Darfur: Overview of Protection Trends in 2005

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KHARTOUM 000424

SIPDIS

AIDAC
SIPDIS

STATE FOR AF/SPG, PRM, DRL, AND ALSO PASS USAID/W
USAID FOR DCHA SUDAN TEAM, AF/EA, DCHA
NAIROBI FOR USAID/DCHA/OFDA, USAID/REDSO, AND FAS
USMISSION UN ROME
GENEVA FOR NKYLOH
NAIROBI FOR SFO
NSC FOR JMELINE, TSHORTLEY
USUN FOR TMALY
BRUSSELS FOR PLERNER

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: EAID PREF PGOV PHUM SOCI KAWC SU
SUBJECT: Darfur: Overview of Protection Trends in 2005
- the NGO Response

REF: (A) Khartoum 272, (B) Khartoum 308

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Summary
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1. This cable represents the third and final in a series
to review the issue of protection and the related
humanitarian response in 2005. In the Darfur crisis,
humanitarian protection - defined as efforts to mitigate
the risks of violence, abuse, harassment, or exploitation
of vulnerable groups - is one of the most vital
components of the international response. The first two
cables outlined trends in protection issues and the
general international response; this cable will briefly
outline the specific contributions and programs of the
non-governmental organization (NGO) community relating to
protection in Darfur. Through their extensive field
presence, NGOs are carrying out the largest portion of
protection activities, translating concepts into action
to help the most vulnerable individuals and groups in
Darfur. Protection programs work to meet the basic needs
of project beneficiaries and simultaneously reduce the
threat of violence to civilian populations; examples
include responding to rape, livelihoods interventions
that mitigate the risk of sexual violence, legal aid, and
programs that meet the needs of children. In addition to
implementing programs, NGOs also serve as the primary
information source for the humanitarian community about
conditions on the ground throughout Darfur. End Summary.

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Response to Rape and Sexual Violence
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2. Rape and other forms of sexual- and gender-based
violence (SGBV) have been the leading protection issue
threatening war-affected women and children in Darfur.
Since 2004, human rights groups, the U.N., and NGOs have
extensively documented the extent of the violence across
the region, and USAID responded by funding a significant
number of activities in 2004 and 2005 to mitigate these
abuses. Following a July 2005 visit by U.S. Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice, USAID augmented resources and
launched the USD 15 million Combating Violence Against
Women Initiative (VAW). One of the important activities
implemented in the initiative is the provision of
specialized medical treatment for victims of rape and
other forms of sexual assault, referral for more
extensive medical needs, counseling, legal assistance,
women's focus groups, and information dissemination
networks.


3. The work of the health clinics delivering services to
victims of GBV has been seriously handicapped by the
Sudanese law that requires victims to file a "Form 8"
with police in order to access medical care or pursue
legal action. Sudanese government authorities often
harassed and intimidated international and Sudanese
humanitarian workers who provided care to victims of
sexual assault and who had not completed the form.
Through extensive advocacy (reftel),the Sudanese
government lifted this requirement in October 2005. In
practice, however, local health care providers and police
are often unaware of the reforms or are unwilling to
accept the new policy. In November, the Sudanese
government certified the International Rescue Committee
(IRC),USAID's largest partner in Darfur, to complete the
Form 8 themselves in order to allow rape survivors to
launch a criminal complaint. This was an extraordinary
step taken by the government in recognizing the
competency of an NGO to complete a document that becomes
part of the official record of a criminal complaint/case.
It is also a strong commentary on the success of the
international community's advocacy on this issue.


4. While the authorization represents progress, much
more work needs to be done to ensure comprehensive
application of the new procedures. NGO staff continue to
express reservations about offering women the option to
file a Form 8 for the purpose of pressing charges either

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out of fear of harassment or because they worry it will
place undue pressure on women to report incidents to the
police. (Comment: NGOs should not preclude women from
making their own decisions by withholding information on
possible courses of action. Despite an abysmal
prosecution record regarding rape in Darfur, there is no
pressure on authorities to improve their prosecution
record without rape victims filing cases. End comment.)

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Mitigation
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5. NGO protection programs work not only to respond to
incidents of violence, but also to prevent them. Camp-
based income generation projects such as mat weaving,
poultry raising, fuel-efficient stove making, and other
craft and food production reduce the need for women to
travel outside the security of the camp or community to
collect firewood or seek employment.


6. Several partners also provide instruction and
materials to construct fuel-efficient stoves, which are
designed to require less fuel wood, thereby reducing the
frequency of wood gathering and the accompanying risk of
attack. However, the actual protective qualities of this
intervention remain in question. Survey results from one
partner NGO indicate that its fuel-efficient stove
program has resulted in a reduction of the amount of time
spent collecting household fuel, from seven days a week
to three days. Other partners, however, have observed
that women may adopt the use of fuel-efficient stoves,
but continue to collect fuel wood at the same rate and
sell the excess for income, thus maintaining the same
exposure to attack.


7. Another method of mitigating attack on women and
girls during firewood collection has been the firewood
patrols organized by NGOs and carried out by the African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) civilian police (CIVPOL)
and Sudanese government police. In theory, the idea of
firewood patrols is very straightforward, but in practice
the involvement of NGOs is necessary to keep AMIS and
government police on schedule and to communicate with
beneficiaries. In Kalma camp, the firewood patrols
facilitated by the NGO Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC)
have made a dramatic difference in reducing the attacks
on women collecting firewood. NRC staff members travel
to the point of departure three times a week to meet with
the women's firewood committee and often attempt to
persuade them to wait for the AMIS and government forces.
The patrols have been consistently late, according to
NRC, because the Sudanese government police lack a
vehicle, officers, or simply fail to show.

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Legal Aid and Related Protection Programs
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8. With support from the U.N. Development Program
(UNDP),IRC conducts training in international
humanitarian law for Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and Arab
militia combatants and provides legal assistance
to internally displaced persons (IDPs). NGOs also engage
in family tracing to unite minors separated from family
members during displacement and collaborate with the U.N.
Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the U.N. Population Fund
(UNFPA) to conduct human rights and sexual- and gender-
based violence training for Sudanese government police
and other authorities.


9. Legal aid and legal rights awareness activities have
become an integral part of the protection response in
Darfur. USAID has been a lead supporter of an increase
in legal aid and legal rights awareness activities during
the past six months. Current interventions help to build
the capacity and coordination of a newly developed Darfur
Legal Aid Network; cover case fees for conflict-affected
persons who have been victims of violence and human
rights abuses; provide equipment and program support to
legal aid organizations; and support legal rights

KHARTOUM 00000424 003 OF 004


awareness workshops and paralegal trainings for IDPs.

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Camp Coordination
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10. In the beginning of the Darfur crisis, the Sudanese
government Humanitarian Affairs Commission (HAC) was the
only camp management entity, and no one organization was
coordinating humanitarian activities. To supplement HAC
management, the donor community began to fund camp
coordinators to ensure sectoral coverage, rationalize
service provision, share information about the camp, and
enhance protection. Many camps coordinators organize
regular protection working group meetings that provide
fora for the development, implementation, management, and
monitoring of local protection strategies.


11. Camp coordination activities can include training on
practical protection activities such as monitoring and
reporting, basic human rights, and the Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement. Protection monitoring is
important in identifying vulnerable groups and their
needs, improving understanding of socio-political
dynamics and trends affecting IDPs, and referring human
rights and international law violations to the U.N. for
investigation. It is often the NGO acting as camp
coordinator that provides the "big picture" on protection
issues, communicates this to U.N. agencies, and advocates
for changes with local authorities. Some NGOs that only
implement programs in health or income-generation will
often not want to put their specific program at risk by
sharing information. In this case, the camp coordinator
can raise issues with authorities, the IDP population,
and U.N. agencies.

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Child Protection
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12. With focus placed on responding to women's violence
and meeting basic humanitarian needs in Darfur, the
international community allocated fewer resources to
supporting children's protection activities in 2005.
Save the Children/U.S. and IRC currently operate child
safe centers and protection programming for children.
These programs, however, primarily provide safe havens
for play, and additional programs are needed such as
greater psychosocial support, educational opportunities,
and job skills training. Despite limited resources, NGOs
specializing in child protection began work very early in
the crisis, and children in camps are receiving primary
education that would be largely unavailable in their
villages of origin.

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Presence
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13. In the beginning of the conflict, the international
community sought to provide protection first and foremost
by increasing their physical presence across Darfur.
This continues to be a strategy employed in the
protection response because some argue that the presence
of international actors allows them to witness events and
deter those who perpetrate violence in Darfur - although
the magnitude of benefit is often debated. In 2005, some
NGO partners expanded operations in previously
underserved areas such as the Al Deain locality of South
Darfur, the Kulbus corridor and Wadi Saleh locality of
West Darfur, and the area surrounding Fata Borno in North
Darfur. In 2005, USAID supported 14 NGO partners to
implement some 400 different projects in 190 IDP
locations in Darfur. However, presence remained limited
in many other areas, particularly those controlled by the
SLA and other opposition groups. Where operational,
humanitarian workers are in a position to be in daily
contact with affected communities and local government
authorities, allowing them to directly monitor human
rights abuses. NGOs use this knowledge of local dynamics
to design and administer programs in multiple sectors

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that work to meet the needs of communities while
addressing protection concerns.

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Comment
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14. Security remains the overriding threat to programs
addressing the needs of conflict-affected communities in
Darfur, including the enhancement of protection. In
addition, bureaucratic impediments imposed by the
Sudanese government appear to be targeting particular
sectors such as women's health and legal assistance.


15. If large budget reductions remain throughout the
year ahead, the specific implications for protection
programming may be more severe than other sectors. The
reason for this is that several organizations with a weak
or modest protection capacity may phase out that aspect
of operations if forced to reduce costs and prioritize
responses. While some NGO staff working primarily in
other sectors remain cognizant of protection concerns,
efforts to mainstream protection will suffer if NGOs no
longer retain staff dedicated to this purpose.


16. Even if the security situation were to stabilize,
funding limitations may also impact the ability of NGOs
to maintain substantial operations in rural communities.
This decreased geographic presence would diminish
response capacity and reduce access to potentially
vulnerable populations. Abuses in such locations may
increase, as perpetrators feel emboldened by the absence
of the international community.

HUME