DISPLACEMENT TRENDS IN DARFUR

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000474

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: DISPLACEMENT TRENDS IN DARFUR

REF: (A) Khartoum 220 (B) Khartoum 230 (C) Khartoum 178

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Summary and Comment
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1. After a relative lull in fighting and displacements
for most of 2005, November and December marked an
increase in the size and frequency of population
movements within Darfur that has yet to subside. Many
movements have resulted, in large part, from struggles
for territory and influence between the Sudanese Armed
Forces (SAF),or those loyal to them, and the Sudan
Liberation Army (SLA). This has been particularly true
in South Darfur, but other factors include continued
militia attacks on villages and internally displaced
person (IDP) camps, general harassment of civilians,
ethnically based rivalry and conflict, and National
Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD) activities in
the Kulbus corridor of West Darfur. Primary areas of
instability in which population movements have occurred
include Mershing, Shaeria, and Gereida in South Darfur
and areas of Jebel Marrah and Zalengei, West Darfur.


2. Overall, violence in Darfur is escalating to levels
not seen since 2003/2004. Field sources indicate that
insecurity may increase further given the current
posturing of armed factions. The February 14 downing of
an SAF helicopter by the SLA near Shaeria, South Darfur
makes the scenario of increased fighting more likely. In
addition, proxy fighting continues along the Sudan/Chad
border, the humanitarian implications of which remain
unknown given the lack of access. End Summary and
Comment.

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Numbers of Displaced
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3. While the numbers of displaced have been considerable
in some cases, it is important to note that recent
movements constitute a second or third displacement for
many of the affected groups. This means that the number
of newly displaced cannot simply be added to existing IDP
caseload figures to arrive at the new number of IDPs in
Darfur, as many were already included in the old figures.


4. The overall number of IDPs reported in the U.N.
Humanitarian Profile remained remarkably consistent at
approximately 1.8 million in 2005 up to the latest report
issued for November. A decrease of 70,000 from October
to November can be explained by the October 4 headcount
in Kalma camp, which brought the previous artificially
inflated figure of 163,000 down to approximately 90,000.
Available statistics do not yet reflect the periods of
increased violence and displacements, but the U.N. Office
for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA)
reported that more than 26,000 people were displaced in
South Darfur in December alone.

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Major Population Movements
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--Mershing-


5. Mershing is the site of the largest recent movement
of IDPs in Darfur. Harassment of IDPs by armed Arab
militia had been ongoing in the area for months, and IDPs
had asked repeatedly for a full-time AMIS presence in the
area. After a January 18 SLA attack on Sudanese
government police outside of Mershing that killed 4
police officers and wounded 10, Arab militia began
conducting retaliatory attacks in the following days on
Kaile IDP camp and extensive looting of Mershing market.
According to U.N. sources, Sudanese government police
supported these actions of the militia that killed four
to six people and injured an additional eight. In the
environment of fear created by the attacks, an estimated
55,000 people are believed to have fled toward the nearby
village of Menawashi between January 25 and 27. The
number of displaced included 35,000 people that had been

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living in Mershing-area IDP camps and 20,000 former
residents of Mershing town.


6. As of February 12, the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) reported that all but 1,500 of the 55,000
Mershing town residents and area IDPs in Menawashi had
returned to Mershing. Strongly motivated to encourage
returns, the Sudanese government Humanitarian Aid
Commission (HAC) met a series of demands by the IDPs,
including replacing the Mershing police commander and
police officers, integrating local police officers from
Mershing into the new police force, and organizing trucks
to facilitate the return. In addition, African Union
Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Civilian Police (CIVPOL)
established a base in Mershing and the AMIS protection
force increased the frequency of their patrols. IOM is
also verifying a non-governmental organization (NGO)
report of the arrival of approximately 200 families from
Mershing in Otash camp outside of Nyala.


7. The NGO World Vision reported that looting by
Mershing-area IDPs and residents in the aftermath of the
displacement caused extensive setbacks for the
organization's programs. One fully equipped primary
health care center, five child-friendly spaces, a school,
a women's center, and the agency guesthouse in Mershing
were all completely pillaged - including the structures
themselves. World Vision and community leaders are
attempting to recover stolen goods to allow local
programs to resume operations, although this looting has
unfortunately negated many months of progress for the
organization.

--Shaeria-


8. According to U.N. sources, the situation in Shaeria,
South Darfur, is complex and involves power struggles
between the Sudanese government and the SLA, as well as
deepening enmity between the Birgit and Zaghawa ethnic
groups. The town is controlled by the government but is
located on the edge of territory controlled by the SLA.
In November, militia from the Arab Birgit ethnic group
and government soldiers reportedly began to harass and
attack non-Arab Zaghawa civilians in an effort to "defend
Shaeria" from SLA takeover due to the assumption that
Zaghawa are natural SLA sympathizers. This violence led
an initial group of approximately 400 Zaghawas to seek
protection by moving outside of the AMIS compound near
the town. SLA subsequently began retaliatory attacks on
behalf of their ethnic brethren, causing the rapid
deterioration of security and economic activity in the
area.


9. Despite an official attempt by the government to
restrict movements out of the town, as of February 12,
the NGO Solidarites reported that only 15,000 to 17,800
of the original 32,000 residents remained in Shaeria.
The displaced are scattered in a number of locations.
More than 10,000 people believed to have come from
Shaeria have recently arrived in Wada'a, North Darfur,
and thousands more are thought to be scattered in the
countryside between Shaeria and the towns of Muhajiriya
and Labado. Some Shaeria IDPs have made it as far as the
North and South Darfur state capitols of El Fasher and
Nyala. As of February 14, the number of Zaghawa citizens
living in the vicinity of the AMIS compound outside of
Shaeria had risen to as many as 1,000.


10. On January 25, the Sudanese government conducted an
aerial attack approximately 10 kilometers east of Shaeria
in an apparent attempt to drive back the SLA. While many
IDPs were believed to be living in the area, the number
of causalities and the humanitarian needs remains unknown
because assessments cannot be carried out until the area
is cleared of unexploded ordnance by AMIS troops. As a
result of this event, Medecins Sans Frontieres-Holland
(MSF-H) and Solidarites evacuated staff on January 26,
leaving no international humanitarian presence in
Shaeria. Furthermore, on February 14, as the SAF again
shelled the area east of Shaeria, the SLA shot down an
SAF helicopter, leaving many to anticipate further
hostilities resulting from retaliation.

KHARTOUM 00000474 003 OF 004



--Gereida-


11. The U.N. reported that as many of 20,000 IDPs fled
to Gereida from surrounding areas during November when,
according to AMIS reports, militias looted and burned 26
area villages. This movement increased the total number
of IDPs in Gereida to 63,000. Problems in the region
began between the Fellata and Masalit ethnic groups, and
ensuing fighting involved numerous factions including the
Sudanese government, SLA, JEM, and Fellata and Masalit
militia. In late December, SLA forces took control of
the town. According to ICRC who is in the process of
verifying the number of new IDPs, the IDP population in
Gereida has grown to between 80,000 and 90,000 as of mid
February. OXFAM reports that new IDP families are
arriving in Gereida daily.


12. Gereida is reported to be tense and additional
violence remains likely, with large numbers of armed
nomads amassed in the area (reftel A, reftel B). AMIS
reported that it is cooperating with the South Darfur
Wali to implement a peace process in Gereida with the
Fullata, Masalit, Reizegat, and Habaniya ethnic groups.
One of the principles of the process is that all militias
should withdraw from Gereida; however, it is doubtful
that the SLA will agree to do so.


13. Related to the situation in Gereida is the nearby
town of Donkey Dereissa, which the SLA took control of on
December 6. As a result of the heavy fighting, nearly
all people from Donkey Derieda are believed to have fled.
The U.N. Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)
estimated a total of approximately 6,500 people had fled
in the direction of Unkunya and scattered as far north as
Kalma Camp.

--Jebel Marrah-


14. Jebel Marrah is a location of long-standing friction
between government and SLA forces. U.N. sources report
that clashes between the SAF and the SLA on December 24
resulted in two new groups of IDPs totaling an estimated
21,000 people near Daya in the Rokoro locality of Jebel
Marrah. An estimated 10,000 IDPs took refuge in Tibon
village; and the populations in nine villages near Kia
accommodated approximately 5,000 IDPs and an additional
6,000 took shelter in the surrounding mountains.


15. On January 23, SLA forces entered Golo town and
engaged in heavy fighting with SAF troops (reftel C).
The NGOs GOAL, MSF-Spain, and Danish Refugee Council
(DRC) evacuated by road with assistance from AMIS troops
after being unable to secure assurances of safe passage
by the two armed groups. It remains unknown, largely due
to the absence of the humanitarian community, whether the
fighting resulted in the displacement of civilians. On
January 25, GOAL also evacuated staff from Daya as a
precautionary measure due to the likelihood of conflict.
However, a technical malfunction caused the U.N.
evacuation helicopter to crash, killing one national
staff member.

--Zalengei--


16. From December 13 to 15, heavy fighting between two
Arab ethnic groups, the Jamala and the Bagara, displaced
more than 8,500 people near Nyangadula in the Abata
locality of West Darfur. (Note: Nyangadula is located
approximately 40 km north of Zalengei and in the vicinity
of Golo. End note.) According to a USAID NGO partner,
the violence resulted in the displacement of both Bagara
and Fur populations south to Zalengei, and Jamalas to
Saraf Omra in North Darfur. Fur communities were
generally not involved in the fighting but fled the area
largely to avoid being drawn in to the fighting on the
side of the Bagara, who had previously provided the Fur
with security from other Arab groups.


17. According to NGO reports, nearly 2,500 Fur IDPs
settled in the existing Hamidiya camp and nearly 3,800
Bagara Arabs settled in a new camp in the Taiba area just

KHARTOUM 00000474 004 OF 004


outside Zalengei. In addition, a portion of the
displaced established shelters near the AMIS Sector 7
Headquarters in Zalengei. An estimated 2,500 Jamala
arrived in Saraf Omra. As of January 23, the U.N. World
Food Program (WFP) reported that 10 percent of those
displaced to Saraf Omra had returned to their communities
of origin in West Darfur.

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Future Displacements and Humanitarian Response
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18. A general trend is beginning to emerge in which
recent sites of large displacements have shared strong
similarities in the lead up to events. In particular, it
has often been in locations near where government- and
SLA-held territory border and where SLA often agitate or
orchestrate low-level attacks on government targets such
as police stations or SAF vehicle convoys. Arab
militias, in turn, retaliate on behalf of the government
with increasing proxy attacks against individual
civilians, then escalate to general looting and attacks
on civilian centers in IDP camps or towns, and eventually
heighten insecurity to a point at which civilians flee in
large number. As one example, Kutum, North Darfur, is
increasingly worrisome when viewed in this light.
Following multiple small-scale events including an attack
on the Head of Military Intelligence, presumably by the
SLA, Arab militia entered Kutum town and fired on
civilians on February 12, injuring three and killing one.
General fear and insecurity are increasing in the nearby
IDP camps of Kutum and Fata Borno, with rumors of larger
attacks looming.


19. Given that security is continuing to trend downward,
USAID's Darfur Field Office expects to see significantly
more displacements in the coming weeks and months. This
increased IDP caseload will place an even larger response
burden on the humanitarian community in this time of
extremely difficult access. In addition to ongoing
hotspots likely to produce large IDP movements, localized
attacks and displacement continue largely unreported.
This level of violence is a marked increase over last
year and reminiscent of 2003/2004.

HUME