UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE'S ZVARYCH ON AGREEMENTS,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001698

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR KDEM PHUM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: OUR UKRAINE'S ZVARYCH ON AGREEMENTS,
WORKING GROUPS, AND MAYBE A COALITION

REF: KIEV 1662

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: In an April 28 meeting with Ambassador, Our
Ukraine legal department chief Roman Zvarych confirmed that,
in ongoing Rada majority coalition negotiations between Our
Ukraine (OU),Yuliya Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the
Socialists, two documents had been signed April 25, one on
cooperation in regional legislatures, and another sketching
the framework of a coalition agreement. Zvarych described a
complex series of working groups tasked to draft sections on
the coalition program and rules of order for the coalition,
leaving the tricky question of positions in government for
later. Zvarych said that BYuT was not taking much interest
in the coalition program or rules, leaving this to OU.
Zvarych thought BYuT would readily accept the program, but
that the Socialists might be difficult to persuade,
particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform. Zvarych
thought President Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting a
deal in which Tymoshenko would be Prime Minister, but did not
discount the possibility of Yushchenko changing his mind, or
even drawing out the coalition formation process through the
summer in a bid to prove that the Rada was ineffectual and
that Constitutional reform should be revisited. Zvarych said
nonetheless that Yushchenko supported the efforts to rebuild
an Orange coalition, constantly talking with OU lead
negotiator Roman Bezsmertny about the negotiations and
demanding a highly detailed document that would constrict
Tymoshenko's room for independent action. Zvarych said there
were no formal coalition talks between OU and the Party of
Regions, but that there had been informal discussions.
Zvarych said that most instances of OU-Regions coalitions
forming on the local level resulted from BYuT refusing to
work with OU simply because of the difficulty in controlling
local party branches. Zvarych thought that the Rada would
convene either May 16 or May 23 and that, after the new Rada
sat, the outlines of an Orange coalition would be clear. End
summary.

Five hours of talk results in agreement on an agreement
-------------- --------------


2. (C) Ambassador met with Our Ukraine legal department chief
Roman Zvarych April 28 to discuss the latest Rada majority
coalition formation negotiations. Zvarych confirmed what
Socialist Deputy leader Iosyp Vinsky told us April 27, that
coalition negotiations between Our Ukraine (OU),Yuliya
Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT) and the Socialists had resumed April
25 (reftel). Zvarych reported that a five-hour meeting
between himself, Yuliya Tymoshenko (standing in for her
hospitalized deputy, Oleksandr Turchynov) and Vinsky, had
resulted in the signing of two documents, one a set of joint
instructions to their regional party organizations on
coalition formation, and the other a one-page document laying
out the structure of the yet to be agreed coalition
agreement. When questioned by Ambassador about whether OU
would reject this framework agreement, Zvarych said that as
of this morning, the central committee of OU had not
abrogated the document, and added his opinion that OU would
not back out. Zvarych said that, while Yushchenko had been
quiet about the agreement, he had tasked Zvarych and lead OU
negotiatior Roman Bezsmertny to write a comprehensive,
detailed and concrete coalition agreement.

Working groups within working groups
--------------


4. (C) Zvarych said one of the main areas of contention with
Tymoshenko was getting her to accept that the coalition
program would drive the government program, not the other way
around. Zvarych said the coalition agreement would still be
tripartite in nature, with sections covering the coalition
program, rules of order, and spheres of responsibility (the
language Zvarych inserted to cover government positions).
Zvarych said working groups were being set up to write the
first two sections, leaving the divisive question of
personnel assignments until after the program and coalition
rules had been hashed out. Zvarych said the working group on
the coalition program had five representatives from each
side, and that the BYuT representative, Mykola Tomenko, was
being cooperative and accepted the need for a detailed
program. Under this working group, there were seven
subgroups, covering such topics as economics, finance,
foreign policy/national security, political/legal reform. On
political/legal reform, Zvarych said one of the ideas being
mooted was to remove the independence of the Prosecutor
General, making it part of the executive, as in the U.S.


5. (C) Zvarych averred that BYuT was taking a back seat in
the drafting, letting OU do the writing with BYuT reviewing.

KIEV 00001698 002 OF 003


Zvarych said the working group on coalition rules of order
had not met yet, but a document OU drafted was being reviewed
by Mykhaylo Teplyuk from the Rada legal department. Zvarych
indicated that BYuT did not care about the principles or
program portion of the coalition agreement, and were letting
OU draft it for their review. Zvarych also indicated that
public discussions would be held with NGO experts about the
coalition agreement, with one being held today and
discussions on the seven subgroup topics to be held in coming
days. Zvarych said a separate working group on possible
amendments to the Constitution, staffed by ex-Constitutional
Court justices and without political direction from OU, would
also be held.

Coalition program: Socialists problematic
--------------


6. (C) Asked whether the program, when completed, would be
acceptable to BYuT and the Socialists, Zvarych averred that
it would not present a problem for BYuT, because Tymoshenko
wanted to be Prime Minister and that would trump BYuT's
posturing as left-leaning populists. Zvarych thought the
program would present more of a problem for the Socialists,
particularly on NATO and agrarian land reform, probably
resulting in a vague formulation on NATO in writing to
satisfy the Socialists, but an unwritten agreement on the
actual policy to be pursued. Zvarych said he understood that
a signal needed to be sent indicating that Ukraine wanted
into NATO, and a signal would be sent. On land reform,
Zvarych said he wanted the land code incorporated into the
civil code, a difficult proposition for the Socialists to
accept. Zvarych thought that the Socialists would eventually
come around, because they wanted to be in power, with Vinsky
pursuing the First Deputy PM job and Socialist MP-elect
Anatoliy Holubchenko their likely choice for Minister of
Industry. Zvarych agreed that Tymoshenko could be useful in
persuading the Socialists to acquiesce to the program.

Yushchenko on Tymoshenko as PM: reluctant acceptance?
-------------- --------------


7. (C) Zvarych said that he thought, with a certain degree of
reservation in case anything unexpected happened, that an
Orange coalition would be formed. He thought Yushchenko had
reached the conclusion that Tymoshenko being PM in an Orange
coalition was inevitable. Zvarych said that, while
Yushchenko had a deep personal antipathy toward Tymoshenko,
he also had objective reasons to fear her, because she was an
"adventuress" who could undercut him. However, Zvarych
thought that if Tymoshenko could be pigeonholed with a
specific list of tasks and requirements, it would make
accepting her much more palatable to Yushchenko. Zvarych
said he thought Yushchenko was leaning toward accepting an
agreement with Tymoshenko, but that he was still volatile,
and could change his mind.

Tymoshenko vs. Poroshenko: still adversaries
--------------


8. (C) Zvarych opined that Tymoshenko was "locked in a
dialectic" in which she was continually fighting with
Yushchenko advisor Petro Poroshenko and wanted to "ruin" him.
Zvarych said he had not had any conversations with
Tymoshenko where she had not mentioned Poroshenko in "irate"
terms. Zvarych said Tymoshenko "went off" whenever
Poroshenko was mentioned for government positions during
coalition negotiations. Asked about the criminal
investigation of BYuT negotiatior and Tymoshenko lieutenant
Oleksandr Turchynov and its possible effect on coalition
negotiations, Zvarych defended the prosecution, citing
Turchynov's illegal eavesdropping while at the SBU,
destruction of documents concerning crimeboss Seymon
Mogilievich, and mishandling of the Gongadze case.

OU-Regions contacts: informal only
--------------


9. (C) Queried about contacts between OU and Viktor
Yanukovych's Party of Regions, Zvarych asserted that there
were only informal contacts between specific people in the
parties, and that there was no formal working group between
OU and Regions. (Note: This contradicts what Yanukovych
told us April 27 -- see septel.) Zvarych said that
Poroshenko was in contact with Regions, as were local party
leaders, but that only one local coalition agreement had been
signed. That was in Zakarpattya and had been brokered by
Emergency Situations Minister and local powerbroker Viktor
Baloha. Zvarych averred that the coalition situation outside
Kiev was "total chaos" and that the local party structures
were hard to control. Zvarych said local OU organizations
were working against BYuT, because outside Kiev, BYuT

KIEV 00001698 003 OF 003


initially refused to deal with OU. Zvarych said that in the
Kiev city Rada, BYuT's Mykhaylo Brodsky refused to work with
OU, trying to form an alliance with Mayor Leonid
Chernovetsky, forcing OU to work with Regions. Zvarych said
Regions oligarch and MP-elect Rinat Akhmetov and Yushchenko
advisor Oleksandr Tretyakov were talking informally because
they had issues in common as businessmen.

Rada sits next month... or this summer?
--------------


10. (C) Zvarych said the Rada would likely convene May 16 or
23, by tradition opening on a Tuesday. However, Zvarych did
not discount the possibility that Yushchenko might try to
drag out the coalition formation process through the summer
in order to demonstrate the ineffectual nature of the Rada
and build an argument that the Constitutional reform package
of December 2004 had been a mistake and should be revisited.
Zvarych noted nonetheless that Yushchenko had said nothing to
bring into question his dedication to a coalition agreement
and was in constant contact with Bezsmertny on the coalition
talks, insisting on an "ironclad" coalition agreement.
Zvarych related one instance where he and Bezsmertny had
showed Yushchenko a draft coalition program, which Yushchenko
rejected as being insufficiently detailed in terms of
responsibilities, tasks, and schedules. Zvarych said he
thought that by May 23 the new Rada would be seated and that
there would be more clarity on where the coalition talks were
going, with an idea of what the coalition would look like by
early June.

And the future?
--------------


11. (C) Zvarych said that OU was "not suicidal" and
understood that it had to form a coalition eventually, or
else Yushchenko would have to call early elections, which OU
would lose badly. Zvarych said OU also understood that if it
made a deal with Regions, OU would be destroyed by voter
backlash. Asked whether Yushchenko might opt for a
relatively tranquil three and a half years of coalition with
Regions, and no chance in the 2009 presidential election,
over a tumultuous coalition with BYuT after which Tymoshenko
would challenge him for the presidency, Zvarych replied that
Tymoshenko might agree not to run in 2009 and that the
"Yushchenko-Teflon" effect would protect Yushchenko from any
allegations Tymoshenko could muster. Zvarych speculated that
Yushchenko might not even want to run again in 2009, citing
health issues, for which Zvarych said Yushchenko was taking
"a lot of pills." Zvarych continued that people close to
Tymoshenko said she had no interest in being president. In
his view, Tymoshenko did not have a presidential persona, but
he was not sure that her ego would let her realize that.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst