UKRAINE: PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO'S OUR UKRAINE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001587

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016
TAGS: PGOV UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: PRESIDENT YUSHCHENKO'S OUR UKRAINE
CHANGES ITS PUBLIC TUNE ON COALITION NEGOTIATIONS

REF: KIEV 1540

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (SBU) Summary. For several weeks in the wake of the March
26 elections in which it was soundly defeated by Yuliya
Tymoshenko's Bloc (BYuT),Our Ukraine (OU) bloc leaders
offered primarily positive public commentary, with
reservations, about the formation of an Orange Rada majority
coalition and its potential coalition partners, BYuT and the
Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU). OU Negotiators Roman
Bezsmertny and Roman Zvarych, the lead advocates for such a
"coalition of democratic forces," provided the public voice
for Our Ukraine. However, in the wake of the April 14
rejection of a key component of the coalition protocol
negotiated April 13 by Bezsmertny and Zvarych, OU has
switched its messengers and the tone of its message. PM
Yekhanurov, empowered by Yushchenko to talk to all five
parties that made it past the three-percent threshold into
the Rada, including Regions and the Communists, assumed a
higher public profile and emphasized the supposed high
correlation between the platforms of Party of Regions and OU,
in pointed comparison supposedly to those of BYuT and the
SPU. OU insider Petro Poroshenko repeatedly trashed
Tymoshenko as a liar and a blackmailer in an April 18 evening
TV appearance, a tone maintained in an April 19 Our Ukraine
press release, which sought to lay the blame for lack of
coalition talk progress completely on BYuT and the SPU.
Several OU MPs openly said that not all OU MPs would vote for
Tymoshenko as PM, even if the coalition leaders and President
Yushchenko eventually endorsed her candidacy. Even though
many OU-BYuT-SPU coalitions had already formed in oblast and
city councils across Ukraine, on April 19 People's Union Our
Ukraine (PUOU) forbade local party branches from forging
coalitions outside the Our Ukraine camp in oblasts and
municipalities without specific authorization from the
national party. Meanwhile, no coalition negotiation sessions
took place April 14-19, and as of late April 20, none were
scheduled. Instead, the parties resorted to increasingly
shrill accusations and insults delivered via the media, even
while claiming commitment to eventual formation of the
three-way coalition.


2. (C) Comment: It was perhaps inevitable that, in the wake
of the April 14 rejection, Our Ukraine would reduce the role
and prominence of the two "Romans" who had negotiated the
April 13 protocol on the formation of a coalition with BYuT
and the SPU, and take a go-slower approach to coalition
formation. But it is also unlikely to be mere coincidence
that two of Tymoshenko's fiercest critics within Our Ukraine,
Poroshenko and Yekhanurov, suddenly became the public voices
of the party, while the two strongest advocates for an Orange
coalition, negotiators Bezsmertny and Zvarych, went
completely silent. This is the second time such a switch has
happened; after Bezsmertny and Zvarych expressed public
willingness on election night to recognize Tymoshenko's claim
on the Premiership based on her strong showing, Yushchenko
temporarily yanked Bezsmertny off the negotiating and public
voice roles in favor of Yekhanurov, before handing the
mandate back to Bezsmertny. Whether this second shift is
simply a negotiating tactic designed to place more pressure
on Tymoshenko and Moroz to meet Our Ukraine demands or proves
to be a harbinger for a more fundamental shift in strategy on
coalition formation remains to be seen. End Summary and
Comment.

Different messengers, and a harsher message
--------------


3. (SBU) After the March 26 election in which BYuT delivered
a stunning defeat of Our Ukraine (22 to 14 percent of the
national Rada vote),the public voice and face of Our Ukraine
was largely that of People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) Party
and Our Ukraine (OU) Bloc chair Roman Bezsmertny, the most
conciliatory advocate of an Orange coalition with BYuT and
the SPU, and of accepting Tymoshenko as PM. The PUOU and OU
Political Councils empowered Bezsmertny and Zvarych to
conduct negotiations with BYuT and the SPU. However, there
was always a significant minority of PUOU leaders against
accommodating Tymoshenko, and by extension, open to
consideration of a deal with Regions as an alternative. In
the wake of the April 14 partial rejection by the People's
Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) Executive Council of the April 13
protocol, PUOU and OU Chair Bezsmertny largely disappeared
from public view. After several days of silence, the OU
vacuum was filled by prominent critics of Tymoshenko, chiefly
PM Yekhanurov and Poroshenko.


4. (SBU) Yekhanurov, who has occasionally quipped that
Tymoshenko's economic policies could be described as national
communism, used his mandate from Yushchenko to carry out

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discussions with all political forces that will enter the
next Rada to highlight the commonality of economic policy
interests between OU and Regions, which he said reached 75%,
in comparison to a 40% with the Socialists; as for BYuT,
"they have no economic platform at all." Yekhanurov's
approach differed greatly from Bezsmertny's, who instead
stressed the deep differences between OU and Regions on
foreign policy and domestic political arrangements. On the
April 7 edition of ICTV's "Svoboda Slova" (Freedom of Speech)
talk show, Bezsmertny aggressively challenged the Regions'
coalition program proposal calling for a review of already
signed WTO protocols, no NATO membership, and effective
federalization of Ukraine, all of which differed from
Yushchenko's stated priorities.


5. (U) Poroshenko-owned Fifth Channel invited both Tymoshenko
and Poroshenko to appear on its prime time interview show
April 18. Tymoshenko declined a live co-appearance but
delivered a taped broadside, saying she would never work with
Poroshenko, Yekhanurov, and OU Rada faction leader
Martynenko, a trio she accused of attempting to scuttle
Orange coalition negotiations in favor of an OU deal with
Regions. Poroshenko replied in the studio, repeatedly
accusing Tymoshenko of lies, lies, and more lies (brekhnya),
twice calling her a blackmailer, and placing the entire blame
for the 2005 Orange team divorce on her. He also said OU was
ready to contest a repeat election if it came to that.


6. (U) OU MP-elect Oleksandr Volkov, identified by Ukrainska
Pravda as a supporter of an OU-Regions coalition as well as
being linked to shadowy Mogilievich associate Dmytro Firtash,
gave an April 18 interview in Ukrainska Moloda, owned by
Yushchenko's childhood friend Myhailo Doroshenko, in which he
recommended Tymoshenko drop her bid to become Premier because
she had been a failure the first time in 2005 and would fail
again in 2006. Our Ukraine MP Pozhyvanov warned that many OU
rank-and-file MPs might not vote in favor of Tymoshenko as PM
even if Yushchenko forwarded the nomination to the Rada,
since there was no constitutional obligation to follow party
discipline.

Playing the blame game, rather than negotiating
-------------- --


7. (SBU) In the absence of any contact by Our Ukraine
negotiators with BYuT and SPU from April 14-18, BYuT and SPU
leaders met April 18, then held separate news conferences in
which Tymoshenko and SPU deputy leader Iosyp Vinsky both
voiced support for Tymoshenko to become PM and Moroz to serve
as Rada Speaker. Both accused Our Ukraine of holding up the
negotiating process and flirting with Regions. Tymoshenko
went further, accusing Poroshenko and Martynenko of
conspiring with prosecutors to have BYuT MPs-elect (and
ex-SBU leaders) Turchynov and Kozhemyatin arrested in an
effort to try to provoke BYuT to withdraw from coalition
talks.


8. (U) The April 19 statement issued by Our Ukraine in reply
continued Poroshenko's combative tone from the previous
evening: "The Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc is continuing the list
of lies that was started during Rada elections. We point out
that they are doing everything possible and impossible to
break up a coalition with Our Ukraine by reducing the
negotiating process to granting the Premier's position to
Tymoshenko and the position of Rada Speaker to the Socialist
Party. We emphasize that all responsibility for disrupting
the negotiations on setting up a coalition of democratic
forces lies with our partners in the negotiations."


9. (SBU) Later April 19, however, the PUOU Executive Council
undermined that claim by forbidding local party organizations
from creating coalitions at the local level with any party
outside the national Our Ukraine bloc without special
permission from the PUOU Executive Council. In the wake of
the March 26 elections, and in anticipation of a likely
national coalition, provincial branches of OU, BYuT, and the
SPU had announced formation of majority coalitions in a
number of oblast and town councils once local results had
been finalized and new councils had been seated (note: the
Central Election Commission has authority over the national
Rada election only). The only known exception was in the
Kiev City Council, where BYuT announced the formation of a
majority with PORA-PRP (Reforms and Order) and a local Kiev
Civic Activist bloc. The PUOU order, if implemented, would
freeze formation of oblast and municipal council majorities,
disrupting local governance in the same way its national
go-slow strategy delays formation of a majority in the
Verkhovna Rada.


10. (SBU) The gamesmanship continued on April 20, with
Poroshenko seeking to split the BYuT-SPU alliance by saying

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that Our Ukraine would not object to Moroz becoming Rada
speaker as long as Our Ukraine retained the Premiership.
BYuT, in his opinion, should get several ministerial and
oblast governor posts.


11. (C) Comment: Given that BYuT received more votes than
Our Ukraine and the SPU combined, Poroshenko's comment can
only be taken as another calculated insult in Tymoshenko's
direction, and an indication that despite OU's claims to be
focused solely on policy issues, jostling over positions
continues in parallel. Meanwhile, an entire week has passed
without a single trilateral negotiating session having
occurred since the April 13 signing of the protocol to form a
coalition.


12. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst