UKRAINE: MARCH 26 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS -- CAN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 KIEV 001154

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV ETRD
SUBJECT: UKRAINE: MARCH 26 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS -- CAN
THE ORANGE PICK ITSELF BACK OFF THE GROUND?


Classified By: Ambassador for reasons 1.4(a,b,d).


1. (C) Summary: The March 26 parliamentary elections are
lining up to be judged free and fair, despite flaws. The
campaign was marred by none (or very, very few) of the Kuchma
government behavior that seriously eroded confidence in how
the fall 2004 presidential elections would be conducted.
Administrative problems, such as chronically inaccurate voter
lists and scattered polling station commission inadequacies,
will blemish election day, but should not subvert the overall
political will of the Ukrainian electorate. Election day
provocations and post-election day legal battles may also
complicate the Central Election Commission's task of tallying
the vote, but no credible observers have suggested that these
obstacles cannot be overcome. Concurrent local elections may
be where the most problems occur.


2. (C) We predict a vote outcome of over 30 percent for
ex-Kuchma PM Yanukovych's Regions Party and 15-20 percent
each for President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine bloc and
ex-Orange PM Tymoshenko's eponymous bloc (BYuT). The
turn-out for second- and third-tier parties -- Socialists,
Communists, Speaker Lytvyn's bloc and others representing a
very wide political spectrum -- will be an important as they
may play a king-making role in the all-important Rada
majority coalition talks that will consume the first days and
possibly weeks of the new Rada. A re-alliance of the major
forces of the Orange Revolution -- Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and
Socialist Moroz -- is one of the two most likely outcomes. A
Yushchenko-Yanukovych coalition is the other. A
Yanukovych-Tymoshenko coalition can not be excluded. An
anti-Orange coalition of Blue, Red and other elements, if the
voters make that possible Sunday, would be the worst result
for Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic prospects; it is the least
possible coalition outcome. We should be fully prepared to
work with whatever coalition emerges from the coming weeks'
political haymaking. If no majority can be formed, we may be
looking at new elections this summer. End summary.

The Process
--------------


3. (C) The March 26 Rada (parliamentary) and local elections
offer the Ukrainian people the chance to freely express their
political views and are an opportunity for the post-Orange
Revolution government led by President Viktor Yushchenko to
make manifest its democratic bona fides. From what we have
seen, both of these opportunities will be fully realized as
the election as a whole will be judged free and fair, despite
problems. The campaign, in sharp contrast to the year-long
lead-up to the fall 2004 presidential election here, has been
Ukraine's freest and fairest in years. All sides have been
able to compete for voter loyalty without hindrance. Parties
and blocs of parties have been able to travel and promote
their product freely. The Yushchenko government, unlike its
Kuchma-led predecessor, issued no "or else" guidance to media
outlets, which in turn displayed much less bias than in the
past. Analysis suggests media ownership still played a role
in political coverage, with the little watched or read
state-owned media favoring President Yushchenko's Our Ukraine
bloc and privately-owed media hewing more closely to their
bosses' preferences. Still, even in these cases, the
reportage was much more balanced than in 2004.


4. (C) Election day itself will be messy, but democratic.
The Yushchenko government has not proven itself efficient in
many endeavors, and the administration of this election is no
exception. Voter lists are inaccurate; polling station
commissions have not all opened on time; and several
revisions to the electoral law over the past year, including
as late as March 17, have no doubt sowed confusion. That
said, the GOU is not solely to blame for these ills. Voter
lists have long been a problem. Many polling station
commissions (PSCs) lacked a quorum because smaller parties
entitled to seats did not provide the necessary bodies. The
independent Rada, often under the control of shifting,
anti-government, situational majorities, has not been a tool
of the Presidency. Nor did the Rada have its own act
together; democracy, difficult anywhere, remains a somewhat
new phenomenon here. The procedural problems, although real
and unfortunate, should not be so great as to suggest the
overall vote was flawed. In another major difference from
2004, there is no evidence (allegations, yes; evidence, no)
that the central government has set out to manipulate these
weakness or any others to skew the outcome. The vote count
of the local and regional elections may see more problems
than the national parliamentary returns, especially if
observers do not manage to stay in place in the long process
that will likely follow the already long process of tallying
the national vote.


5. (C) Sunday's vote may also be marred by heightened
political passions and intentional provocations that could
lead to ugly, even violent scenes in places. Most of the
parties and blocs, whether with or without much hope of
entering the Rada over the three-percent threshold, have
engaged in a vehement and vociferous political fight. The
September 2005 split between erstwhile allies Yushchenko and
ex-Orange PM Yuliya Tymoshenko has been getting deeper and
wider, despite talk (dreams?) of a post-election re-formation
of the "Maidan team" (shorthand for the political forces that
joined on Kiev's Independence Square to resist the
Kuchma-Yanukovych efforts of 2004 to "win" the presidential
election by hook or by crook). When not spitting on each
other, many Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko bloc (BYuT)
representatives have spared little energy in attacking their
"Blue" opponent, Yanukovych's Party of Regions (again,
despite behind the scenes feelers of possible post-election
coalescing).


6. (C) Meanwhile, the lesser parties (Socialists, Communists,
Speaker Lytvvn's bloc, Kuchma-crony party SDPU(o),radical
Progressive Socialist Vitrenko, a progressive PRP-PORA bloc,
and the independent Orange rightist party of Kostenko) have
in many cases been busy spewing their own venom in this
largely negative campaign. It is not at all out of the
question that some groups, with little to no hope of entering
parliament and wanting nothing more than to blacken the
Yushchenko team's eye (and sully the Orange Revolution that
deposed them),will incite actions that could mar the vote.
Violence or purposefully improper electoral acts at a polling
station could cause that PSC's vote to be disqualified.
Nuisance lawsuits over some of the procedural problems noted
above could tie up final elections results for some time.
Luckily, tens of thousands of election monitors (both
international and more importantly domestic, the latter
including media reps, party representatives and, for the
first time, non-partisan domestic NGO observers) will be
present at the more than 34,000 PSCs that dot the country.

The Results
--------------


7. (C) Polls over the last several months have consistently
pointed to an electoral result that will give a Rada
plurality (of about 30 percent) to Yanukovych and his eastern
Ukraine-based Party of Regions. While such a result does
indicate a remarkable amount of staying power for the most
visible loser of the Orange Revolution, it does not represent
some kind of dramatic reversal of Ukrainian public opinion.
In the December 2004 presidential revote, deemed acceptably
free and fair, Yanukovych received 44 percent in the two-way
race; Yushchenko received 52 percent (the remainder were
spoiled ballots or "against all" votes). If you aggregate
the latest poll findings into roughly Blue and Orange camps,
Blue (Regions, Communists, Lytvyn's bloc, Vitrenko, Ne Tak)
garners 42 percent support, while Orange (Our Ukraine,
Tymoshenko, Socialist, PORA-PRP) takes 49 percent, among
likely voters. The nine-percent undecided vote, according to
some analysis, were mostly Orange supporters in 2004, but
even if the undecideds split three ways into Orange, Blue and
abstention, that puts the totals at almost exactly the
December 2004 numbers.


8. (C) Barring major disruptions to the vote, the outcome
should give roughly 30-plus percent of the vote to Regions,
15-20 percent each to Our Ukraine and Tymoshenko blocs, and
5-10 percent to the Socialists. Those seem to be the only
sure bets to overcome the 3-percent threshold into the Rada.
Communists and Lytyvn's bloc seem likely to receive just over
3 percent, while the SDPU(o)-led Ne Tak, progressive
PORA-PRP, radical Vitrenko-led and rightist Kostenko-Plyushch
blocs have been hovering right at or just below 3 percent.
Perhaps more important even than an extra one or two percent
of the vote would be to any of the major parties/blocs would
be the entry into the Rada of any of these lesser groups that
might coalesce with one side or the other in majority
coalition talks that will dominate the first days (weeks?) of
the new Rada. For example, a PORA-PRP faction in the Rada,
with 3 percent of the seats (14) would likely add to
Yushchenko's coalition potential, whereas if PORA-PRP were to
receive, say, 2.9 percent of the vote and not enter the Rada,
that percentage in effect gets divided up, proportionally,
among the parties/blocs that do get in (i.e., adding less
than 3 percentage points to Orange forces).


9. (SBU) If only the top six parties/blocs get into the Rada,
the seats will be roughly divided up in one of the following
two ways:

(If Orange forces do relatively well)
--------------
Regions (30% of the vote) 154
Our Ukraine (20%) 103
Tymoshenko (20%) 103
Socialists (7.5%) 38
Communists (5%) 26
Lytvyn (5%) 26
Parties not reaching 3% (12.5%) 0
--------------
Total (100%) 450

or

(if Regions does relatively well)
--------------
Regions (35% of the vote) 180
Our Ukraine (17.5%) 90
Tymoshenko (17.5%) 90
Socialists (7.5%) 38
Communists (5%) 26
Lytvyn (5%) 26
Parties not reaching 3% (12.5%) 0
--------------
Total (100%) 450

Such a result would represent a huge boost in Rada seats for
"Blue" Regions (currently 60),but also an improvement for
Orange forces (currently around 150). Parties that will have
dropped dramatically or disappeared altogether from the Rada
include the Communists (currently 56),SDPU(o) (19),
unaffiliated deputies (31) and a host of other assorted,
mostly anti-Orange or ambivalent leftover factions from the
Kuchma era.

What the results will mean
--------------


10. (C) Assuming that the elections proceed with minimal
hiccups and that post-election law suits by bitter losing
parties do not delay final results too long, we can expect to
get to the real business of the elections as soon as the
polls close: forging a Rada majority coalition and forming a
new government. As reported reftel, constitutional reforms
that took effect January 1 require that a majority in the new
Rada select a new Prime Minister, who will in turn take the
lead on forming a new Cabinet (with the prominent exception
of Defense and Foreign Ministers, Security Service (SBU)
chief, and Prosecutor General). Based on the above estimates
of Rada seat allocation, various coalition permutations are
quite possible, but the leading likelihood remains a
pro-reform re-alliance of the Orange
Yushchenko-Tymoshenko-Socialist team. Polling shows a
re-formed Orange alliance to be the most popular among
voters, 34 percent, as compared to 21 percent for a
Region-Communist-Lytvyn arrangement and only 6 percent for an
Our Ukraine-Regions marriage.


11. (C) Despite continued mutual personal vitriol at various
levels of the Yushchenko and Tymoshenko organizations, talks
continue about a coalition deal. Foreign Minister Tarasyuk
confirmed to Ambassador March 24 that the sides had almost
reached agreement the day before, when Tymoshenko decided to
wait until 10 pm election day to ink the deal (septel).
Tymoshenko foreign policy adviser Hryhoriy Nemyrya confirmed
to DCM March 24 that the sides were talking, but said no deal
would be closed until Tymoshenko had an idea as to how she
did at the polls Sunday. Such an outcome would bode best for
Ukraine's pace of Euro-Atlantic integration, though it would
potentially revisit clashing economic philosophies on display
in 2005.


12. (C) Yushchenko could find it easier, even if distasteful
and perhaps a sharp blow to his own popularity, to join
parliamentary forces with Party of Regions leader Yanukovych,
the once-reviled candidate of the Kuchma camp in the 2004
presidential elections; easier because Yanukovych is more
predictable than the "fiery" Tymoshenko, and also because
only two blocs would be needed to form the majority. Talks
between the sides have been intermittent, with many a public
statement by the two sides' representatives denying the
possibility of such an alliance (perhaps with an eye on the
low popularity of such a deal). At the very least, the
threat of a coalition with Yanukovych is something Yushchenko
can brandish in his talks with Tymoshenko. A Yushchenko deal
with Regions would bring in a government with which we could
work, but which might slow-track some Euro-Atlantic vectors.


13. (C) One key factor in determining whether Yushchenko
partners with Yanukovych or Tymoshenko will be will be the
relative showing of Our Ukraine and BYuT. In the
negotiations, the two parties appear to have agreed that the
side that does better in the elections will get to choose the
PM. If Our Ukraine finishes ahead of BYuT, the odds on
Tymoshenko demanding the PM slot considerably diminish. This
should make it easier for Yushchenko to accept a coalition
with BYuT.

14. (C) The least likely pairing among this threesome would
be Tymoshenko and Yanukovych. Overcoming mutual distrust and
personal distaste would be very difficult. However, were
both unable to reach a deal with Yushchenko and company, they
would be left to consider their mutual interests in regaining
influence over the government (whatever their conflicting
motivations and policy orientation). Of the three major
likelihoods, such an outcome would be worst for U.S.
interests, as the Yushchenko team's pro-reform, pro-West
policies would be seriously derailed. Even if macroeconomic
policies did not suffer too much, the prospects of
market-oriented reform could be dimmer. Moreover,
significantly increased corruption would seriously affect
their impact. NATO membership would lose even lip service
support, while EU membership might remain a stated goal, but
would be less vigorously pursued.


15. (C) Two other coalition possibilities are worth
mentioning. If some past opinion polls turn out to be
accurate, there is a potential majority coalition that would
involve Regions, but neither Yushchenko nor Tymoshenko's
blocs. While unlikely, the March vote could result in a
majority of Rada seats going to some combination of Regions,
Speaker Lytvyn's bloc, Communists, ex-President Kravchuk's Ne
Tak coalition, and/or radical Socialist Vitrenko's group.
While such a coalition would require bringing together a
diverse group, all but perhaps the last of these forces are
driven more by a hunger for power (and spoils) rather than
ideology. The attraction of an undiluted anti-Orange
coalition might drive the groups together. Foreign policy
directions would turn even more toward Moscow. Even the
specter of a reversal of some civil society gains would
threaten, although most observers think that the civic
freedoms cat cannot be put back in the bag.

Doing it all over again?
--------------


16. (C) Finally, it is conceivable that the forces that make
it into the Rada in the March elections will not be able to
make the compromises necessary to form a majority.
Constitutionally, they have 30 days after taking their seats
to form a majority and 60 days after the divestiture of
powers of the Cabinet to appoint a new Cabinet (presumably
early in the new Rada session). If they fail to do so, the
President, after consultations with the Rada and Rada faction
leadership, may dismiss the Rada, and new elections are to be
held within 60 days. Presumably, for this to happen,
significant forces would have to calculate that they could do
better in new elections.

U.S. approach
--------------


17. (C) We will be watching carefully the March 26 vote, as
well as the behavior of all sides in the aftermath. Our
approach should be to continue to support a pro-reform
coalition. With the unlikely exception of a majority
coalition that excluded both Yushchenko's and Tymoshenko's
forces, the USG should be able to work with the government
put together by the majority that eventually emerges. The
elections will determine in the near-to-medium term the
overall pace of Ukraine's own progress in Euro-Atlantic
integration, but, as we have seen over the past year with a
purely Orange government in place, progress is unlikely to be
simple, swift, smooth and steady no matter what the results.


18. (U) Visit Embassy Kiev's classified website:
www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/kiev.
Herbst