UKRAINE: FAREWELL CALL ON PM-HOPEFUL TYMOSHENKO ON

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001992

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FAREWELL CALL ON PM-HOPEFUL TYMOSHENKO ON
EVE OF RADA OPENING


Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: Ambassador paid his farewell call on
PM-aspirant Yuliya Tymoshenko May 24, the day prior to the
opening of the new parliament (Rada) May 25. Tymoshenko said
she and her team had stayed up "all night" analyzing the
completely new coalition proposal Our Ukraine (OU) had sprung
on the Tymoshenko Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialists May 23, a
day on which "all of my optimism (on coalition prospects)
fell away." Tymoshenko, who had just completed a phone call
with President Yushchenko trying to agree on the way forward
in the coming days, felt slightly better about the coalition
May 24. However, she complained again about maneuvering by
her archrival Petro Poroshenko, who she said was forging
working arrangements with ex-PM Yanukovych's Regions Party,
lining up support for a potential vote in favor of Yanukovych
as PM, and spiking chances for an Orange coalition. While
BYuT could live with the OU-proposed program elements on
foreign and domestic policy and the program for the next
government, the suggested new coalition rules were a recipe
to destroy an effective Orange coalition, not to maintain it;
the section on personnel choices was also objectionable.
Tymoshenko said she and Moroz would make a joint public
appeal at 1300 May 24 to send a positive signal to Ukrainian
society about coalition prospects and seek to secure a joint
meeting with Yushchenko after the Rada opening; she would
meet OU chief negotiator Bezsmertny at 1500 hours to sort
through what exactly the new OU proposal was intended to
accomplish. Tymoshenko thanked Ambassador for his
contributions to Ukraine over the past three years,
particularly during the Orange Revolution, and suggested it
was regrettable to have a gap between Ambassadors at this
critical moment of coalition formation. End summary.

Expected "May Surprise" Emerges from OU, Poroshenko
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2. (C) Yuliya Tymoshenko, accompanied by foreign policy
adviser and MP Hryhoriy Nemyrya, told Ambassador that she and
her team had stayed up all night assessing the "completely
new" OU coalition proposal passed by courier mid-day May 23.
Two months of work had been lost, with the Rada opening May

25. BYuT had been expecting such a maneuver from OU from the
beginning. While BYuT could accept the foreign, domestic,
economic, and social policy programs, as well as the proposed
agenda for the new government, the new rules and personnel
sections were completely unacceptable; they were designed to
destroy an Orange coalition, not keep it intact. Poroshenko
had secured the OU Political Council's endorsement of his
candidacy as Rada Speaker, which would be a disaster; his
collaboration with Regions in the Rada Working Group (below)
would continue, voting one day with Regions and the next with
the government, dooming any effectiveness of an Orange
coalition. Poroshenko's team also aimed to have presidential
confidant Oleksandr Tretyakov return to the Presidential
Secretariat, ex-Ministers Zhvaniya and Chervonenko to the

SIPDIS
Cabinet, Martynenko as head of OU's Rada faction, and PM
Yekhanurov as the head of the National Security and Defense
Council (NSDC),she claimed.


3. (C) May 23 had been a down day for Orange prospects across
the board, since Poroshenko had maneuvered within the Rada
Working Group working with Regions, not BYuT and the
Socialists, on planning for the next Rada, including folding
the Euro-Integration Committee (note: which took the lead on
NATO issues) into the Foreign Policy Committee, and splitting
the National Security and Defense Committee into a Defense
Committee to be headed by OU and a National Security
Committee to be headed by Regions. BYuT deputy leader
Turchynov had met with Poroshenko, but the trilateral
OU-BYuT-Socialist preparatory work on both the coalition
document and in the working group had been ignored.


4. (C) For its part, Regions was busy attempting to buy MPs
to secure a majority that would vote in favor of Yanukovych
as PM, alleged Tymoshenko. She was aware of 16 BYuT MPs who
had met with Regions at Regions' invitation; the money
offered to support Yanukovych ranged from $1.5 million to $10
million; in addition, Poroshenko had secured roughly 12 OU
MPs willing to turn. The alleged plan was for Regions to
"spontaneously" raise a vote for a possible PM candidate,
attain roughly 230 votes in favor of Yanukovych (Regions plus
bought deputies from the Communists as well as BYuT, OU, and
the Socialists),and then use that as leverage against
Yushchenko, forcing his hand in favor of an OU-Regions
coalition. Tymoshenko warned that this was a dangerous but
potentially successful gambit, particularly if the prices
rose to $15 million; few MPs could resist the lure to secure
the future of themselves and their children.

Whither Yushchenko?

KIEV 00001992 002 OF 002


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5. (C) Nonetheless, Tymoshenko had just completed a phone
conversation with Yushchenko, initiated by Yushchenko, which
had left her feeling slightly more optimistic. She had
raised her concerns about how the proposed rules section
would be an obstacle to a successful coalition; Yushchenko
had not read any of the three versions of the OU coalition
proposal but promised to get involved. Yushchenko and she
had also talked about the need to strengthen the laws and
regulations regarding the imperative mandate, to protect
against the buying of deputies. In order to send a positive
public signal about coalition chances, she and Moroz would
hold a joint press conference at 1300 expressing support for
the developing coalition and express a readiness to meet
Yushchenko to iron out details. She would sit down with
Bezsmertny at 1500 to go through details. (Note: At the
press conference, Tymoshenko mentioned the Yushchenko phone
call and stated that there would be a meeting of Yushchenko
and leaders of the three putative coalition parties May 25
after the formal opening of the Rada to hammer out details of
the coalition agreement, a different spin than the one she
shared with us privately, perhaps meant to pressure
Yushchenko to follow through on the meeting. While
Tymoshenko and Moroz "signed" the coalition proposal BYuT and
the Socialists had passed to OU previously, Tymoshenko
acknowledged that negotiations on a new document would
continue.)


6. (C) Ambassador asked about Yushchenko's views on
Poroshenko's play for the Rada Speakership. Tymoshenko
replied that she did not sense Yushchenko supported
Poroshenko, but acknowledged the situation was complex;
Yushchenko did not seem to have an entirely free hand to run
his party. BYuT had mapped out the various OU MP groupings
and leaders and was engaging them. Kinakh, Rukh (Tarasyuk),
Katerynchuk, and Stretovych's small factions seemed to be
approaching the coalition negotiation process normally.

Changing colors, changing of the guard
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7. (C) Noting that each day brought a different dynamic to
the coalition process, Tymoshenko expressed regret that there
would be a gap between U.S. Ambassadors. Ambassador replied
that coalition negotiations were likely at least three weeks
from the end game; Tymoshenko agreed, but stressed that the
coming days would shape the issues and set the stage for the
ultimate outcome. Tymoshenko thanked Ambassador for the
positive role he played in promoting U.S. and Ukrainian
interests, first and foremost during the "breakthrough" of
the Orange Revolution. Ambassador suggested Tymoshenko build
on her initial steps in recent weeks to increase business
confidence in her economic policy perspectives to foster
increased investment in Ukraine, since if she were to return
to the Premiership, she could be guaranteed to face a vocal
opposition.


8. (SBU) Note: BYuT staff had changed the color of the large
poster-sized photos on the walls of the party headquarters of
Tymoshenko and cheering Ukrainians on the Maidan in recent
days, from 100 percent Orange dating from November-December
2004 to half white, black and red (heart) of BYuT's 2006 Rada
and local election campaign, a reminder of the political and
psychological distance 18 months after the displays of Orange
unity. Escorting Ambassador out of the building, Tymoshenko
commented half-apologetically on the changed colors: "it was
time to update the images and look forward."


9. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst