UKRAINE: ELECTION SNAPSHOT OF SEVERODONETSK, HOST

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001247

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PHUM KDEM OSCE
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: ELECTION SNAPSHOT OF SEVERODONETSK, HOST
OF THE LATE NOVEMBER 2004 SEPARATIST RALLY

REF: A. 04 KIEV 4355


B. KIEV 936

C. KIEV 1022

(U) Sensitive but unclassified. Not for Internet
distribution. Please handle accordingly.


1. (SBU) Summary: We observed Ukraine's March 26 Rada and
local elections in the city of Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast,
site of the infamous November 28, 2004 separatist rally held
at the height of the late 2004 Orange Revolution, at which
then-PM Yanukovych, many Party of Regions backers from
eastern and southern Ukraine, and Moscow Mayor Luzhkov
suggested that eastern and southern Ukraine might pursue
separatism rather than coexist under an "Orange" government
in Kiev. Severodonetsk's vote went relatively smoothly March
26, with Regions winning in a landslide, though our
observation team observed more election day procedural
violations in Severodonetsk than in other locations,
suggesting that some old habits die hard. At least in
Severodonetsk, concerns about voter list inaccuracies and
polling station commission (PSC) understaffing proved less
disruptive than the opposition Regions Party and the
independent Committee of Voters of Ukraine (CVU) had
predicted. Most Severodonetsk PSCs were formed a week late,
but CVU thought that voters had had an adequate opportunity
to check their names on the voter list, and only small
numbers of voters were turned away on election day because
their names were not on the voter list. The complexity of
holding four elections at the same time, plus inadequate
space in some polling stations, led to long lines and
exhausted PSC staff, who were in many instances still
counting votes late on March 27, with results reported to the
Central Election Commission only on March 29. End summary.

Severodonetsk: from separatist rally to Regions' landslide
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2. (SBU) Severodonetsk earned an enduring place on Ukraine's
political map by hosting a frenzied separatist rally, which
then-PM Yanukovych attended on November 28, 2004, at the
height of the Orange Revolution. During Ukraine's March 26
Rada (Parliament) and local elections, we observed the
election in Severodonetsk under the auspices of the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR).

3. (U) In Luhansk oblast overall March 26, Regions scored a
74-percent outright victory (with 91 percent of the oblast
vote tallied),largely consolidating the base Yanukovych
established in the 2004 presidential election cycle, when he
received over 90 percent of the vote, shifting the province's
primary allegiance from Communist "red" to Regions' "blue"
(ref A). In the 2002 Rada elections, the Communists won a
plurality of 39.7 percent in the oblast, followed by the
pro-Kuchma For a United Ukraine (from which Regions emerged)
with 14.4%, SPDU(o) 9.5%, Vitrenko 4%, Our Ukraine 3.6%, the
Socialists 3.1% and the Tymoshenko Bloc 1.4%.


4. (U) Severodonetsk is an industrial city of 140,000 in
Luhansk Oblast, near the border with Russia. Severodonetsk
hosts the AZOT fertilizer plant, subject of a heated
privatization dispute (it was privatized in November 2004 in
the midst of the heated presidential election season); a
massive oil refinery is located in the bordering city of
Lisichansk. On March 25 in advance of the vote, we met with
Sergey Kamyshan, head of the CVU's Severodonetsk branch;
representatives of District Election Commission (DEC) 109;
and with 4 polling station commissions (PSCs) in DEC 109. On
election day, March 26, we visited 10 PSCs in DEC 109.

Problems with voter list, but not insurmountable
-------------- ---


5. (SBU) CVU's Kamyshan predicted there might be problems on
election day due to the poor quality of the voter list, an
assessment echoed by numerous PSCs. (In the end, however,
the problems did not appear to be that great.) Kamyshan and
the PSCs blamed the Voter List Working Groups (VLWGs) tasked
with updating the voter list and the city administration
heads charged with coordinating the VLWGs. The working
groups failed to go door to door verifying people's
information, as was expected. Separately, a PSC chairperson
indicated that the VLWGs were hotbeds of nepotism and
cronyism with relatives and friends being hired, but not
actually working on improving the voter list. Problems on
the voter lists frequently cited by PSCs were bad computer
transliterations of names and addresses from Russian to
Ukrainian, some translations of street names from Russian to
Ukrainian, and persons being listed at one address but
actually living at another address. Both the CVU and PSCs
thought that these problems were well within the capacity of
PSCs to deal with on election day, an assessment that was
borne out in our observation of the voting.

PSCs formed late, but good balance
--------------


6. (SBU) Similar fears that PSCs would not have sufficient
staffing also went unrealized, with the DEC using the March
17 amendment to the parliamentary election law to top up PSC
staffing. According to the DEC, additions were mostly people
who worked at the same institution or business that hosted
the PSC. The DEC indicated that 28 parties were represented
on PSCs, with mainly small parties unable to supply
commissioners. Visits to PSCs showed a good distribution of
party representatives on PSCs, with representatives from a
wide range of parties playing leadership roles. Kamyshan
indicated that most PSCs opened 5-7 days late, an assessment
verified by our discussions with PSC commissioners. Kamyshan
and the PSCs thought this still gave voters sufficient time
to check their names on the voter list and prevent themselves
from being disenfranchised, an assessment borne out by our
observation on election day, when the number of voters turned
away by polling stations ranged from 0-10 per station.

Long lines, late counts
--------------


7. (SBU) The biggest concern voiced by the DEC and PSCs
concerned the difficulty of administering four elections at
the same time, particularly the time involved in counting the
ballots by hand at large polling stations (2000-plus voters).
These concerns were borne out as we observed long lines at
some polling stations, particularly those with large numbers
of registered voters, but too small a facility to handle the
voters. PSC management played an important role, with
well-run PSCs keeping lines outside the PSC proper to prevent
overcrowding, and badly-run PSCs allowing everyone to wait
inside, leading to standing-room only conditions that limited
access to the booths/ballot boxes. We observed wait times
averaging from 30 minutes to an hour at large urban PSCs.
Fears of long vote counts also came to pass; we observed the
vote count at PSC 17 in Severodonetsk, which took 12 hours to
count 1672 parliamentary ballots. PSC 17's results finally
appeared on the CEC website mid-day March 29 (accurately, we
note). Conversations with OSCE/ODIHR's long-term observers
in Luhansk indicated that these problems were endemic
throughout Luhansk Oblast.

Possible fraud in local elections
--------------


8. (SBU) CVU's Kamyshan thought that, while administrative
resources would not be used to influence the parliamentary
election, falsifications were likely on the local level.
Kamyshan alleged that Party of Regions twice rigged the
selection process for the chairmanship of a Territorial
Election Commission (TEC, the supervisory commission for the
local elections) in Severodonetsk. The first time the TEC
chairman was selected by random drawing, and the CVU filmed
an official holding aside the envelope with the Party of the
Regions commissioner's names so that it was drawn first. CVU
sued to have the selection invalidated, but the local court
threw out the suit; an appeals court overthrew this decision
and ordered that the selection be redone. Suspiciously, on
the repeat selection, Regions won again.


9. (SBU) During our observation, we identified some
violations of election law in the outlying town of Rubizhne,
likely connected with local elections there. At PSC 54, we
observed PSC workers giving out ballots without checking the
voter list, or even having a copy of the voter list on the
table. When we asked to see the voter list, we were whisked
away to see the PSC chairperson. When we returned with
chairperson in tow, a voter list had appeared. In Rubizhne
we also noted PSCs with 100-200 voters registered to vote
from home. (Note: Ukrainian election law allows the elderly
and sick to vote from home via a mobile ballot box. CVU in
Severodonetsk had advised us that more than 50 mobile voters
registered with a single PSC should be considered
suspicious.) At PSC 65 in Rubizhne, the mobile ballot boxes
were not stored in the open as required by law, but were kept
in a back room, without control slips in them. PSC 65 had
approximately 200 voters on the mobile list, but at 11:00 am
the mobile boxes were empty and being kept in a back room,
raising suspicions that they were going to be stuffed. We
related this to fellow election observers with CVU, who sent
a team to PSC 65 to investigate. When they spoke with the
PSC Chairperson, she reportedly falsely claimed that we had
been there at 6:15 am, thus explaining the lack of control
slips in the empty boxes. (Comment: The number of votes
involved was relatively small on the national scale, but
could be significant in local elections, particularly in city
council or mayoral elections.)
Old habits die hard
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10. (SBU) Comment: The Embassy observation team in
Severodonetsk witnessed more procedural violations than in
other provinces covered by Embassy teams. Though
circumstantial, the evidence was suggestive of abuses that
had been commonplace on behalf of Regions' leader Yanukovych
in 2004 when he ran for president (stacking committees,
manipulating voters' lists, abusing mobile ballot boxes).
While the actions in 2006 may well have been locally
initiated and intended to boost performance in local
elections, the violations stood in contrast to Regions Party
efforts to project an image of concern over the integrity of
the election process (refs B-C). In the end, the highlighted
shortcomings in the voter list should have been addressed by
the voter list working groups staffed by local administration
officials, which in Severodonetsk at least mostly claim
fealty to Regions.


11. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst