Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KIEV1157
2006-03-24 15:20:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Kyiv
Cable title:  

MANAFORT ON ELECTION PROBLEMS

Tags:  PGOV PINR PHUM 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001157 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM
SUBJECT: MANAFORT ON ELECTION PROBLEMS


UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KIEV 001157

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PGOV PINR PHUM
SUBJECT: MANAFORT ON ELECTION PROBLEMS



1. (SBU)Summary: Party of Regions (PoR) political consultant
Paul Manafort (AmCit, please protect) called on the
Ambassador March 21 to express his continuing concern about
the possible disenfranchisement of "hundreds of thousands" of
Ukrainian voters unless President Yushchenko signed into law
an amendment to the election law that would authorize local
courts to add voters, names to the lists on election day.
Manafort cautioned that if the March 26 election did not go
smoothly, any finding by the U.S. that it was free and fair
would influence PoR leader Viktor Yanukovych's understanding
of democracy. Manafort said his most recent data showed PoR
in the lead, followed by Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko,s
eponymous BYuT bloc. While he did not rule out a PoR-Our
Ukraine coalition after the election, he said that Our
Ukraine's conduct on election day would influence PoR's
willingness to consider joining ranks with Yushchenko's
people. End Summary.

The Country,s Mood
--------------


2. (SBU) Manafort said his polling indicated that 70% of
Ukrainians wanted change, although the definition of change
varied among the population. The Yushchenko government was
no longer popular, and Ukrainians generally blamed it for all
the problems the country faced. His polling showed that five
months ago 50% of Ukrainians thought Yushchenko was
trustworthy, and only 14% found Yanukovych trustworthy.
Those numbers had shifted dramatically, with Yushchenko's
confidence rating at 27% and Yanukovych's at 33%. Yanukovych
scored higher in the public's view than Yushchenko regarding
management of issues such as gas supply and relations with
Russia. Ambassador noted that the key issue affecting these
numbers was the fracturing of "Orange" forces following the
Yushchenko/Tymoshenko split, while the "Blue" forces had
coalesced around one leader. Manafort agreed and said his
goal from the outset was to build Regions into a party that
had a platform and policies. Doing so was important for the
development of democracy in Ukraine, he asserted.

Yushchenko Trending Downward
--------------


3. (SBU) Manafort predicted that five parties would pass the
3% threshold and win seats in the next Rada: PoR, Our
Ukraine, Tymoshenko's BYuT, Communists, and Socialists.
According to Manafort's most recent polling data, Regions had
held steady for two weeks and would likely receive 30% of the

ballots cast March 26. Yushchenko's Our Ukraine was trending
downward, from 20% two weeks ago to a current 17%.
Tymoshenko's BYuT bloc was holding at 14%, although she could
pick up Orange votes if Our Ukraine's numbers continued to
decline. Moroz's Socialist party could pick up as much as 7%
of the vote. Both Rada Speaker Lytvyn's bloc and former
Kuchma chief of staff Medvedchuk's "Ne Tak" bloc were
hovering in the 3-4% range, as was radical Progressive
Socialist Vitrenko's party. Speaker Lytvyn's party was
trending downward. Manafort characterized the poll's margin
of error as "razor thin" and asserted that the "fraud factor"
could keep Lytvyn's bloc, Vitrenko, and Ne Tak out of the
next parliament.


4. (SBU) Manafort said the pool of undecided voters had
dwindled to 3-4% and noted that the undecided vote would not
cross between the Regions and Orange camps. Orange
undecideds would vote Orange, although it was not clear if
Yushchenko or Tymoshenko would pick them up. The same held
true for "Blue" undecided voters, who would not drift to Our
Ukraine or Tymoshenko's bloc. Manafort said that at the
start of the campaign, he had thought Tymoshenko would
present the greatest political threat to Regions. However,
while Tymoshenko was dynamic, her campaign had no message and
had not reached its potential.

Concerns for Election Day
--------------


5. (SBU) Manafort said he had two concerns for election day:
fraud by Our Ukraine and the poor state of the voter lists.
He asserted that Our Ukraine could "steal" up to 5-6% of the
vote and had plans to conduct "carousel voting" in the west
and had trained its precinct workers to implement this scam.
Reflecting, he said Our Ukraine's fraud "would not affect
me," because Regions was assured of a first-place showing.
Instead, his concern focused on incomplete voter lists, which
he said could disenfranchise "tens of thousands or hundreds
of thousands" of voters on election day. Manafort said that
Our Ukraine's goal several months ago was to "cut down"
Regions voters by one million people. Now he thought that
Our Ukraine would reduce the number of Regions voters by
500,000 to 700,000 people. He said that entire buildings and
blocks were left off voter lists. Ambassador interjected
that the Chairman of the Central Election Commission
Davydovych had told us the previous week that the lists were
incomplete, but that it was a nationwide problem that had no
regional pattern. Manafort said he was happy to hear that
information, but suspected that the problems with the voter
lists were greater in eastern Ukraine.


6. (SBU) Manafort predicted that voters would sour on the
process if they were denied the opportunity to vote as they
wished. If Regions received only 21-22% of the vote, it
would still be the number one party in the Rada.
Nonetheless, Regions supporters would feel like they had been
"cheated again." Ambassador noted that if Regions supporters
felt they had been cheated in the 2004 elections that was a
bad sign. It would be a very good thing if Regions leaders
stopped claiming that they were cheated in 2004. Manafort
acknowledged Ambassador's point, but said he was conveying a
feeling prevalent in Regions. Yanukovych himself did not
care, for example, if the recent signing of the WTO bilateral
between Ukraine and the U.S. was a boost to Our Ukraine.
Ambassador noted that Regions campaign head Kushnaryov had
indicated that he cared. Manafort said that Kushnaryov was
not driving Regions policy. But Yanukovych was not bothered
that the U.S. had taken this step. He was campaigning five
days a week and had been doing so for the last four months.
Yet, Manafort asserted, Yanukovych's campaign received little
coverage by the major television stations in Ukraine;
Yekhanurov received all the coverage.


7. (SBU) Ambassador reiterated that the U.S. knew there were
significant problems with the voting lists. Amendments to
the election law had been approved by the Rada and signed by
President Yushchenko to help correct problems in election
administration. Manafort said that Yanukovych knew that the
USG was saying the right things, but if the U.S. would
convince Yushchenko to sign another amendment that authorized
local courts to add voters to the list on election day, then
the U.S. would get "credit." "It would be a sign," Manafort
continued, "that the U.S. puts action where others put
words." If Yushchenko vetoed the technical amendment, it
would be "viewed symbolically." We asked if Yanukovych and
Regions were urging voters to go to the precincts and verify
whether their names were on the lists, as remedies existed
prior to election day to add names incorrectly left off the
voter lists. Nearly all independent organizations and the
GOU were urging voters to check their names on the lists, we
noted. Manafort said that Yanukovych was pressing that
message, but that many precinct commissions had not yet been
organized. We noted our understanding that the number of
understaffed precinct commissions was growing smaller since
Yushchenko signed the Rada amendment to fix this problem and
that many commissions had not been able to form initially
because political parties, particularly small parties, had
not provided their representatives in numbers sufficient to
staff the commissions. Manafort did not comment.

Building U.S. Credibility
--------------


8. (SBU) Yanukovych had accepted that the U.S. wanted fair
and free elections in Ukraine and knew that there "is only so
much the U.S. can do," Manafort continued. But, he
cautioned, if there were fraud or large numbers of
disenfranchised voters on March 26 and the U.S. characterized
the election as free and fair, that position would "taint
(Yanukovych's) perception of what constitutes a free and fair
election." Manafort acknowledged that the election system
was better now than in 2004. Manafort said he had spent "a
lot of time in building U.S. credibility as a supporter of
democracy." Regions would receive the highest number of
votes on March 26, no matter what. If Regions opponents
(e.g., Our Ukraine, Tymoshenko) came into power, their
government would fracture and not last for a year. And, he
added, a smart opposition leader would know how to bring such
a government down. Regions had been "on the verge" of moving
to a "grand coalition," but now Manafort did not know what
would happen after the election. Yanukovych wanted a
coalition, Manafort asserted, and was willing to abide by its
terms. Yanukovych believed he had a way of "trapping"
Yushchenko into doing things to "live up to" a possible
coalition agreement. But if election day went badly and many
people were disenfranchised, or if Our Ukraine engaged in
provocations, then he did not know what would happen to
coalition possibilities. Manafort said that Regions had
excellent sources in Our Ukraine and that he read the same
election material that Yushchenko received. He had
information that Our Ukraine supporters intended to
masquerade as Regions supporters on election day and engage
in provocations that would cause precinct commissions to shut
down the precincts. Then Regions would get the blame, and
even more voters would be disenfranchised.


9. (SBU) Comment: Independent observer missions with
long-term observers stationed in western Ukraine have
reported no evidence of an Our Ukraine plan to use carousel
voting, but we have alerted them to this allegation so they
can be alert to any possible abuse. Independent media
monitoring organizations also report far more balanced
reporting and media treatment of candidate parties and blocs
than in 2004.
Herbst