UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO'S PARTY "ENDORSES" PREVIOUS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001540

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM UP
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: YUSHCHENKO'S PARTY "ENDORSES" PREVIOUS
DAY'S COALITION PROTOCOL, BUT REJECTS KEY COMPONENT

REF: A. KIEV 1481


B. KIEV 1443

Classified By: Ambassador, reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) Summary: President Yushchenko's Hamlet-like dance
over whether or when to endorse ex-Premier Yuliya
Tymoshenko's claim on returning to her old job in the
"Coalition of Democratic Forces" continued April 14 when the
Executive Council of the People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU)
party's Political Council endorsed the protocol signed April
13 with one significant reservation: they withheld support
for a key point (paragraph 6 in the protocol) that
effectively would give Tymoshenko the PM job. FM Tarasyuk,
head of the Rukh party that is one of the six parties in the
Our Ukraine electoral bloc, told Ambassador early April 14
that Our Ukraine (OU) electoral bloc negotiators Roman
Bezsmertny and Roman Zvarych had exceeded their instructions
April 13 in signing the protocol with the inclusion of
paragraph 6. Bezsmertny explained to Ambassador later April
14 how Yushchenko had called him late April 13 and again
early April 14 with a supportive comment about moving forward
in negotiations while making clear he should not exceed
instructions, i.e. he should not have agreed to a point on
who will occupy the premiership. Bezsmertny said that
coalition negotiations would continue April 17-18; both
Bezsmertny and Zvarych did not think Our Ukraine had any real
options other than eventually to accept Tymoshenko as PM.
(Note: A primer on the confusing multiple layers of decision
making authority in Our Ukraine (both the electoral bloc and
the PUOU party) is included at the end of this cable.)


2. (C) Comment: Bezsmertny and Zvarych appeared giddy
throughout the conversation in describing the difficulties of
dealing with Tymoshenko on the one hand and their Our Ukraine
colleagues on the other. At one point Bezsmertny commented:
"I look over at Zvarych and he's grinning like a boy at the
circus," to which Zvarych replied: "This is a circus." The
PUOU decision and Yushchenko's telephonic remonstrations
constitute the third time that "the Romans" have been
upbraided for going too far in accommodating Tymoshenko too
quickly (in negotiating the never-signed pre-election
coalition memorandum, and in endorsing Tymoshenko's right to
lead the coalition after the exit polls came out on election
night). It is a strange dynamic within Our Ukraine, which
seemingly has a clear understanding of where it will
eventually go, slaps Bezsmertny and Zvarych on the wrist, but
then keeps them in place to continue what they started
because they are the ones who are viewed as able to close a
deal with Tymoshenko. By characterizing a Rada dismissal as
the only alternative to accepting Tymoshenko as PM,
Bezsmertny is ruling out an Orange-Blue coalition. End
summary and comment.

The Romans exceeded their authority
--------------


3. (C) FM Tarasyuk, head of the Rukh Party and thus a member
of the seven-person Political Council for the Our Ukraine
electoral bloc, alerted Ambassador early April 14 that
Bezsmertny and Zvarych, the two OU negotiators in discussions
with the Tymoshenko, had exceeded their instructions in
signing the protocol on forming a coalition of democratic
forces late April 13 (ref A).


4. (C) The concluding clause in the April 13 protocol read
that the protocol was subject to the final approval of the
political councils of the three blocs. Ambassador met
Tymoshenko at 1400 hours April 14, just after BYuT had
ratified the protocol (septel). Ambassador then met with
Bezsmertny and Zvarych at 1500 hours April 14, immediately
after the PUOU Executive Council (Presidium) had met to
consider the protocol. While PUOU endorsed the protocol,
they did so with one significant exception: a pointed
non-endorsement of paragraph 6, which referenced the
principles of the coalition memorandum negotiated before the
election by OU, BYuT, and the Socialists but never signed.
That memorandum gave the right to select the PM to the
coalition party finishing with the largest vote total (as it
turned out, the Tymoshenko bloc).


5. (C) Both Tymoshenko and Bezsmertny apparently realized
Bezsmertny was taking a risk in signing the protocol
including paragraph 6, because they both claimed authorship
of the final clause requiring endorsement by the political
councils of the three blocs when talking to Ambassador April

14. Tymoshenko said she did so "to protect the Romans";
Bezsmertny said he had insisted on the clause to avoid the
accusation that he had exceeded his negotiating authority.

Our Ukraine still torn over Tymoshenko

KIEV 00001540 002 OF 003


--------------


6. (C) Bezsmertny said that the PUOU meeting, which included
all of the party heavyweights save Tymoshenko nemeses Petro
Poroshenko and David Zhvaniya, mostly expressed support for
the protocol but also included significant criticism of
Tymoshenko. In addition, Yushchenko had called Bezsmertny to
discuss the negotiations both late on April 13, after the
protocol had been signed, as well as early in the morning
April 14. The message the first time was: "It is good that
you are working at negotiations, but don't exceed your
instructions." The second time: "It is good to negotiate,
but do not give answers before you should. Treat it like a
play in the theater; people should not applaud too early."


7. (C) Bezsmertny stated that it was clear sitting at the
coalition negotiating table April 13 that Tymoshenko would be
Premier; he was not sure why she insisted on inclusion of
paragraph 6 in the protocol text, since the reaction of PUOU
was predictable. He added: "We will get to the right
answer, but it could take a month or two." Negotiations
would resume April 17-18. Our Ukraine had passed to BYuT and
the Socialists a substantive draft of the first two sections
of the proposed coalition agreement, covering the proposed
programmatic elements and rules for mediating disputes that
arose when the three coalition members disagreed on policies
and decisions. The toughest part, though, would be part
three: division of responsibilities and positions.


8. (C) It was not a matter of Our Ukraine wanting or not
wanting Tymoshenko as PM, asserted Bezsmertny; OU ultimately
had no choice but to accept Tymoshenko, since the alternative
of dismissing the Rada seemed unlikely. Ambassador asked
Zvarych, who had said April 11 that Yushchenko would not
dismiss the Rada (ref B),whether he still felt that way.
Zvarych replied yes.


9. (U) Begin text of the PUOU decision:

PRESIDIUM OF THE COUNCIL OF THE POLITICAL PARTY PEOPLE'S
UNION OUR UKRAINE

"On Approving the Protocol on the procedure of forming the
Coalition of Democratic Forces"

The Presidium of the Council of the Party, having heard the
report of the member of the Party's Strategic Council R.
Zvarych, decided to:


1. Approve the actions of the Chair of the Party's Council R.
Bezsmertny regarding the creation of the Coalition of
Democratic Forces comprised of the Our Ukraine Bloc, Yuliya
Tymoshenko's Bloc, and the Socialist Party of Ukraine in the
Fifth Convocation of Ukraine's Verkhovna Rada (note:
parliament).


2. Approve the Protocol on the procedure of forming the
Coalition of Democratic Forces with the exception of
paragraph 6 of the Protocol.


3. Authorize the Chair of the Party's Council R. Bezsmertny
to defend the above position at the meeting of the Political
Council of the Our Ukraine Bloc, and to convey this decision
to the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc and the Socialist Party of
Ukraine.

Chair of the Council R. Bezsmertny

End Text.

Primer on the multiple kitchens of Our Ukraine
-------------- -


10. (SBU) In comparison to the unambiguous line of authority
in BYuT (Tymoshenko personally decides everything, with
long-time Batkyvshchina deputy leader Turchynov also
participating in the coalition negotiations),and for the
Socialists (Moroz is the unquestioned leader, with deputy
leader Iosef Vinnsky the designated negotiator),Our Ukraine
has a confusing four layers of formal authority. Two are
related to the Our Ukraine electoral bloc of six parties; two
are related to the People's Union Our Ukraine Party, which is
the electoral bloc's main element/primary funder, along with
an honorary party chair (President Yushchenko) who wields a
clearly influential voice. The old proverb: "Too many cooks
in the kitchen" comes to mind. The chefs who belong to all
four kitchens and the negotiating process but clearly do not
determine all the recipes: Roman Bezsmertny and Roman
Zvarych.


11. (SBU) Six parties comprise the Our Ukraine Electoral

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Bloc, whose seven member Political Council includes the six
party heads listed below and Roman Zvarych serving as
Secretary:

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--Bezsmertny-led People's Union Our Ukraine (PUOU) Party
--FM Borys Tarasyuk's Rukh (People's Movement of Ukraine)
--NSDC Secretary's Anatoliy Kinakh's Union of Industrialists
and Entrepreneurs (UIE)
--Naftohaz Chair Oleksiy Ivchenko's Congress of Ukrainian
Nationalists (KUN)
--Presidential Secretariat Deputy head Anatoliy Matviyenko's
Sobor
--MP Volodymyr Stretovych's Christian-Democratic Union

The OU bloc's named negotiators for coalition talks with BYuT
and the Socialists are: Bezsmertny (lead),and Zvarych
(deputy negotiator).


12. (SBU) The Our Ukraine electoral bloc also has a
little-mentioned Strategic Council which resolved
"operational issues" and day-to-day decisions related to the
election campaign (what advertising to purchase, etc). If
the Political Council acted like the bloc's board, the
Strategic Council acted as the campaign's management
executives. All six are members of PUOU; two stayed in
government after the September 2005 shakeup; three were
"orange oligarchs" forced from office after unproven
allegations of corruption.

--Bezsmertny
--Zvarych
--PM Yekhanurov
--Petro Poroshenko
--Oleksandr Tretyakov
--David Zhvaniya


13. (SBU) The People's Union Our Ukraine Party formed in
mid-2005 on the basis of two of the five parties which had
formed the 2002 Our Ukraine electoral bloc: Razom
(Bezsmertny),and Solidarity (Poroshenko). Of the other
three forces, Tarasyuk's Rukh refused to join the new PUOU
party but eventually returned to the 2006 edition of the Our
Ukraine electoral bloc. In contrast, Finance Minister
Pynzenyk's Reforms and Order Party and Yuri Kostenko's
Ukrainian People's Party refused to join both the new party
and the electoral bloc, contested the March 26 elections
separately, and failed to make it past the three percent
threshold. In the immediate aftermath of the March 26
elections, PUOU was the last of the six forces in the Our
Ukraine electoral bloc to endorse pursuit of a "Coalition of
Democratic Forces" with BYuT and the Socialists.

PUOU's Executive Council ("Presidium") has seven members,
plus Zvarych as secretary. According to Bezsmertny's
assistant, Zhvaniya often "shows up" but is not a formal
member.

--Bezsmertny (Chair)
--Yekhanurov
--Tretyakov
--Poroshenko
--Mykola Martynenko (note: OU Rada faction leader in the
outgoing Rada)
--Pavlo Zhebrivsky (note: former Zhytomyr governor,
associated with Poroshenko)
--Borys Bespaly (note: has a generally good reputation for
integrity)


14. (SBU) The wider PUOU Political Council currently has 178
members, roughly a third of which come from provincial party
branches.

Plus:

PUOU Honorary Chair: President Yushchenko


15. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website at:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst