Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06KHARTOUM494
2006-02-27 07:38:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Khartoum
Cable title:
SUDANESE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,S TRIP TO ERITREA
how-toVZCZCXRO9942 PP RUEHROV DE RUEHKH #0494 0580738 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 270738Z FEB 06 FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1634 INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE PRIORITY RUEHTRO/USLO TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0040
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000494
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,S TRIP TO ERITREA
Classified By: Charge Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L KHARTOUM 000494
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,S TRIP TO ERITREA
Classified By: Charge Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On February 23 Sudanese First Vice President Salva
Kiir traveled to Eritrea with a delegation that included
Director of the National Intelligence and Security Services
Salah Gosh, MFA Under Secretary Mutriff Saddiq, and SPLM-bloc
parliamentary leader Yassir Arman. Eritrean President Isaias
Afewerki insisted that he meet one-on-one with Kiir and
refused any participation by other delegation members.
2. (C) According to Saddiq and Arman, this trip was part of a
concerted effort to improve Sudan,s relations with Eritrea.
Because of the SPLM,s long-term relationship with Eritrea,
Kiir agreed to undertake the mission on behalf of the
Government of National Unity. Kiir,s talking points were
that Sudan was ready to raise its representation in Eritrea
to the ambassadorial level immediately; Sudan wanted good
relations with both Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it would not
allow its relations with one to disadvantage the other.
Sudan agreed that Eritrea (rather than Libya) could take the
lead on mediating between the Government of National Unity
and the Eastern Front. Kiir added that Sudan was committed
to a negotiated solution to the Darfur crisis and wanted
Eritrea to use its influence with the Darfur
rebels to that end.
3. (C) Comment: The Sudanese are now waiting for a response
on these points. This was Kiir's second trip to Asmara since
December 2005, and is important for several reasons: it shows
the partners in the Government of National Unity working
together for the first time on national and security policy;
it parallels other moves the government is making to secure a
negotiated solution for Darfur; and, it shows new flexibility
on the path to a solution with the Eastern Front. End
comment.
4. (U) Tripoli minimized considered.
HUME
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, DRL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016
TAGS: PREL ER SU
SUBJECT: SUDANESE FIRST VICE PRESIDENT,S TRIP TO ERITREA
Classified By: Charge Cameron Hume, Reason: Section 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) On February 23 Sudanese First Vice President Salva
Kiir traveled to Eritrea with a delegation that included
Director of the National Intelligence and Security Services
Salah Gosh, MFA Under Secretary Mutriff Saddiq, and SPLM-bloc
parliamentary leader Yassir Arman. Eritrean President Isaias
Afewerki insisted that he meet one-on-one with Kiir and
refused any participation by other delegation members.
2. (C) According to Saddiq and Arman, this trip was part of a
concerted effort to improve Sudan,s relations with Eritrea.
Because of the SPLM,s long-term relationship with Eritrea,
Kiir agreed to undertake the mission on behalf of the
Government of National Unity. Kiir,s talking points were
that Sudan was ready to raise its representation in Eritrea
to the ambassadorial level immediately; Sudan wanted good
relations with both Eritrea and Ethiopia, and it would not
allow its relations with one to disadvantage the other.
Sudan agreed that Eritrea (rather than Libya) could take the
lead on mediating between the Government of National Unity
and the Eastern Front. Kiir added that Sudan was committed
to a negotiated solution to the Darfur crisis and wanted
Eritrea to use its influence with the Darfur
rebels to that end.
3. (C) Comment: The Sudanese are now waiting for a response
on these points. This was Kiir's second trip to Asmara since
December 2005, and is important for several reasons: it shows
the partners in the Government of National Unity working
together for the first time on national and security policy;
it parallels other moves the government is making to secure a
negotiated solution for Darfur; and, it shows new flexibility
on the path to a solution with the Eastern Front. End
comment.
4. (U) Tripoli minimized considered.
HUME