Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV1913
2006-05-17 15:53:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: FORMER NSDC SECRETARY KINAKH ON

Tags:  PREL PGOV PARM UP 
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VZCZCXRO8222
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #1913/01 1371553
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 171553Z MAY 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9361
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001913 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FORMER NSDC SECRETARY KINAKH ON
TRANSNISTRIA, BELARUS, RUSSIA


Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 KIEV 001913

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/17/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PARM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: FORMER NSDC SECRETARY KINAKH ON
TRANSNISTRIA, BELARUS, RUSSIA


Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: In Ambassador's May 17 farewell call on
outgoing National Secretary and Defense Council Secretary
Anatoliy Kinakh, who has resigned in order to take up a seat
in the new parliament (Rada),Kinakh detailed Ukrainian
thinking on Transnistria, Belarus, and the deteriorating
Ukraine-Russia relationship. Kinakh contended that Russia
was the real problem in Transnistria, that Moscow was
financially propping up Transnistria leader Smirnov's
self-blockade through significant transfers, and that
Transnistrian Supreme Soviet Leader Shevchuk might prove a
viable opponent to Smirnov and his pro-Russia clique. On
Belarus, Kinakh stressed Ukraine's disapproval of the recent
presidential election, its decision not to invite Belarus
President Lukashenka to the Chornobyl 20th anniversary
commemoration, and its approval of EU actions against the
Lukashenka regime. Russian-Ukrainian relations had been on
the downslide since late 2005, as the result of a conscious
Russian plan to create problems for Ukraine, limit its
movement Westward, and contain any spillover of
democratization in the region. End Summary.

Transnistria: Russia the problem; Shevchuk an alternative?
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ex-NSDC Secretary Kinakh told Ambassador May 17 that
he and Foreign Minister Borys Tarasyuk had convened a GOU
meeting on Moldova and Transnistrian policy May 16. The
Ukraine-Moldova Intergovernmental Commission was scheduled to
meet May 24, chaired by the two Prime Ministers. The GOU
objective was to get the 5-plus-2 discussions on Transnistria
back on track. It was clear that the scheduled May 18
session would not occur, due to mutual recriminations between
Chisinau and Tiraspol. The May 16 GOU meeting reinforced GOU
determination to continue enforcement of the customs regime.


3. (C) The real problem in Transnistria ultimately was
Russia, claimed Kinakh. Ukraine hoped the July G-8 meeting
would put real pressure on Moscow to adopt a more
constructive approach on Transnistria. The recent meetings

between Transnistria's Smirnov and high-ranking Russian
officials in Moscow demonstrated that they were working on a
plan; the Russian Security Services (FSB) were clearly
involved, with Vladimir Antyufeyev (Transnistrian "Minister
of State Security") allegedly planning a referendum for this
June. Kinakh claimed that the Russians were currently
financing payments of $50 million a quarter for the Pension
Fund and minimum salary levels of $40-50/month, compared to
the $80-90/month average before the self-blockade; Russia had
also just extended a $150 million credit for the same
purpose, using the Sberbank affiliate in Tiraspol to transfer
the funds. However, the assistance would not fully offset
the economic losses of the self-blockade; if Smirnov did not
change his policy, the inevitable result would be economic
migration of people out of Transnistria, including into
Ukraine.


4. (C) Kinakh suggested that the head of the Transnistrian
Supreme Soviet, Yevgeniy Shevchuk, was a young, pragmatic
representative of Transnistrian businesses opposed to the
Smirnov-imposed "self-blockade," which had created real
tensions between Smirnov and Shevchuk. Smirnov had forbade
Shevchuk to travel to Kiev to meet Kinakh, as had been
planned. Shevchuk had sent a signal that he was ready for
dialogue. Kinakh said that the GOU was working through
business contacts to relay messages to Shevchuk and suggested
that Shevchuk could be a possible opponent to Smirnov in the
"presidential" elections planned for December. It was
important to explore ways of "removing" the radical,
pro-Russian clique in Transnistria represented by Smirnov and
his inner circle. Ukraine fully supported "pre-term"
elections under OSCE auspices whenever those could be
arranged.

Belarus: no platform for Lukashenka
--------------


5. (C) Kinakh said that Ukraine's relationship with Belarus
had quieted down in comparison to the post-Belarus election
period (note: when a number of Ukrainian citizens were
temporarily detained in elections-related activity). He
stressed that Ukraine had pointedly shelved preliminary plans
to have a Yushchenko-Lukashenka meeting at Chornobyl on the
twentieth anniversary of the April 26, 1986 disaster to avoid
giving Lukashenka a platform to claim legitimacy. Many
innocent Belarusan citizens had suffered human rights
violations during and after the elections. Kinakh agreed
with the EU decision to implement a visa blacklist for
Lukashenka and key regime officials involved in election
fraud and expressed support for a potential EU effort against

KIEV 00001913 002 OF 002


regime figure bank accounts as well.

Russia: plans to meddle in Ukraine
--------------


6. (C) Kinakh dated the deterioration of Ukrainian-Russian
relations to the second half of 2005, prior to the gas
crisis, which he said was but one of a long list of problems
and provocations from Moscow. He alleged that Russian
President Putin, in conjunction with the FSB, had formulated
a scenario to create doubt and instability in Ukraine,
threatening the latter's aspirations to 1) integrate into
European institutions and NATO and 2) act as a beacon and
supporter of democratic advances in the region. The Russian
reaction to the May 4 Summit in Vilnius spoke for itself.
Russia clearly had made a strategic decision to project its
interests more aggressively around the world. That affected
Ukrainian interests, and its government's and people's right
to choose their own path. It would be important for
Ukraine's next government to address the Ukrainian-Russian
dynamic, because current trends only portended worsening
relations, he concluded.


7. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst