Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM708
2006-03-20 12:37:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
SPLM VIEW OF THE GNU-EAST NEGOTIATIONS
how-toVZCZCXRO5114 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0708 0791237 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 201237Z MAR 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1962 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000708
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SPLM VIEW OF THE GNU-EAST NEGOTIATIONS
REF: KHARTOUM 00941
Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000708
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SPLM VIEW OF THE GNU-EAST NEGOTIATIONS
REF: KHARTOUM 00941
Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloff spoke with Malik Agar, Minister of Investment
and SPLM member of the GNU-East negotiating team about the
stalemate in negotiations between the GNU and the Eastern
Front. Agar said the GNU needed to accomplish four things:
acknowledge the marginalization of the East, present a
negotiating package for the East, improve the
Sudanese-Eritrean relationship, and include Eritrea in
negotiations.
2. (C) Agar commented that he could not speak for the GNU,
only for the SPLM, as he had not met with Kamal Obeid,
National Congress Party (NCP) representative to the East,
since their first meeting in mid-February. Agar said his
first and only meeting with the NCP demonstrated that it was
not serious about negotiating with the Eastern Front; the NCP
had no package to offer, and did not acknowledge there was a
problem in the East. Instead, the NCP would negotiate solely
due to international pressure. At the NCP meeting, Agar said
he questioned the ability of Libya to broker an agreement and
its decision to exclude Eritrea from the process. He
suggested the NCP use the Blue Nile/South Kordofan peace
agreement as a model, and tailor the agreement to the needs
of the East. This suggestion, however, was rejected.
SPLM Troop Withdrawal from the East
--------------
3. (C) According to Agar, the SPLM has delayed withdrawing
troops from Hamesh Koreib due to logistical difficulties.
Agar denied rumors that the SPLM would not withdraw from
Hamesh Koreib until the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew
from the South; however, he did add that the SAF was
withdrawing its troops unconventionally, soldier by soldier,
instead of platoon by platoon, making it difficult to track
the exact numbers of SAF troops withdrawing from the South.
Furthermore, if there were no political solution to the East,
the SPLM might remain there to pressure the NCP to solve the
East politically rather than militarily.
4. (C) Comment: Since February, Poloff and the UN have
attempted in vain to contact Kamal Obeid, who so far has
demonstrated an unwillingness to speak with the international
community. Post will continue to try to contact Obeid to
discuss the next steps for resolving the situation of Sudan's
East.
STEINFELD
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SPLM VIEW OF THE GNU-EAST NEGOTIATIONS
REF: KHARTOUM 00941
Classified By: P/E Chief Eric Whitaker, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Poloff spoke with Malik Agar, Minister of Investment
and SPLM member of the GNU-East negotiating team about the
stalemate in negotiations between the GNU and the Eastern
Front. Agar said the GNU needed to accomplish four things:
acknowledge the marginalization of the East, present a
negotiating package for the East, improve the
Sudanese-Eritrean relationship, and include Eritrea in
negotiations.
2. (C) Agar commented that he could not speak for the GNU,
only for the SPLM, as he had not met with Kamal Obeid,
National Congress Party (NCP) representative to the East,
since their first meeting in mid-February. Agar said his
first and only meeting with the NCP demonstrated that it was
not serious about negotiating with the Eastern Front; the NCP
had no package to offer, and did not acknowledge there was a
problem in the East. Instead, the NCP would negotiate solely
due to international pressure. At the NCP meeting, Agar said
he questioned the ability of Libya to broker an agreement and
its decision to exclude Eritrea from the process. He
suggested the NCP use the Blue Nile/South Kordofan peace
agreement as a model, and tailor the agreement to the needs
of the East. This suggestion, however, was rejected.
SPLM Troop Withdrawal from the East
--------------
3. (C) According to Agar, the SPLM has delayed withdrawing
troops from Hamesh Koreib due to logistical difficulties.
Agar denied rumors that the SPLM would not withdraw from
Hamesh Koreib until the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) withdrew
from the South; however, he did add that the SAF was
withdrawing its troops unconventionally, soldier by soldier,
instead of platoon by platoon, making it difficult to track
the exact numbers of SAF troops withdrawing from the South.
Furthermore, if there were no political solution to the East,
the SPLM might remain there to pressure the NCP to solve the
East politically rather than militarily.
4. (C) Comment: Since February, Poloff and the UN have
attempted in vain to contact Kamal Obeid, who so far has
demonstrated an unwillingness to speak with the international
community. Post will continue to try to contact Obeid to
discuss the next steps for resolving the situation of Sudan's
East.
STEINFELD