Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV1693
2006-04-28 13:23:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

UKRAINE: PARTY OF REGIONS LEADER YANUKOVYCH'S

Tags:  PGOV PREL ENRG NATO EPET PINR ZK ZJ AJ BO 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO8253
PP RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKV #1693/01 1181323
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 281323Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KIEV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9077
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001693 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG NATO EPET PINR ZK ZJ AJ BO
RS, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PARTY OF REGIONS LEADER YANUKOVYCH'S
CONTINUING CHARM OFFENSIVE

REF: A. KIEV 1642

B. KIEV 1530

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary and Comment
-------------------

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001693

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/28/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ENRG NATO EPET PINR ZK ZJ AJ BO
RS, UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PARTY OF REGIONS LEADER YANUKOVYCH'S
CONTINUING CHARM OFFENSIVE

REF: A. KIEV 1642

B. KIEV 1530

Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

Summary and Comment
--------------


1. (C) Party of Regions leader Viktor Yanukovych told
Ambassador April 27 that working-level negotiations with
President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc continued. While
many issues had been worked out, Yanukovych would need to
meet with Yushchenko to resolve key issues. Yanukovych
implied that Regions was prepared to be helpful on
Euro-Atlantic integration questions, but could not explicitly
support NATO membership in a coalition agreement. To clinch
a deal with Our Ukraine, Yanukovych was prepared to endorse
Yushchenko's presidential candidacy in 2009 and not run a
Regions candidate. He claimed key Central Asian and Caucasus
leaders wanted him in government in order to enhance their
ability to develop energy arrangements free of Russian
influence. Yanukovych had indirect contact with Belarusan
president Lukashenka, who also saw a Yanukovych participation
in a government coalition as an opportunity to work with
Ukraine vis-a-vis Russia.


2. (C) Comment: Yanukovych continues to hope to send
messages through us to Yushchenko's circle as a way to
buttress Regions' negotiating position and was putting the
best spin he could on his positions. Yanukovych was clearly
attempting to demonstrate that he would be open to improved
Ukraine-NATO relations and other Western-oriented policies if
he were to become prime minister. His description of his
position on NATO and Yushchenko's reaction tracks with what
he said in meetings with CODEL Frist and Deputy National
Security Adviser Crouch (reftels). Yanukovych's stated
flexible positions on NATO and energy were designed to
persuade us that we should see Regions as a natural partner

for a coalition with Yushchenko. At the same time,
Yanukovych used a press event the same day to send a very
different, even contradictory, signal. He claimed publicly
that "foreign governments" were seeking to exert influence on
the coalition-forming process. End summary and comment.

Finessing the NATO Issue
--------------


3. (C) Yanukovych invited Ambassador to a private lunch April
27, during which he provided an update on Party of Regions'
coalition efforts and his views on domestic and foreign
policy, including his contacts with Belarus. Yanukovych said
a working group of Party of Regions and the pro-presidential
Our Ukraine (OU) bloc, with four representatives on each
side, had been meeting regularly and had hammered out a
common approach on many issues, but not on big policy
questions. He would meet one-on-one with President
Yushchenko to decide the remaining issues "in a discreet
manner." Yanukovych said Regions could not take a public
position on issues that would weaken the party's support
among its followers or relations with the Communist Party or
the (radical pro-Soviet) People's Opposition Bloc of Natalya
Vitrenko. In an official and public document, Regions could
not commit to pursue certain elements of Yushchenko's policy
but could promise to be "flexible." Yushchenko understood
this approach, and particularly that Regions could not
justify explicit support for NATO membership to its
supporters.


4. (C) Later in the conversation, Yanukovych said Regions
could not agree to language supporting Ukraine's NATO
aspirations, but Regions was ready to work on the issue.
During his meeting with key directors from Ukraine's
military-industrial complex, Yanukovych said half of them
were prepared to sell their output to NATO. What was needed,
Yanukovych urged, was a significant NATO purchase that would
demonstrate to executives in the military-industrial sector
that cooperation with NATO would allow them to maintain jobs
and modernize their factories. If there were a NATO contract
and a massive public education campaign beginning soon, the
Ukrainian government could persuade business and industrial
leaders and the public in two years to support close
cooperation with NATO.

Orange Coalition Prospects
--------------


5. (C) Yanukovych averred that Regions found itself in a
comfortable situation. If the negotiations with Our Ukraine
on a coalition did not work out, Regions would not enter into
a coalition with the eponymous bloc of leader Yuliya

KIEV 00001693 002 OF 003


Tymoshenko but would enter the opposition. Even so,
Tymoshenko's emissaries were constantly reaching out to
Regions. Yanukovych said, even in opposition, Regions would
endeavor to behave responsibly. Yanukovych argued a
reformulated Orange coalition would not be stable. Once it
fell apart, Yushchenko would be seriously weakened and,
rather than entering into a coalition under such conditions,
Regions would prefer to see another election. If the Orange
coalition failed a second time, the public would view it as a
failure of Yushchenko's leadership but not blame Tymoshenko.
If the Orange coalition succeeded, Tymoshenko would get all
the credit.


6. (C) Yanukovych said Yushchenko needed Regions and should
be negotiating seriously. Yanukovych said he had met three
times with Prime Minister Yekhanurov and, each time, he and
Yekhanurov had agreed on the main elements of an agreement.
Although he had not said so yet, Yanukovych said he would be
prepared to make a commitment as part of a coalition
agreement that Regions would not run a candidate against
Yushchenko in the 2009 presidential elections and would
support Yushchenko's candidacy. Yanukovych argued that
Yushchenko could not win without Regions' support. He
thought the new Rada would convene May 16.


7. (C) Ambassador noted that U.S. preference for a
reform-oriented coalition was well known. The USG would be
prepared to work with Regions either in power or in the
opposition. If Regions ended up in the opposition, it should
endeavor to be helpful on issues such as WTO accession and
NATO membership.

Energy Supply Diversity and Russia
--------------


8. (C) Yanukovych said Azerbaijan president Ilham Aliyev had
sent Deputy Prime Minister Abbas Abbasov to meet with
Yanukovych during the week of April 10. Aliyev was unhappy
that Russia was controlling energy exports from Central Asia
and the Caucasus region to Europe and understood that Ukraine
was key to developing alternate routes bypassing Russia.
Abbasov told Yanukovych that Aliyev saw Yanukovych as a
stable partner for Azerbaijan and so was hoping that Regions
would be part of a ruling coalition. Yanukovych responded
that Ukraine would support plans to diversify energy supply
routes. Yanukovych added that Kazakhstan President Nursultan
Nazarbayev and Uzbekistan president Islam Karimov were also
resolved to look for alternate routes for their energy
experts. The three presidents wanted a strong and stable
Ukraine, and, Yanukovych claimed, saw Yanukovych as a key
element.


9. (C) Yanukovych continued that Abbasov had said Aliyev did
not see Tymoshenko as a viable prime ministerial candidate,
because she was susceptible to Russian influence. Moscow
still had the legal case against Tymoshenko as a potential
tool, and Russian Ambassador to Ukraine Viktor Chernomyrdin
was in continuous touch with her. This contact also existed
when Tymoshenko was prime minister. Natalya Vitrenko was
also purely a tool of Moscow, receiving most of her funding
from Russian sources. Vitrenko's recent statement that she
opposed Regions indicated that Moscow had grown increasingly
unhappy with Regions, and Yanukovych.

Lukashenka the Landlord
--------------


10. (C) Yanukovych said he had long known a close aide to
Belarusan President Lukashenka, in part due to a mutual
interest in sports. The Lukashenka aide had told Yanukovych
that Lukashenka wanted Yanukovych to be in the coalition so
the Ukrainian government would be stronger and more stable.
If Yanukovych and Regions were part of the ruling coalition,
Lukashenka would be interested in combining with Ukraine to
work together vis-a-vis Russia. Lukashenka was unhappy with
his isolation and hoped to meet someday with Yanukovych.
Yanukovych told Ambassador that Lukashenka should not be put
in a corner.


11. (C) Ambassador responded that the U.S. and its European
partners had clearly communicated the steps that Lukashenka
needed to undertake and that Lukashenka had sealed his fate
by his own actions. Lukashenka had not only falsified the
March 19 presidential elections, he was now cracking down on
the opposition in the election's aftermath. Ambassador
strongly advised Yanukovych not to meet Lukashenka unless
Lukashenka took action to reverse some of the harm that he
had inflicted on Belarus. Yanukovych said he agreed with
Ambassador but repeated that Lukashenka should not be put
under excessive pressure.

KIEV 00001693 003 OF 003




12. (C) Yanukovych also related an anecdote to describe
Lukashenka's character. Yanukovych's great grandfather had
come from a small village in Belarus that was desperately
poor. Some years ago, Yanukovych visited the village and
decided to help reduce the suffering of the villagers. He
provided money for electric power distribution, toward the
operation of an old age home, and to increase farming income.
Lukashenka sharply reprimanded the district governor when he
heard about Yanukovych's generosity and, as a consequence,
the governor blocked Yanukovych's further attempts to help
the village. Yanukovych ended up speaking to Lukashenka, who
demanded to know why he had not asked for permission to
provide the help. Yanukovych said he had not thought it
necessary, since he was simply giving money and getting
nothing in return. Lukashenka retorted that Yanukovych
should remember that he, Lukashenka, was the landlord
("khozyain" in Russian) in Belarus.


13. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst