regions Chairman
and Yushchenko rival Viktor Yanukovych.

OU: "A Mess"
--------------


5. (C) Zinchenko characterized OU as a "mess" of a political
party over which Yushchenko now had little control.
Asserting that "nobody in OU listens to Yushchenko,"
Zinchenko stressed that a housecleaning was needed;
Yushchenko had to assert his authority by appointing three or
four young leaders to unify the party, enforce discipline and
turn it into the "dynamic force" that it once had been.

Relations With Russia: "Total Chaos"
--------------


6. (C) Ukraine's relations with Russia, according to
Zinchenko, were in state of "total chaos." The message from
the Kremlin, dutifully repeated by the Russian mass media,
was that "everything is bad in Ukraine." This negative image
of Ukraine was having a significant impact on trade
relations, which Zinchenko asserted were in bad shape and
getting worse. Zinchenko groused that the Ukrainian
government's reaction to Moscow's hostility had been crude
and counterproductive; Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, in
particular, had done nothing but antagonize the Kremlin.


7. (C) Zinchenko argued that Yushchenko needed to reach out
to Moscow. The best way to do that was to appoint a special
representative to handle relations with Russia. That person
needed to be a professional, and someone respected in Moscow.
Responding to a question from DAS Kramer, Zinchenko said he
would be willing to serve as Yushchenko's emissary to the
Kremlin, but only if Yushchenko fully supported him in
attempting to patch things up with Russia. Asked for an
example of what he would do differently than Tarasyuk,
Zinchenko cited Ukraine's NATO accession effort. Tarasyuk,
he said, regularly and deliberately stoked the Kremlin's
already considerable anxiety about Ukraine joining NATO.
Zinchenko said he would take a "professional" approach,
listening to Russian concerns while at the same time using a
PR campaign to build public support in Ukraine for accession,
highlighting the fact that Russia itself had a robust
relationship with the alliance.

Gas Deal
--------------


8. (C) Zinchenko also blamed Tarasyuk, and the Ukrainian
government more broadly, for failing to reach out to
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in an effort to
diversify Ukraine's energy supplies. Instead, Zinchenko
said, Ukraine had "voluntarily given Russia monopoly control"
of its energy sector via the January gas deal, which
Zinchenko characterized as "a crime." "Somebody" had
betrayed Ukraine "simply because he wanted to become a
millionaire," Zinchenko asserted, adding that Yushchenko
still did not know the details of the January agreement --
"or does not want to know."


9. (U) The delegation cleared this cable.
Herbst