Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM973
2006-04-24 11:55:00
UNCLASSIFIED
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:  

Written Statement of FM Lam Akol on Chad-Sudan

Tags:  PREL CD SU 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO2451
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0973/01 1141155
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 241155Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2453
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000973 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: Written Statement of FM Lam Akol on Chad-Sudan
Relations

Ref: a) Khartoum 00972, b) Khartoum 00938

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000973

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR AF/SPG
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL CD SU
SUBJECT: Written Statement of FM Lam Akol on Chad-Sudan
Relations

Ref: a) Khartoum 00972, b) Khartoum 00938


1. Summary: On April 23, Foreign Minister Lam Akol
briefed the diplomatic corps on the state of Chad-Sudan
bilateral relations. The statement cites Chad as the
source of tension in the relationship, and maintained
that Sudan did not support rebel groups against it. It
further describes the historical roots of tension in
Darfur and the two states, and identifies Chad as the
source of its own conflicts. Chad, it states, has failed
to live up to the Tripoli agreement. Sudan thanks Libya
for its role in interceding on behalf of its interests,
and in trying to resolve the differences between Chad and
Sudan. End summary.


2. During a 30-minute briefing of approximately 60
diplomats in attendance, Foreign Minister Lam Akol
outlined the state of Chadian-Sudanese relations. Ref A
details his verbal presentation; at the end of his
remarks, the MFA distributed the below text, which
provides a more detailed account of historical background
and various rebels groups.

(Begin text)

Statement by Minister of Foreign Affairs on the Briefing
Session of Foreign Diplomatic Heads of Mission
Khartoum - April 23, 2006


1. Ever since the present regime assumed power in Chad,
the Sudan government has maintained excellent relations
with it based on mutual respect and good neighborly
relations. We have adopted a strategy that prevented
hostile Chadian opposition activities be launched from
the Sudanese territories. This strategy has been
enshrined in joint Agreements that contained arrangements
for operations to patrol the common borders in
anticipation of hostile attacks by rebel groups in both
countries.


2. Furthermore, the government of Sudan has initiated
reconciliation talks between the government of Chad and
the major political and armed opposition groups in Chad,
a move that cemented the stability of the regime and the
region at large. This course of stability could have
continued has it not been for the behavior of the
government of Chad that threatened the efforts of
maintaining harmonious relations. The Chadian government
violated the already signed Agreements, suppressed
internal opposition, liquidated its leaders, e.g., Abbas
Kotti, Adama Asil, and others who were left with no

option but to return to opposition camps and launch armed
rebellion.


3. The current armed groups in Chad are targeting the
regime of Idris Deby and has no links whatsoever with the
government of Sudan. The opposition activities are
developing from different directions because of divisions
and factionalism among army personnel equipped with
weapons and machinery.

Background to the current situation

The present regime in Chad is widely based on tribalism.
The ruling tribe has constituted a purely tribal strategy
to establish the "Grand Zaghawa State" that includes the
present three Darfur states of the Sudan as an integral
part of the large dream state. The plan to implement
this strategy started as early as the year 2000 under the
leadership of the former Minister of Defense Jim Four,
who died in France as a result of an injury in the
battlefield. The Plan Implementation hence had been
delayed until the emergence of the Fur Militias in (Jebel
Marrah) in 2003, and this time Idris Debe has assumed the
leadership of this movement himself.

Many of the leadership of the rebel movements are not of
Sudanese nationality. The Sudan government is in
possession of documents that they are citizens of Chad.
Some of them are active officers in the Chadian army, to
mention a few of them:


1. Mannie Arko Minawi, the founder of Darfur Liberation
Movement, which then turned to be called Sudan liberation
Movement.


2. Tigani Salem Jero founder of the Justice and Equality
Movement is an officer in the National Guard of Chad.


KHARTOUM 00000973 002 OF 003



3. Ahmed Tugud, a leading figure in the Justice and
Equality Movement. He was an officer in the Customs
Department of Chad and now holds a British Passport. He
only had his education in the Sudan.


4. Major General Jebriel Abdelkarim, leader of the
"Reform and Development Front" who is till an officer in
the Chadian army getting his pay until this day from the
Chadian army.


5. Many more army officers of Chadian nationality are
presently fighting with rebel movements in Darfur. The
Sudan government has all the material evidence (i.e.
photos and documents) to support this.


6. 60% of the "Justice and Equality" forces are
essentially Chadian soldiers.


7. 64 soldiers of the Chadian army arrested inside the
Sudan has testified to the AU interrogating offices that
Chad is supporting the rebel movements in Darfur by
logistics, training, and armaments.


8. The Stance of Idris Deby towards Darfur crisis was
initially unclear. He started strongly supporting the
mediation to resolve the crisis, then under tribal
pressures turned his back to the mediation effort render
to render unconditional support for the rebel movements
in Darfur. At the same time he lost control of the army
when many military officers failed to identify his real
intentions towards Darfur crisis and his allegiance to
the tribe was questioned. At this juncture he decided to
render full support for the rebels of Darfur, regardless
of the effects that such stand could cause against his
statesmanship and the national interests of his country.


9. Last October Chadian forces in Abeche staged a
mutiny, after that the Chadian authorities closed their
consulate in Jenaina and ordered the Sudan Consulate in
Abeche to close and the staff was evacuated to Sudan. A
request by the Sudanese authorities to go to Ndjamena to
meet Chadian authorities on the matter was rejected by
the Chadians. The Sudanese President tried to talk on
telephone with Idris Deby and that was also refused.


10. The Chadian leadership failed to administer the
internal plight and the confrontational attitude among
the factions ad that prompted the presidency to accuse
Sudan of interference to divert attention away from the
internal problems of the government. The president of
Chad used his argument to close our Consulate in Abbashi
while the real reason for this step is to escalate his
supportive campaign for the rebels in Darfur.


11. The Sudan has documented evidence of Chadian plans
to launch offensives against Sudanese border points and
they had issued licenses for importation of arms as
military equipment from East Europe and Asia for arming
rebel forces of Darfur.


12. Many regional and bilateral attempts were made to
reconcile and normalize relations between Sudan and Chad
the last of which was the Libyan initiative culminating
in the Tripoli Agreement which laid the foundation for
security and political arrangements aiming at patrolling
the joint borders. Yet Chad had refused to deploy its
observers at the agreed border points in clear
manifestation of its reluctance for the control of the
borders lest the Sudanese observers detect the Chadian
logistical and material support for the rebel groups.


13. The government of the Sudan accepted the mediation
in Darfur crisis, despite our prior knowledge of their
flagrant support to the Darfur rebels. This fact was
proved once more when the Chad delegation in the AU Peace
and Security Council started to launch allegations
against the Sudan government instead of reporting on
their role as a mediator. They even rejected the idea of
a common political strategy between the two countries
towards their respective opposition groups, and that
demonstrates their bad intensions towards the Sudan.


14. In another attempt to reconcile the difference
between the two countries, Tripoli has invited Heads of
Security Services in Sudan, Chad and Libya last March to
follow-up implementation of Tripoli Agreement, and to
meet with President Idris Deby in Ndjamena. All parties
met in 19 March 2006 and agreed with President Deby to
terminate all forms of opposition presence in both

KHARTOUM 00000973 003 OF 003


countries under the Libyan supervision. The opposition
forces to bypass this tripartite arrangement urge their
forces to speedily move towards Adry and Abeche and
southward through Central Africa territories towards
Ndjamena, to take the lead in the recent attack.

Official stance of the Sudan:

In continuation of Sudan strategy of transparency in the
course of relations with Chad, and in our attempts to
curb the present escalation against the Sudan, it has
confined its action to a process of clarification of the
situation in Chad and its organic relationship with the
current situation in Darfur.

The Sudan will take all necessary measures to safeguard
its national interests at bilateral, regional, and
international levels. It will take all necessary
precautionary measures to defend its borders against any
possible attacks, in light of the hostile attitude of
Chad that developed in the last few days. However, the
Sudan maintains its principal stance towards the
developments in Chad as follows:


1. The government is committed, in letter and spirit, to
the Tripoli Agreement signed between the two countries
last February, including its commitment to deploy joint
military observers to the agreed upon points at the
common borders. We hope that Chad would send its
representatives to the joint military Observers.


2. The government upholds its commitment to the
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of
others and will continue to observe the good neighborly
relations.


3. The Sudan welcomes the statement issued by the AU
Peace and Security Council on 13 April 2006 on the
current situation in Chad. The statement indicates that
what is happening in Chad is an internal problem that
should be resolved through dialogue.


4. The Sudan welcomes the Libyan initiative for
reconciliation as expressed by the Libyan envoy Dr.
Eltereiki during his recent visit to Sudan. We are ready
to attend meetings of the security and political
committees as envisaged by Tripoli Agreement.


5. The Sudan continues its determination to reach a
settlement of the Darfur crisis at the on-going Abuja
negotiations, hopefully before the end of April 2006.


6. The Sudan calls on the international community to
lend full support to the on-going Peace Process in Darfur
and refrain from any actions that might discourage the
peace process.


7. We strongly condemn the occupation of the Sudan
Embassy in Ndjamena, which was engineered and directed by
the Chadian authorities, and the uncivilized behavior of
the occupants. We take this opportunity to thank the
Libyan mission in Ndjamena for their relentless efforts
that facilitated the safe return of the Embassy staff to
Khartoum

(End text)

STEINFELD